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Home / Work Products

by on May 24, 2022

The High Costs of Growing Corn: How Growers are Squeezed by High Input Prices That Are Set by the Fertilizer Oligopoly

In this podcast, AAI President Diana Moss talks with two experts about corn, a leading U.S. crop. Many growers now face serious margin “squeezes.” They pay higher and higher prices to powerful oligopolies for inputs that are necessary to grow their crops. But growers then sell into markets where commodity prices are also often controlled by only a few firms, such as in animal proteins, and are subject to significant commodity price fluctuations. This episode of Ruled by Reason will focus on how growers are paying high prices for nitrogen fertilizer, a major input for growing corn. Economic studies, including a recent one authored by Dr. Joe Outlaw, a guest on this podcast, raise serious concerns about fertilizer prices. These prices have been set for years by a small group of powerful, global fertilizer producers. Other studies, including one done by AAI, indicate the likelihood that fertilizer producers more likely coordinate with each other, rather than compete. Anticompetitive fertilizer prices hurt corn growers and consumers, and imperil the stability and integrity of a vital agricultural supply chain. The podcast discussion touches on issues relating to the importance of fertilizer for growing corn for its many uses, how corn and fertilizer prices are related, the power of the fertilizer oligopoly, and how international trade issues exacerbate the situation.

 

MODERATOR:

Diana Moss, President, American Antitrust Institute

 

GUESTS:

Dee Vaughan is a Texas-based corn, cotton, sorghum seed, and wheat grower and a long-time, proactive supporter of Texas and U.S. agriculture. He currently serves as a director of the Texas Corn Producers Association, the Texas Corn Producers Board, and the Southwest Council of Agribusiness. Mr. Vaughan has worked extensively on policy and regulatory issues in the areas of farm policy, energy, transportation, and trade.

 

 

 

Dr. Joe Outlaw is a Regents Fellow, Professor and Extension Economist in the Department of Agricultural Economics at Texas A&M University. He also serves there as the Co-Director of the Agricultural and Food Policy Center. Dr. Outlaw’s research is focused on assessing the impacts of farm programs, risk management tools, renewable energy, and climate change legislation on U.S. agricultural operations.

 

 

 

 

by on May 24, 2022

Antitrust Experts Review New Data on Private U.S. Antitrust Enforcement, Identify COVID-19 Implications and Key Statistical Trends

The American Antitrust Institute and Professor Joshua P. Davis of the UC Hastings College of Law and the Berger Montague firm have released a Commentary on the Huntington National Bank and UC Hastings 2021 Antitrust Annual Report: Class Action Filings in Federal Court (2021 Report). The goal of the Commentary, The Role of Private Antitrust Enforcement in a Time of Change, is to identify major implications for private enforcement in the United States. Like the 2018, 2019 and 2020 Reports, the 2021 Report relies largely on data for private U.S. antitrust class actions available through Lex Machina, as well as supplemental data analysis. The 2021 Report extends the dataset to the thirteen-year period covering 2009-2021, thus allowing for a deeper analysis of private enforcement trends and their implications. The analysis provided in the AAI-UC Hastings Commentary highlights the importance of private antitrust enforcement in the U.S. system and the particularly important role played by the antitrust class action.

The Commentary makes several observations based on the new data and discusses potential implications for private enforcement. After three years of the COVID-19 pandemic, we may be seeing the virus’s impact on the timing of antitrust enforcement actions and their resolution. With consolidated antitrust class action filings down 40% from 2020 to 2021 and settlements also down according to both quantitative and qualitative metrics, not to mention a key indicator of delay—the time from the initial filing of a complaint to the order granting final settlement approval—trending upward, there are reasons to suspect the pandemic has taken its toll on private enforcement. In particular, we might note that the pandemic caused federal courts to suspend and delay trials, especially jury trials. That could explain why the time increased to resolve litigation, why the number of settlements decreased, or other apparent patterns. The data raise a number of questions, however, and further study is required.  To fully appreciate the pandemic’s effect on private enforcement, a more granular analysis of the data would be needed to address patterns in proportional sizes of settlements, the influence of settlement size and the imminence of trial on case resolution, fluctuations in mean and median settlement amounts, and other factors.

The Commentary also discusses how new data in the 2021 report informs trends we have been monitoring over time.  It observes that the average annual rate of change in filings shows variability over time. For example, based on data from 2009-2019, the average annual change in total filings was about 15% per year. But based on data from 2009-2020, this rate dipped slightly to about 14% per year. And for the 2009-2021 data, the rate fell even more to about 9% per year. The possible slowdown in filings may be accompanied by a more arduous journey through the courts as well.

