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Home / Work Products

by on July 8, 2026

Interlocking Directorates and the Antitrust Laws: A Conversation Between Roger Noll and Mark Lemley, Jerry S. Cohen Award Winner for Antitrust Scholarship

In this episode of Ruled by Reason, guest host Roger Noll, Professor of Economics Emeritus at Stanford University and a member of the Jerry S. Cohen Award Selection Committee, sits down with Mark Lemley, the William H. Neukom Professor of Law at Stanford Law School. The two discuss Professor Lemley’s award-winning article, Anticompetitive Directors, 125 Colum. L. Rev. 1939 (2025), co-authored with Professor Rory Van Loo of the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania and Lane Miles, a 2025 graduate of Stanford Law School.

The article won the 24th Annual Jerry S. Cohen Memorial Fund Writing Award, presented on June 4 at AAI’s 2026 Annual Policy Conference, Competition Policy, Journalism, and the Promotion of Truth Regarding Public Matters. The article provides the first large-scale analysis of interlocking directorates involving both public and private companies and finds 2,309 instances of individuals sitting on the boards of companies that are direct competitors. It meaningfully advances our understanding of the scope and competitive significance of interlocking boards, while proposing legal and structural reforms to address the problem.

Professor Noll and Professor Lemley discuss how the project grew out of earlier research on biotech company board interlocks (5:28); why many companies appear to have forgotten that interlocking directorates remain unlawful under Section 8 of the Clayton Act (7:49); whether the per se prohibition reflects outdated formalism or an important safeguard against softened competition and collusion (9:03); the role of investors, venture capitalists, and private equity representatives on competing company boards (10:39); the data the authors used to identify competitors and board relationships across the economy (18:19); the relationship between interlocking directorates and the common-ownership literature (23:43); whether interlocks may serve as a plus factor in proving collusion (27:22); and potential reforms, including stronger enforcement, board-disclosure obligations, and pre-clearance rules (29:29).

Antitrust scholarship that is considered and selected for the Jerry S. Cohen Award reflects a concern for principles of economic justice, the dispersal of economic power, the maintenance of effective limitations upon economic power, or the federal statutes designed to protect society from various forms of anticompetitive activity. Selected scholarship reflects an awareness of the human and social impacts of economic institutions upon individuals, small businesses and other institutions necessary to the maintenance of a just and humane society–values and concerns Jerry S. Cohen dedicated his life and work to fostering.

GUESTS:

Mark Lemley, William H. Neukom Professor of Law, Stanford Law School

Roger Noll, Professor of Economics Emeritus, Stanford University

by on June 23, 2026

AAI Reminds Second Circuit that a Trade Association’s Binding “Ethical” Principles Are a Section 1 Agreement Among the Members (Uddin v. Elsevier)

On June 18, 2026, the American Antitrust Institute (AAI) filed an amicus brief in Uddin, et al. v. Elsevier, B.V., No. 26-457, asking the Second Circuit to reverse a district court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’ antitrust complaint for failing to allege an agreement in restraint of trade under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. The complaint alleged an unlawful price-fixing and market-allocation conspiracy on the part of for-profit publishers of peer-reviewed scholarly journals.

Plaintiffs are four scholar-scientists who seek to represent a class of similarly situated scholar-scientists. Defendants are the world’s six-largest for-profit publishers of peer-reviewed scholarly journals. The complaint alleges that the publisher-defendants, working through a trade association, adopted “ethical principles for scholarly publishing” that, among other things, require authors to submit their manuscripts to only one journal at a time and that deny scholar-scientists any compensation for their peer review services. The publisher-defendants, as a condition of membership in the trade association, explicitly agreed to abide by the principles.

In dismissing the complaint, the district court looked only at allegations setting forth the text of the ethical principles themselves, while ignoring many other factual allegations showing that the publisher-defendants’ agreement to adhere to them and their written policies and other conduct enforcing them. The district court reasoned that, under the Second Circuit’s 2023 decision in Relevent Sports, LLC v. U.S. Soccer Federation, it could only consider the principles themselves and could not consider what it deemed to be other circumstantial evidence of agreement. Further, the district court said the principles were merely non-binding, best-practices guidelines.