Trends in the data also reveal interesting developments involving judgments on the pleadings. We see a 50% increase in filings that were decided on judgments on the pleadings from the 2009-2019 to 2009-2021 data. As a percentage of all defendant wins, this category increased by 14% with the addition of the 2020 and 2021 data. Yet the average time to resolution for those cases remained steady, at about 2.4 years. Meanwhile, at the same time, a decreasing proportion of defendants won on summary judgment. We see only about a 7% increase in filings that were decided on summary judgment between the 2009-19 to 2009-21 data. As a percentage of all defendant wins, this category decreased by almost 20% between the 2009-2019 to 2009-2021 data. It is possible this may reflect the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, as defendants and courts sought to resolve cases on the merits without trial.

Another observation is that 2021 marked a further increase in recoveries above $100 million. Past reports have shown settlements between $10-$99 million and between $100-$499 million peaking around 2018 and falling off thereafter. While the 2020 numbers in these categories were higher than the recent low point of 2019, they remained substantially below average 2014-2018 levels. The 2021 increase may indicate a trend towards a return to 2014-2018 levels, however.

Finally, the new data offers takeaways concerning trends in antitrust class actions filed on behalf of different classes of plaintiffs. The percentage of the total settlements involving direct purchasers has declined by just over 25% between the 2009-2019 and 2009-2021 data, while indirect purchases cases have increased by close to 60%. Statistics for total settlement dollars obtained in direct and indirect purchaser cases parallel these trends. For example, the percentage of total settlement dollars obtained in direct purchaser cases decreased by almost 10% from the 2009-2019 to 2009-2021 data, while those for indirect purchaser cases increased by over 45%. The possible shift admits of several potential explanations. First, it may reflect an increased preference for, or an increased rate of success under, state versus federal antitrust law.  Indirect purchaser actions for damages are permitted under the former and foreclosed by the latter. Second, the increased percentage of indirect purchaser settlements and amounts may reflect increasingly sophisticated data and statistical techniques allowing indirect purchasers to better trace the impact of anticompetitive conduct through the various levels of the market, making previously impractical suits more viable.

A third possibility is more troubling. Plaintiffs may be bringing more indirect purchaser claims—and fewer direct purchaser claims—because of judicial enthusiasm for pre-dispute mandatory arbitration clauses. Such clauses often force direct purchasers—who enter contracts with alleged antitrust violators—to pursue individual arbitration rather than collective litigation. Indirect purchasers, by contrast, often are not in contractual privity with the alleged antitrust violators and so are not subject to such arbitration clauses.

If forced arbitration does explain the shift from direct to indirect actions, that could bode poorly for antitrust enforcement. The 2021 Report shows that almost as many indirect purchaser class actions as direct purchaser class actions settled from 2009-2021—559 and 604, respectively—but the indirect purchaser class actions recovered only slightly more than one quarter as much as the direct purchaser class actions— about $6 billion as compared to about $23 billion.

Based in Washington, D.C., the American Antitrust Institute is an independent, nonprofit organization devoted to promoting competition that protects consumers, businesses, and society. It serves the public through research, education, and advocacy on the benefits of competition and the use of antitrust enforcement as a vital component of national and international competition policy.

The nonpartisan Center for Litigation and Courts (CLC) at the University of California, Hastings College of the Law was established in 2021 to expand the knowledge of civil litigation, alternative dispute resolution, and the courts; to disseminate that knowledge to the bench, bar, legal academy, and public; and to supply resources and guidance to members of the UC Hastings Law community interested in civil litigation.

by on May 24, 2022

AAI Paper Calls for Careful Analysis of Apple’s Security Justifications for App Store Restrictions to Avoid False Negatives

AAI has published a commentary on the appropriate antitrust analysis of Apple’s security-related justifications for its App Store restrictions. In Protection or Pretext? Structuring an Appropriate Antitrust Analysis of Apple’s Security Justifications for App Store Restrictions, AAI sets forth the proper allocation of evidentiary burdens and the role of less restrictive alternatives (LRAs) to assist Congress, the Biden Administration, and the federal courts, all of which are currently grappling with Apple’s restrictions and justifications in proposed legislation, investigations, or pending cases.

The commentary begins by explaining the competitive consequences of Apple’s decision to open its otherwise closed ecosystem to third-party app developers, with two key consequences for Apple. First, Apple created market competition that it must meet in order to prevent its own proprietary products and services from being displaced. Second, because Apple imposes numerous restrictions on app sales and distribution, Apple oversees this competition in the course of meeting it.  By setting and policing the privacy, security, and other terms on which independent third-party developers may sell and distribute products through the App Store, Apple serves as a quasi-regulator of the app market, and its “regulatory” policies often have important implications for competition.

The commentary then discusses the challenges that arise when private market participants possess regulatory powers in the markets where they actively compete. Drawing a limited analogy to Supreme Court state-action cases involving state governmental delegations of regulatory authority to active market participants, the commentary observes that the Court applies heightened scrutiny when there is a structural risk that a private market participant will conflate the goal of a regulatory policy with the market participant’s own self-interest in earning monopoly profits.  The Supreme Court’s analysis suggests policymakers are right to be carefully scrutinizing the security justifications for app store restrictions claimed by both Apple and Alphabet.

The commentary then discusses the nuances of allocating evidentiary burdens and analyzing LRAs in evaluating Apple’s restrictions and justifications under the rule of reason’s three-step burden-shifting approach. At step one, the plaintiff has the initial burden to prove that the challenged restraint has a substantial anticompetitive effect. At step two, if the plaintiff carries its initial burden, the burden then shifts to the defendant to show a procompetitive justification.  At step three, if the defendant carries its burden, the burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the procompetitive benefits could be reasonably achieved through less anticompetitive means.

Pretext first enters the equation at step two. Federal courts define a procompetitive justification as “a nonpretextual claim that [the defendant’s] conduct is indeed a form of competition on the merits because it involves, for example, greater efficiency or enhanced consumer appeal.” The commentary explains that the defendant, at step two, must produce evidence of a procompetitive justification that would allow a reasonable factfinder to rule out a pretextual explanation. If the defendant’s evidence of a procompetitive justification admits as easily of a pretextual explanation as not, then the defendant has not made the requisite evidentiary showing and has not carried its burden. 

Placing this burden on the defendant makes sense because the evidence of efficiencies is almost always in the defendant’s control, and the defendant is therefore in the best position to come forward with the evidence. Moreover, because the plaintiff will have already established prima facie illegality at step one, the chances of a false positive are greatly diminished. Misallocating the burden by requiring the plaintiff to produce evidence of pretext, rather than requiring the defendant to show evidence that its restrictions are reasonably necessary to achieve a legitimate objective, raises a significant risk of false negatives.

The commentary also considers the role of LRAs at step two of the rule of reason. In the Epic Games v. Apple case, the district court wrongly assumed that LRAs only have relevance at step three, after the burden has shifted back to the plaintiff to counter the defendant’s rebuttal evidence.  However, when an obvious LRA is unaccounted for the defendant’s showing at step two, before the plaintiff has had to introduce any rebuttal evidence, it prevents the defendant from carrying its burden of establishing a nonpretextual procompetitive justification. In that case, the burden should not shift back to the plaintiff; the case should end. Failing to consider the potential role of LRAs at step two can similarly manifest in the misallocation of burdens, leading to evidence being misconstrued. 

In sum, if Apple’s App Store and other similar iOS restrictions harm competition, Apple should have the burden to establish that its security justifications are nonpretextual. The burden should be to produce evidence, likely to be within Apple’s control, from which a reasonable factfinder would rule out an illicit anticompetitive strategy masquerading as a legitimate, procompetitive regulatory policy. If the evidence suggests a pretextual explanation is as likely as a nonpretextual explanation, including because it fails to account for an obvious LRA before the plaintiff has had to adduce any rebuttal evidence of an LRA at step three of the rule of reason, the restrictions should be condemned.

The commentary was written by AAI Vice President of Legal Advocacy Randy Stutz.

by on May 17, 2022

AAI Asks USDA to Weigh in on Agricultural Biotechnology, Says Growers and Consumers Feel the Effects of Harmful Mergers

AAI filed comments today in United States Department of Agriculture Docket No. AMS-AMS-22-0025, a request for information on competition in markets for seeds and other agricultural inputs to support the USDA’s response to President Biden’s July 9, 2021 executive order on competition.  AAI’s comments focus primarily on genetic seed traits and transgenic seed (“agricultural biotechnology”), and how consolidation has eroded and transformed competition in agricultural biotechnology markets.  AAI’s comments explain how unchecked consolidation over several decades has led to a tight oligopoly of three vertically integrated companies that control the markets for seeds, seed traits, and their associated pesticides, and how the growing role of farming data compounds the competition issues resulting from this market structure.