AAI’s brief argues that the district court misread Relevent Sports, where the Second Circuit held that a FIFA rule, characterized as a “sporting principle,” represented direct evidence of a Section 1 agreement where soccer leagues and teams had agreed to be bound by FIFA rules. The scholar-scientists’ allegations exactly track those held sufficient to allege an agreement in Relevent Sports. AAI also argues that, even if the other allegations are deemed to be circumstantial evidence, they are as probative as directive evidence of a Section 1 agreement. That is especially so given the illusive distinction between direct and strong circumstantial evidence. And when the scholar-scientists’ allegations are considered in their entirety, they show the publisher-defendants’ commitment to and enforcement of the principles.

AAI also notes that the Supreme Court and courts of appeals have repeatedly found that ethical principles characterized in normative terms nevertheless are binding agreements under Section 1.

The brief was written by AAI General Counsel Mark Hegedus.

Read the full brief: AAI Amicus Brief in Uddin, et al. v. Elsevier, B.V.

by on June 23, 2026

AAI Urges Fourth Circuit to Reject Specific-Intent Requirement and Focus on Effects in Section 2 Monopolization Claims (CareFirst of Maryland, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson)

The American Antitrust Institute (AAI) recently filed an amicus brief in CareFirst of Maryland, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 26-1248, urging the Fourth Circuit to reverse a grant of summary judgment that erroneously imposed a freestanding specific-intent requirement on a completed civil monopolization claim under Section 2 of the Sherman Act.

CareFirst, a health insurer, alleges that Johnson & Johnson used patents obtained in its acquisition of Momenta Pharmaceuticals as part of a scheme to delay biosimilar competition against Stelara, its blockbuster immunology drug. The district court granted summary judgment on reconsideration, holding that CareFirst could not prove J&J intended to exclude rivals anticompetitively when it acquired the Momenta patents.

AAI’s brief argues that the district court committed a clear and dangerous legal error. The test for completed civil monopolization has always been effects-based, not intent-based. Under the two-part standard articulated by the Supreme Court in United States v. Grinnell Corp., the “willful” acquisition or maintenance of monopoly power requires only a general intent to engage in the challenged conduct—not a specific purpose to exclude rivals. The Supreme Court, an unbroken line of circuit courts, and recent Fourth Circuit authority all confirm that intent evidence is relevant only to help characterize ambiguous conduct and is not a threshold element that plaintiffs must independently satisfy.

AAI’s brief shows that the district court compounded its error by isolating J&J’s patent acquisition from the broader course of conduct of which it was alleged to be a part. The Fourth Circuit’s decision in Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC v. NTE Carolinas II, LLC requires courts to assess allegedly anticompetitive conduct holistically and to draw the line between lawful and unlawful behavior based on competitive effect, not state of mind. In Duke Energy, evidence of anticompetitive intent played only a supporting role—bolstering a conclusion that the effects analysis had already reached—not a dispositive one. The district court’s approach inverts that framework.

AAI also explains that the general-intent requirements for a completed civil monopolization claim stand in contrast to the specific-intent requirement for two other distinct types of claims. Attempted monopolization requires proof of specific intent because the anticompetitive harm lies in the future and effects cannot yet supply one. Criminal Section 2 prosecutions require mens rea because of the general principles of criminal liability. Completed civil monopolization requires neither, because its effects have already materialized and can be examined directly. The district court’s ruling effectively grafted the attempt standard onto a completed offense.

Finally, AAI argues that sound antitrust policy independently supports an effects-based standard. Only an effects-based standard is consistent with the consumer welfare focus of case law under the Sherman Act and effective, fair enforcement. Because anticompetitive intent is proved largely through a defendant’s own documents, a sophisticated firm can evade liability simply by training employees to avoid incriminating language, while the underlying anticompetitive conduct and its market effects remain unchanged.