AAI’s comments break down how a lack of effective competition between the Big 3 in agricultural biotechnology, combined with the rise of genetic seed trait technology, has reduced choice and innovation in seeds and seed traits available to farmers.  Consolidation has fostered the elimination of the parallel path innovation and joint ventures that are critical to pathbreaking innovation in complex technology markets.  At the same time, as the Big 3 have bought up smaller rivals, they have removed those rivals products from the market and neutered the potential for nascent competitors to grow into true alternatives.  AAI also explains how the vertical integration of agricultural biotechnology markets has shifted competition from individual seeds and traits to competition between a limited number of integrated systems, raising barriers to entry and reducing choice.

AAI’s comments urge the USDA to both work proactively with antitrust agencies to carefully scrutinize further horizontal and vertical merger activity, particularly mergers involving nascent competitors, and to develop positive policies that will facilitate competition in these markets.  Specifically, AAI proposes that USDA work to define property rights in farming data, develop technological standards and open-source resources for interoperability between seed trait systems, and develop rules to facilitation switching and portability between large systems.

by on May 10, 2022

AAI Highlights New Multidisciplinary Analysis of Price Maintenance in the U.S., EU, and China

The article, Modernizing Competition Policy and Law: The Impact of Marketing Developments on the Legal Treatment of Price Maintenance in the United States, the European Union, and China, was published on May 9, 2022 in the Journal of Public Policy & Marketing. The article’s co-authors are Riley T. Krotz (Rawls College of Business, Texas Tech University), Gregory T. Gundlach (Coggin College of Business, University of North Florida and AAI Director and Senior Fellow), and Diana L. Moss (AAI President).

Abstract 

Competition policy and law toward price maintenance (e.g., resale price maintenance, unilateral price policies, minimum advertised prices) draws on scholarly perspectives and theory developed over a half century ago. Since that time, changes to marketing practice have caused scholars to question the practical relevance of the perspectives and theory and to call for the modernization of competition policy and law toward price maintenance. Responding to these calls, the authors examine three important developments in contemporary marketing practice and assess their impact on the legal treatment of price maintenance in the three largest economies: the United States, the European Union, and China. Their analysis reveals significant differences in how each jurisdiction is responding to (1) increasing market concentration and accompanying shifts in interfirm power, (2) advances in information technology and the commercial use of the internet, and (3) developments in cross-channel shopping and the rise of omnichannel distribution. Their findings pose implications for future public policy, marketing practice, and academic scholarship and contribute to the modernization of competition policy and law.

by on May 4, 2022

Litigation Funding Is Changing the Contours of Antitrust Class Actions in the U.S. and Abroad

In this episode, AAI Vice President of Policy Laura Alexander discusses third-party litigation funding and its impact on private antitrust class actions with two experts in the field, one of the country’s foremost litigators of antitrust class actions and a representative from a leading litigation funder with deep experience in antitrust. Antitrust class actions are expensive to bring and prosecute. Historically, plaintiffs’ lawyers have used their own assets and traditional bank loans to finance them, in a high-risk/high-reward business model.  In the last decade, however, an alternative funding model has emerged: litigation funding firms have begun financing plaintiff-side antitrust litigation for profit using non-recourse debt, shifting risk and reward from the lawyers to the funders and, in the process, changing the landscape of private antitrust litigation and class actions. The conversation starts with a primer on litigation funding, and goes on to discuss how funding decisions factor into leadership and settlement dynamics, how litigation funding impacts which cases are brought and who brings them, and how monetization of claims is changing incentives for opt outs and what that might portend for class actions. Finally, the episode concludes with an analysis of the different role that litigation funding plays in collective actions abroad, and what lessons we might draw from foreign jurisdictions for funding class actions in the U.S.

MODERATOR:

Laura Alexander, Vice President of Policy, American Antitrust Institute

 

GUESTS:

Bill Isaacson is a partner in the Litigation Department at Paul Weiss and widely considered one of the preeminent litigators of his generation. A Fellow in the American College of Trial Lawyers, Bill was named “Litigator of the Year” in 2016 by The American Lawyer. Bill has tried cases in a number of areas, including contract, commercial torts, copyright, international arbitration and antitrust. In antitrust, Bill has successfully represented both plaintiffs and defendants in major antitrust litigations; of the approximately dozen federal antitrust class actions that have gone to trial and judgment in this century, he has tried five of them, winning verdicts in each case.

 

 

Dai Wai Chin Feman is the Director of Commercial Litigation Strategies at litigation funding firm Parabellum Capital. Recognized as one of 100 global leaders in legal finance by LawDragon, Dai Wai is a frequent speaker and writer on cutting-edge issues in the litigation finance industry. Dai Wai is a member of the US Regional Committee of the International Legal Finance Association, served as one of two industry members of the New York City Bar Association’s Litigation Funding Working Group, is a member of the New York City Bar Association’s Professional Ethics Committee, and participated on the Uniform Law Commission’s Third-Party Funding of Litigation Study Committee. Prior to joining Parabellum, Dai Wai was a litigation partner at Dorsey & Whitney LLP, where he specialized in commercial and antitrust litigation.

 

 

 

by on April 27, 2022

AAI Amicus Briefs Help Deliver Two Important Antitrust Victories in 9th Circuit

On April 26 and April 8, 2022, the Ninth Circuit, aided by AAI amicus briefs, handed victories to antitrust plaintiffs in two important cases involving platform markets and class certification, respectively, The PLS.com, LLC v. National Association of Realtors and Olean Wholesale Grocery Cooperative, Inc. v. Bumble Bee Foods, LLC (en banc).

In The PLS.com v. National Association of Realtors, a unanimous panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in favor of plaintiffs, reversing a district court opinion that held PLS had failed to state a claim against the National Association of Realtors (NAR).  Before it was driven from the market by NAR’s conduct, PLS offered an alternative real estate listing service to NAR’s MLS, targeting listings with limited information, so-called pocket listings.  AAI’s amicus brief argued two important points.  First, antitrust plaintiffs are only required to allege harm to competition and direct purchasers from conduct, and are not required also to allege harm to end consumers.  Second, AAI argued that the presence of network effects does not excuse exclusionary conduct by platforms.

The Ninth Circuit accepted both arguments.  First, the panel held that in an antitrust context, “the term ‘consumer’ is not limited to ‘ultimate consumers.”  Real estate agents, who are the buyers of network listing services are also consumers in an antitrust case.  Second, as urged by AAI, the court rejected NAR’s argument that the presence of network effects implied that consumers would be better off with a single listing platform (NAR’s MLS) than multiple competing platforms.  The opinion mirrored AAI’s argument in its brief that such an argument is directly contrary to the purpose of the antitrust laws and that consumers, not NAR, should be allowed to choose which products they prefer.  If NAR’s arguments about the consumer benefits of its MLS were correct, then they would be a basis on which NAR could compete, not a basis for excluding its competitors.

The district court had also dismissed PLS’s claims on the basis that they failed to satisfy Ohio v. American Express (“Amex”).  Specifically, the district court held that “PLS does not allege a plausible injury to participants on both sides of the market…both home sellers and home buyers.”  On appeal, PLS argued that AmEx does not apply at the motion to dismiss stage or to networks that do not involve simultaneous transactions and that, in any event, it had alleged harm to both sides of the market.  While AAI did not brief the Amex issues, the Ninth Circuit’s decision largely followed AAI’s work on Amex in other cases.

The Ninth Circuit held that Amex can apply at the pleading stage in certain rule of reason cases based on indirect evidence of anticompetitive effects, but that market definition (and, therefore, satisfaction of the Amex requirements for market definition) is never required for rule of reason claims based on direct evidence.  Because PLS’s pleading of its claim based on indirect evidence satisfied Amex’s requirements, even if Amex did apply, the court found it unnecessary to decide “the more difficult questions the parties raise about how broadly the Amex decision applies.” Importantly, in holding that PLS had satisfied Amex by pleading harm to both buyers and sellers of homes, the court went out of its way to note that “Amex does not require a plaintiff to allege harm to participants on both sides of the market. All Amex held is that to establish that a practice is anticompetitive in certain two-sided markets, the plaintiff must establish an anticompetitive impact on the ‘market as a whole.’”