Read the full brief: AAI Amicus Brief in CareFirst of Maryland, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson

by on June 22, 2026

AAI 27th Annual Policy Conference: Rapporteur’s Report

On June 4, 2026, the American Antitrust Institute (AAI) held its 27th Annual Policy Conference, Competition Policy, Journalism, and “the Promotion of Truth Regarding Public Matters.” The full-day program brought together more than 100 diverse experts from business, government, academia, private practice, journalism, and public interest backgrounds. Guest speakers, panelists, and audience members discussed important legal, economic, and political developments affecting journalism and local news broadcasting. Key topics included (1) the challenges that journalism faces in today’s media markets, (2) the potential impacts of proposed mergers between Nexstar and Tegna and between Paramount and Warner Bros. Discovery, and (3) the use of antitrust enforcement and competition policy to protect journalism’s role in our democracy.

Read the full report: AAI 27th Annual Policy Conference: Rapporteur’s Report

This report was prepared by AAI summer intern Addison Wagner, who is a rising 3L at William & Mary Law School. Assistance was provided by Sam Bromer and former AAI intern Steven Lim.

by on June 2, 2026

Class Action Issues Update Spring 2026

The American Antitrust Institute (AAI) seeks to preserve the effectiveness of antitrust class actions as a central and vital component of private antitrust enforcement. As part of its efforts, AAI issues periodic updates on developments in the courts and elsewhere that may affect this important device for protecting competition, consumers, and workers. This update covers developments since our Fall 2025 update and includes the following new decisions:

  • Mandatory Arbitration Agreements: Flores v. NFL, No. 1:22-cv-871, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30015 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2026); Avery v. TEKsystems, 165 F.4th 1219 (9th Cir. 2026); Flower Foods, Inc. v. Brock, __ U.S. __, 24-935, 2026 U.S. LEXIS 2297 (May 28, 2026) (slip op.); Silva v. Schmidt Baking Distrib., LLC, 162 F.4th 354 (2d Cir. 2025); Valli v. Avis Budget Grp. Inc., 162 F.4th 396 (3d. Cir. 2026); Greystone Mortg., Inc. v. Equifax Workforce Sols. LLC, No. 24-cv-2260, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31200 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 17, 2026)
  • Uninjured Class Members and Article III Standing at Class Certification: Healy v. Milliman, 164 F.4th 701 (9th Cir. 2026); Clippinger v. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co., 173 F.4th 817 (6th Cir. 2026); Generation Changers Church v. Church Mut. Ins. Co., 168 F.4th 354 (6th Cir. 2026)
  • Ascertainability: Cline v. Sunoco, Inc. (R&M), 159 F.4th 1171 (10th Cir. 2025); Rider v. OXY USA, Inc., __ F.4th __, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12992 (10th Cir. May 5, 2026)
  • Attorney’s Fees: Chieftain Royalty Co. v. EnerVest Energy Institutional Fund XIII-A, L.P., 166 F.4th 34 (10th Cir. 2026)
  • Incentive Awards for Class Members: Nat’l Veterans Legal Servs. Program v. United States, 170 F.4th 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2026)
  • Timing of Class Certification Determination: Oliver v. Navy Fed. Credit Union, 167 F.4th 106 (4th Cir. 2026)

I. Mandatory Arbitration Agreements

We have long been following the antitrust implications of mandatory arbitration agreements in adhesion contracts. Mandatory arbitration agreements often include forced class action waivers that may prevent class litigation and class arbitration. In our Summer 2015 update, we examined the impact of Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228 (2013), in which the Supreme Court instructed lower courts to “rigorously enforce arbitration agreements according to their terms,” even when that meant forcing federal antitrust plaintiffs into individual arbitrations that would make their claims prohibitively costly.

Italian Colors dealt with the judge-made “effective vindication” exception to the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), which the Court first recognized in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614 (1985), and which establishes that even FAA-protected arbitration agreements are subject to invalidation when they operate as a prospective waiver of a party’s right to pursue statutory remedies. Although it held in Italian Colors that an antitrust plaintiff cannot invoke the exception to invalidate a class-action waiver merely because the costs of individually arbitrating a federal statutory claim exceed its potential recovery, the Court did not invalidate the exception, and plaintiffs can still challenge an arbitration provision under Mitsubishi if it prevents them from effectively pursuing statutory remedies.