In Olean Wholesale Grocery Cooperative, Inc. v. Bumble Bee Foods, LLC, a district court certified three classes of purchasers, including direct purchasers and two groups of indirect purchasers, seeking to recover for the confessed criminal price fixing of the three leading producers of packaged tuna, Bumble Bee Foods LLC, Starkist, and Chicken of the Sea (“Tuna Suppliers”).  In opposition to class certification, the Tuna Suppliers introduced rebuttal experts seeking to counter plaintiffs’ expert statistical analysis attempting to show that the price fixing caused widespread injury across the respective classes.  The district court held a three-day evidentiary hearing and weighed the competing expert opinions, finding plaintiffs’ experts more persuasive. It held that plaintiffs’ common statistical evidence of impact was sufficient to help satisfy Rule 23’s predominance requirement, though it allowed that defendants could still challenge the admissibility and probative value of the evidence at trial.

On interlocutory appeal, the Tuna Suppliers, supported by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the Washington Legal Foundation, argued that the district court erred by refusing to definitively resolve the battle of the experts at class certification, and that plaintiffs’ expert’s statistical analysis was inherently problematic because it relied on the average overcharges to the classes, thereby masking the possibility that some of the class members were uninjured by the price fixing.  The Tuna Suppliers maintained that, because plaintiffs’ expert evidence could not necessarily sustain a jury finding for every class member, it should not be a permissible means of establishing that common questions would predominate at a class trial.

In an amicus brief submitted last August, AAI argued that such evidence need only be relevant and reliable to be admissible; it does not have to assure that each plaintiff would prevail on the merits of the impact element in an individual action. Rule 23 requires only that common “questions” must predominate over individual questions at trial; it cannot be read to suggest that the questions’ answers must be determined as a prerequisite to class certification. Moreover, any uninjured class members may be identified after trial, and longstanding case law prevents defendants from capitalizing on the uncertainty created by their own illegal conduct, including uncertain damages calculations.

The AAI brief also argued that the court should unequivocally reject the defendants’ effort to cast categorical doubt on statistical analysis, and specifically regression modelling, in antitrust cases.  Regression models frequently rely on averaging techniques, but that is not where they begin and end.  Such models are routinely accepted as reliable methods of proving widespread injury to antitrust classes because econometric techniques can control for price changes caused by supply and demand factors and then focus on the uniformity of differences across class members to reliably show common impact.

All three judges on the merits panel adopted the position advocated by AAI in rejecting defendants’ categorical arguments on the use of statistical analysis and regression modeling to prove class-wide impact in antitrust cases.  However, the three judges sided with defendants in holding that the district court erred by refusing to resolve the disagreement among the parties’ experts over the number of potentially uninjured members in the class.  And the panel then split over the standard for determining whether the presence of uninjured class members may defeat predominance.  The panel majority concluded that the district court, before certifying a class, must find that only a “de minimis” number of class members are uninjured. Judge Hurwitz, partially dissenting, maintained that neither the text of Rule 23 nor Ninth Circuit precedent permit the court to implement such a requirement.

In the aftermath of the panel opinion and partial dissent, neither party petitioned for panel or en banc rehearing, instead agreeing to accept remand.  However, the court sua sponte ordered briefing on whether en banc hearing was warranted, and on August 3, 2021, it ordered rehearing.  In a merits brief before the en banc Court, AAI argued that the defendants’ proposed predominance standard would undermine antitrust policy while contravening Supreme Court precedent, Ninth Circuit precedent, and the text of Rule 23.

The AAI en banc brief emphasized, first, that defendants’ proposed de minimis standard is inappropriate because, in many cases, common issues will predominate regardless of whether more than a de minimis percentage of class members were uninjured. Second, a de minimis rule does not follow from Article III standing doctrine, which is jurisdictional.  Federal courts do not need to determine whether injury has occurred on the merits to determine whether they have the power to adjudicate the issue of injury.  Third, Rule 23 does not require merits determinations, or resolving the battle of the experts, to assess whether class plaintiffs are capable of establishing injury using common evidence.  According to binding precedent, plaintiffs’ evidence is sufficient if it could sustain a jury verdict.

On April 8, 2022, the en banc court affirmed the district court’s certification of all three classes, implicitly crediting and accepting numerous arguments put forward in the AAI brief. Like the merits panel, the en banc court flatly rejected the Tuna Suppliers’ argument that regression models involving “averaging assumptions” are inherently unreliable, noting that such approaches are widely accepted as a reliable econometric technique in antirust cases and are permissible under Tyson Foods.  Moreover, the court was not persuaded by the Tuna Suppliers’ contention that averaging masked impact insofar as the price-fixed products at issue here were susceptible to individualized negotiations and differences in bargaining power among customers.  The court held it is “both logical and plausible” to conclude “that the conspiracy artificially inflated the baseline for price negotiations.”

Accepting one of AAI’s principal arguments, the en banc court also rejected the Tuna Suppliers’ attack on the plausibility of plaintiffs’ use of averaging as applied to certain individual class members.  The court held that the Tuna Suppliers’ argument “improperly conflates the question whether evidence is capable of proving an issue on a class-wide basis with the question whether the evidence is persuasive.” The court explained that “the question is whether each member of the class can rely on [the expert’s] model to show antitrust impact of any amount.” Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that each member could.

The court added, importantly, that “[w]hile individualized differences among the overcharges imposed on each purchaser may require a court to determine damages on an individualized basis, such a task would not undermine the regression model’s ability to provide evidence of common impact.” The court therefore rejected the Tuna Suppliers’ argument that the regression model could not “sustain liability in individual proceedings” on the question of impact in satisfaction of the Tyson Foods standard.

The court also considered and rejected the Tuna Suppliers’ contention that the district court was required to make a merits determination on whether the plaintiffs’ expert’s model was correct to ensure it did not improperly certify a class in which some members lack Article III standing. The court explained that “the class did not have to ‘first establish that it will win the fray’ in order to gain certification under Rule 23(b)(3).” Rather, it was sufficient that the district court determined the plaintiffs’ expert’s pooled regression model “was capable of showing that the DPP class members suffered antitrust impact on a class-wide basis, notwithstanding [the defense expert’s] critique.” The court reasoned that, while “[r]easonable minds may differ” as to whether plaintiffs’ expert’s evidence “is probative,” “that is a question of persuasiveness for the jury once the evidence is sufficient to satisfy Rule 23.”

On the question of how Article III standing doctrine applies to the predominance inquiry at class certification, the court held that it did not need to reach the issue because the plaintiffs made the requisite showing that all class members had standing.  However, it held, with respect to the presence of uninjured class members generally, that “courts must apply Rule 23(b)(3) on a case-by-case basis, rather than rely on a per se rule that a class cannot be certified if it includes more than a de minimis number of uninjured class members.” The court acknowledged, however, that the Supreme Court’s recent decision in TransUnion v. Ramirez expressly left open the question whether every class member must demonstrate Article III standing before a court certifies a class.

Judge Lee dissented from the en banc court’s opinion, joined by Judge Kleinfeld.  The two dissenting judges believed the district court’s Rule 23 gatekeeper role required it to resolve the the uninjured class member question and deny certification if the number of uninjured class members is more than de minimis.

AAI’s amicus program is a key component of fulfilling AAI’s mission of promoting competition that protects consumers, businesses, and society. Comments on AAI amicus briefs or suggestions for AAI amicus participation should be directed to Randy Stutz, rstutz@antitrustinstitute.org, (202) 905-5420.

 

 

by on April 27, 2022

AAI Advisor Robert Taylor Issues New Analysis on the Market Power Problem in Beef, Lays Out New Policy Framework for Ensuring Competition and Fairness in Cattle and Beef Markets

Today, AAI Advisor and agricultural economist, C. Robert Taylor (Alfa Professor Emeritus in the College of Agriculture, Auburn University) issued the new report Harvested Cattle, Slaughtered Markets?

In this seminal report, Professor Taylor explains that cattle and beef production is increasingly horizontally concentrated and vertically integrated, from cattle feedlots to packers/processors to beef retailers. Although size and integration may lead to economic efficiencies, narrowly defined, they may also be a deadly combination that lead to abuses of market power and many undesirable market and externality consequences, including an illusion of choice for consumers, unfairness and harm to the competitive process. He highlights the current challenge of developing appropriate policy to neutralize the potential for market power exploitation, to internalize externalities, to insure or even increase efficiency by adoption of technology, and to insure competition and fairness in the future.

In the report, Professor Taylor analyzes the market power of the four largest beef packers and its relationship to certain contractual and trading markets practices. In particular, the report explores certain current market practices that may undermine fair and competitive markets, and harm competition as an active, dynamic process. These practices include, among others: (1) overreliance on Alternative Marketing Arrangements (AMA) base prices tied to the residual cash market; (2) the opacity of and variability around what “live cattle” is being priced in the markets; (3) limited depth and competitiveness in certain cash negotiated markets; (4) the risks of market manipulation arising from captive supply flexibility by dominant packers and/or large captive feeders; (5) preferential deals; and (6) partial vertical integration by dominant firms.