In our Fall 2025 update, we examined Flores v. N.Y. Football Giants, 150 F.4th 172 (2d Cir. 2025), in which the Second Circuit invalidated a professional football player’s arbitration agreement with his team and the NFL under the effective-vindication exception after finding that it required him to submit his claims to the “unilateral discretion” of the NFL Commissioner, without providing an independent arbitral forum or a process for bilateral dispute resolution. On remand, in Flores v. NFL, No. 1:22-cv-871, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30015 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2026), the Southern District of New York held that the Second Circuit’s opinion also invalidates other class members’ arbitration agreements with their respective teams, and ordered the case to proceed in federal court.

Also, earlier this year the Ninth Circuit held in Avery v. TEKsystems, 165 F.4th 1219 (9th Cir. 2026), that Rule 23(d)’s grant of “broad authority” includes the ability to decline to enforce an arbitration agreement. In Avery, just after the close of class certification briefing, the defendant employer sent successive emails to plaintiff employees imposing a mandatory arbitration agreement but informing them that they had a right to opt out of the agreement for the limited purpose of maintaining their ability to participate in the instant lawsuit. Reasoning that the defendant’s emails attempted to effectively convert Rule 23’s opt-out process into an opt-in process, the district court denied the defendant’s motion to compel arbitration and declined to enforce the agreement. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, explaining that, under Rule 23(c), class members are included within a certified class unless they “request[] exclusion,” and circuit precedent recognizes district courts’ “power to regulate the notice and opt-out processes and to impose limitations when a party engages in behavior that threatens the fairness of the litigation.”

Since our Fall 2016 update, we have been tracking the use of mandatory arbitration clauses in employment agreements, which the Supreme Court upheld in a 5-4 decision in Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 584 U.S. 497 (2018). In our Spring 2019 update, we reviewed the Supreme Court’s decision in New Prime, Inc. v. Oliveira, 586 U.S. 105 (2019), which held that an FAA exception for “contracts of employment” with “transportation workers” who are “engaged in foreign or interstate commerce” excludes such contracts from the Act’s coverage and that its application turns on the nature of the contract rather than whether the contract purports to create an employer-employee relationship. In our Summer 2022 update, we examined the Supreme Court’s unanimous holding in Sw. Airlines v. Saxon, 142 S. Ct. 1783 (2022), that a class of workers is “engaged in foreign or interstate commerce” for purposes of the FAA exclusion if they are “directly involved in transporting goods across state or international borders.” In our Spring 2024 update, we examined the Supreme Court’s holding in Bissonnette v. LePage Bakeries Park St., LLC, 601 U.S. 246 (2024), that a worker need not work in the transportation industry to fall within the exclusion, and that courts should focus on workers’ duties rather than the industry they work in. We also explained that a circuit split has formed regarding last-mile delivery drivers who do not cross state lines, with the First, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits holding that they fall within the transportation-worker exclusion and the Fifth Circuit holding that they are subject to the FAA.[1]

As we discussed in our Fall 2025 update, the Tenth Circuit in Brock v. Flowers Foods, 121 F.4th 753 (10th Cir. 2024), examined the case of a franchisee delivery driver who distributes baked goods from a national baker to in-state retail stores, following the First and Ninth Circuit’s approaches to hold that he is directly engaged in interstate commerce under Saxon such that he falls within the exclusion. The Supreme Court recently affirmed that holding in a unanimous opinion in Flower Foods, Inc. v. Brock, __ U.S. __, No. 24-935, 2026 U.S. LEXIS 2297 (May 28, 2026), ending the circuit split and confirming, based on the statutory text and the court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence, that delivery drivers may be “engaged in interstate commerce” under Saxon even if they do not cross state lines or interact with a vehicle that does.

In December, the Second Circuit addressed the separate question of what constitutes a “contract of employment” under the exclusion, holding that the language includes contracts between business entities. In Silva v. Schmidt Baking Distrib., LLC, 162 F.4th 354 (2d Cir. 2025), plaintiff delivery drivers worked as W-2 employees through a staffing agency until their employer required them to form single-employee corporations and sign mandatory arbitration clauses to continue their work. Reversing the district court’s order forcing arbitration, the Second Circuit distinguished the drivers’ single-entity corporations from large logistics companies, emphasizing that the drivers incorporated at their employer’s behest, maintained the same work duties before and after incorporation, and personally guaranteed performance under the contracts. The case stands for the proposition that employers cannot circumvent the FAA’s transportation-worker exclusion by forcing workers to incorporate.

Beyond the employment context, we have also been tracking cases addressing circumstances under which a defendant waives its right to enforce an arbitration agreement. In our Fall 2024 update, we examined the Eighth Circuit’s holding in Thomas v. Pawn Am. Minn. LLC (In re Pawn Am. Consumer Data Breach Litig), 108 F.4th 610 (8th Cir. 2024), that a defendant waived its right to compel arbitration by “substantially invoking the litigation machinery” when it participated in a motion-to-dismiss hearing, stipulated to a discovery plan, and scheduled a mediation before moving to compel discovery. In our Fall 2025 update, we reported on the Eighth Circuit’s holding in Lackie Drug Store v. OptumRx, 143 F.4th 985 (8th Cir. 2025), that a waived right to arbitration was “revived” with respect to newly added claims in an amended complaint such that a defendant could move to compel arbitration of those claims.

Earlier this year, the Third Circuit addressed the issue in Valli v. Avis Budget Grp. Inc., 162 F.4th 396 (3d. Cir. 2026), holding that defendant Avis did not waive its right to compel arbitration of certain class claims when it litigated those claims before certification because it consistently asserted arbitration as an affirmative defense, raised arbitration issues in opposing class certification, and promptly moved to compel arbitration after certification. In February, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania distinguished the facts of Valli in an antitrust class action, Greystone Mortg., Inc. v. Equifax Workforce Sols. LLC, No. 24-cv-2260, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31200 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 17, 2026). The court relied on the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Avery to exercise its Rule 23(d) authority to deny arbitration, holding that defendants waived their right to arbitrate by engaging in discovery and failing to raise an arbitration agreement that it had imposed on plaintiffs after the complaint was filed. Defendants’ appeal of that decision is currently pending before the Third Circuit.

II. Uninjured Class Members and Article III Standing at Class Certification

We have long been following the recurring debate in the federal courts over the rules and standards that govern the certification of classes that may contain some class members who were not injured by the defendant’s conduct. As we explained in our Fall 2025 update, there is a persistent circuit split on this issue, and the Supreme Court has repeatedly declined to address it. As covered in our Spring-Summer 2021 update, a sharply divided Court ruled in TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413 (2021), that “every class member must have Article III standing to recover individual damages,” but explicitly declined to reach “the distinct question whether every class member must demonstrate standing before a court certifies a class.”

This January, the Ninth Circuit relied on TransUnion to hold in Healy v. Milliman, Inc., 164 F.4th 701 (9th Cir. 2026), that unnamed class members must demonstrate evidence of Article III standing at the summary judgment stage, not just when individual damages are awarded. Drawing on TransUnion’s language that plaintiffs “must demonstrate standing with the manner and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation,” the court reversed the district court’s order for failing to allow circumstantial evidence of standing and declining to make reasonable inferences based on that evidence, as required at summary judgment.

The issue of uninjured class members is arguably analogous to the issue of “disjuncture,” which focuses on whether a disparity between the named plaintiffs’ injuries and the injuries of prospective class members presents standing issues under Article III. As we explained in our Fall 2025 update, the First, Third, Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits have employed the “class-certification approach,” which requires only that the named plaintiffs have standing,[2] while the Second and Eleventh Circuits have adopted the more intensive “standing approach,” which requires that the named plaintiff must have suffered harms that are analogous to those suffered by the rest of the class.[3]

As we explained in our Fall 2025 update, there has recently been significant debate between judges on the Sixth Circuit about which approach to follow, with Judges Thamar and Nalbandian issuing warring concurrences on the issue in Speerly v. GM, 143 F.4th 306 (6th Cir. 2025). The debate continued earlier this year, when a three-judge panel in Generation Changers Church v. Church Mut. Ins. Co., 168 F.4th 354 (6th Cir. 2026), declined to adopt either the class-certification or standing approach after finding that plaintiffs’ class claims could continue under either approach. Calling into question Judge Thamar’s characterization in his Speerly concurrence that the court adopted the class certification approach in its 1998 opinion in Fallick v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 162 F.3d 410 (6th Cir. 1998), the panel in Generation Changers stated that the court has “yet to explicitly endorse this view in a published opinion.” Last month, Judge Bush expanded the debate in his concurrence in Clippinger v. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co., 173 F.4th 817 (6th Cir. 2026), in which he argued that some classes may only include only a handful of injured plaintiffs such that district courts should also consider unnamed plaintiffs’ Article III standing as part of their numerosity analysis.