The report explains that since the advent of AMAs, tens of millions of taxpayer dollars have been spent by academic and government economists studying cattle markets. All reflect an “ideology,” over-simplified economic models, largely untested but critical assumptions, standards of statistical significance that may not be appropriate for policy prescription, and limited as well as sometimes inaccurate data. Professor Taylor emphasizes that restoring competition and fairness to cattle and beef markets requires moving policy beyond a number of prevailing assumptions and conventions. These include narrow economic ideology and hidden value judgments inherent in oft-cited academic studies of cattle and beef markets. Moving policy beyond textbook models of monopsony and monopoly is also vital, due to the dominance of complex giant transnational corporations with vast webs of corporate legal entities and financing and risk sharing arrangements offered only to a few aligned businesses.

The report concludes with analysis of several pathways for change, including: modest reforms, breaking up the giant corporations; developing and protecting a parallel system; and exchange trading.

by on April 25, 2022

AAI Says FERC Should Act Quickly to Update Natural Gas Facilities Certification Policy to Protect Competition and Consumers

AAI filed comments today in Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Docket No. PL18-1-001, a proceeding designed to update the Commission’s over two-decade old policy regarding certification of new interstate natural gas facilities. AAI’s comments focus exclusively on how the Commission’s policy of relying on so-called Affiliate Precedent Agreements (APAs) as evidence of “need” for certificating natural gas facilities raise potentially serious competition and consumers concerns around “regulatory evasion” or “self-dealing.” AAI’s comments explain that such conduct can impair competition and result in higher prices of essential natural gas and electricity, to the detriment of consumers.

AAI’s comments state that updated, strong, and comprehensive Commission policy governing reliance on APAs as evidence of project need is critical to the agency’s mandate to promote competition and protect consumers. AAI’s comments address two major issues. First, addressing the potentially harmful effects of APAs, especially against the backdrop of changes in energy markets and broader concerns over declining competition, should be high priority for the Commission. Second, there are important additional informational requirements, not included in FERC’s most recent Draft Policy Statement, that should be considered in promulgating accurate, comprehensive, and strong policy to address the potential adverse effects of APAs.

AAI’s comments urge the Commission to act expeditiously in producing binding, updated policy containing an accurate analytical framework to address the potential harmful effects of APAs and the agency’s reliance on them as evidence of project need.

 

by on April 21, 2022

AAI Provides Comprehensive Look at Merger Policy to Assist Federal Agencies in Updating Guidelines

AAI has submitted a response to a request for information from the Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice (“Agencies”) to assist the Agencies in updating their merger guidelines. 

AAI’s response to the request for information addresses both overarching aspects of merger policy and specific aspects and omissions from the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines currently in effect. (The 2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines are no longer endorsed by both agencies). AAI’s response begins by discussing key principles for an effective review and drafting process and then provides detailed legal, economic, and policy analysis of nine major issues that are particularly important for the Agencies to consider in updating and strengthening their merger guidelines, which implicate a critical area of antitrust enforcement. 

On January 18, 2022, the FTC and DOJ announced that they were launching an inquiry into antitrust enforcement against illegal mergers.  As part of the inquiry, which was encouraged by President Biden’s Executive Order on Promoting Competition in the American Economy, the Agencies issued a detailed request for information addressing potential updates to the Agencies’ merger guidelines. 

AAI’s response to the request examines a series of substantive considerations the Agencies should consider and address, including the following:

  1. Accounting for mergers that are part of a trend toward concentration but that may not be individually concentrative in isolation
  2. Accounting for merging parties’ past antitrust violations—whether for collusion or monopolization—in predicting the effects of their mergers
  3. Clarifying the probative value of various forms of evidence, viewed both individually and collectively, including evidence of non-price effects, intent evidence, and evidence of post-merger effects in addressing consummated mergers
  4. Accounting for the buyer power and labor-market effects of mergers, countervailing power as a merger defense, and how to evaluate divergent pro- and anticompetitive effects found on the buy-side and sell-side of a market or across different markets
  5. Accounting for special complexities accompanying mergers involving digital business ecosystems
  6. Accounting for mergers involving two-sided simultaneous transaction platforms as defined by the Supreme Court in Ohio v. American Express
  7. Updating competitive effects theories to account for nascent competitor acquisitions and mergers facilitating information exchange
  8. Accounting for empirical and other trends in merging firms’ failure to realize claimed efficiencies
  9. Considering how remedies factor into appropriate merger guidance.
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