III. Ascertainability

We have been following a circuit split over whether Rule 23 contains a heightened ascertainability requirement under which class plaintiffs must plead and prove an administratively feasible mechanism for identifying class members. In our Winter 2022 update, we noted that the Third Circuit, where the heightened ascertainability requirement first gained credence, had been steadily eroding the requirement in a series of cases. However, in our Summer 2023 update, we noted that the court reaffirmed its heightened ascertainability requirement in an antitrust class action, In re Niaspan Antitrust Litig., 67 F.4th 119 (3d Cir. 2023), upholding a denial of class certification on administrative-feasibility grounds. The court later denied a petition for rehearing en banc.

As explained in our Fall 2024 update, the First and Fourth Circuits have joined the Third Circuit in adopting a heightened ascertainability requirement,[4] while the Second, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Eleventh, and Federal Circuits have rejected any heightened ascertainability requirement.[5] The Fifth, Tenth, D.C., and Federal Circuits had not yet adopted an explicit position, although the Tenth and D.C. Circuits had acknowledged the issue. Last November, the Tenth Circuit joined the majority of circuits in rejecting a heightened ascertainability requirement.

In Cline v. Sunoco, Inc. R&M, 159 F.4th 1171 (10th Cir. 2025), Sunoco appealed the district court’s certification order and award of over $170 million in damages to a class of landowners who failed to receive interest on late oil and gas royalty payments as required by Oklahoma law. Sunoco appealed, arguing that the class members were not ascertainable because they were not identified by name. The Tenth Circuit rejected that argument, explicitly adopting the Seventh Circuit’s ascertainability test as articulated in Mullins and rejecting the heightened ascertainability requirement because it would allow Sunoco to “defeat class certification either by failing to keep proper records or failing to produce them.” The court held that “administrative feasibility may bear on whether class resolution is superior to individual resolution, but it should not operate as a trump card that outweighs all other factors under Rule 23.”

Earlier this month, the Tenth Circuit applied Cline to plaintiffs’ appeal of a district court’s pre-Cline order denying certification of another class of landowners with oil and gas leases. In Rider v. Oxy USA, Inc., No. 25-3142, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 12992 (10th Cir. 2026), the district court found that the class definition was not administratively feasible because it required the court to “individually consider” payment, lease, and acquisition records to determine whether class members own mineral interests in land leased to the defendant. The Tenth Circuit reversed, noting that it had since rejected the administrative feasibility requirement in Cline, that the defendant could identify class members through its own records, and that, “[r]egardless, Cline clarified that neither gaps in a defendant’s record-keeping nor the large number of records to be reviewed can defeat class certification.”

IV. Attorney’s Fees

Over the past several years, we have been tracking notable developments involving the fairness and reasonableness of fee awards in class-action settlements under Rule 23(e)(2), which has important implications for private enforcement incentives. In our Spring 2024 update, we examined In re Wawa Data Sec. Litig., 85 F.4th 712 (3d Cir. 2023) (“Wawa I”), in which the Third Circuit vacated a $3 million fee award—amounting to 25% of the recovery amount—and remanded with instructions to reconsider the reasonableness of the award. In our Fall 2025 update, we examined In re Wawa Data Sec. Litig., 141 F.4th 456 (3d Cir. 2025) (“Wawa II”), in which the court affirmed the same fee award, reiterating its “flexible approach toward analyzing fee awards.”

Also in our Spring 2024 update, we examined In re Broiler Chicken Antitrust Litig., 80 F.4th 797 (7th Cir. 2023) (“Broiler I”), in which the Seventh Circuit reversed a district court’s $57.4 million fee award—amounting to 33% of the settlement fund—because the court failed to consider auction bids made by counsel in other litigation. In our Fall 2025 update, we examined In re Broiler Chicken Antitrust Litig., 142 F.4th 568 (7th Cir. 2025) (“Broiler II”), in which the court reduced the district court’s revised award from 30% to 26.6% after comparing it to the fees in other cases.

In our Fall 2025 update we also examined Kurtz v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 142 F.4th 112 (2d Cir. 2025), in which the Second Circuit clarified that Rule 23(e) safeguards the fairness of a settlement for the class by asking whether the proportion of attorney’s fees compared to the total recovery allocated to the class raises any questions about the settlement’s adequacy, and that courts must weigh attorney’s fees settlements against the relief provided “for the class” under Rule 23(e)(2)(C)(iii).

In January, the Tenth Circuit in Chieftain Royalty Co. v. Enervest Energy Institutional Fund XIII-A, L.P., 166 F.4th 34 (10th Cir. 2026), affirmed the district courts $17.3 million fee award—amounting to 33% of the settlement fund—as substantively reasonable. The court affirmed the district court’s inclusion of time class counsel spent on appeals in calculating the lodestar, emphasizing that the district court had reduced the 40% fee that counsel originally requested and had credited class counsel with winning a greater per-member recovery than a comparable case during a period when “controlling law regarding class certification was in flux.”

V. Incentive Awards for Class Members

Since our Fall 2020 update, we have been following unusual developments surrounding the legality of incentive awards for lead plaintiffs in class action settlements. In 2020, the Eleventh Circuit in Johnson v. NPAS Sols., LLC, 975 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2020), unexpectedly held that incentive awards paid to lead class plaintiffs—a mainstay of antitrust and other class actions for decades—are unlawful under nineteenth-century Supreme Court precedent disallowing salaried class representatives. As discussed in our Fall/Winter 2022, Summer 2023, Spring 2024, and Fall 2024 updates, the First, Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuit have rejected the Eleventh Circuit’s “anomalous” analysis and affirmed the legality of incentive awards.[6]

In March, the Federal Circuit joined the “overwhelming majority” of circuits to reject the Eleventh Circuit’s holding in Johnson and hold that incentive awards are legal. In Nat’l Veterans Legal Servs. Program v. United States, 170 F.4th 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2026), the court upheld the district court’s approval of $10,000 incentive awards to three nonprofit class representatives who litigated a PACER fee case on behalf of the class for eight years. In doing so, the court observed that, far from the salaries that were prohibited under the nineteenth century precedent reviewed in Johnson, incentive amounts are “token amounts to encourage the participation of representative plaintiffs,” who “step up, often at significant personal and financial cost, to vindicate the rights of others.”

VI. Empirical Data on Class Actions 

In April, Huntington Bank (Huntington) and the UC Hastings Center for Litigation and Courts (UCHCLC) published the 2025 Annual Antitrust Report: Class Actions in Federal Court, their ninth annual antitrust report examining empirical information involving the filing and resolution of private antitrust class action lawsuits. The new report covers the years 2009–2025.

The Report shows the number of antitrust class action complaints filed each year, the amount of time they took on average to reach a settlement, the mean and median recoveries, the attorney’s fees and costs awarded, and the total settlement amounts in each year and overall. It also analyzes the law firms that represented plaintiffs and defendants in antitrust class action settlements, describes cumulative results, and tabulates cumulative totals for claims administrators involved in the settlement process. The report also distinguishes private antitrust enforcement by particular industries, by type of claim, and by type of plaintiff. Key findings include the following:

  • From 2009-2025, a mean number of 124 consolidated complaints were filed per year, with outlier years as low as 72 and as high as 220.
  • From 2009-2025, there were Defendant Wins in 158 cases as a result of judgments on the pleadings, summary judgment, judgment as a matter of law, or trial.
  • From 2009-2025, most antitrust class actions that reached final approval did so within 5-7 years.
  • The mean settlement amount varied by year from $6 million to $184 million, and the median amount varied by year from $2 million to $18.5 million.
  • The total annual settlements ranged from $225 million to $9.6 billion per year.
  • The cumulative total of settlements was $51.8 billion from 2009-2025.

Download the Spring 2026 Class Action Issues Update

 

[1] Rittmann v. Amazon.com, 971 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2020); Waithaka v. Amazon.com, 966 F.3d 10 (1st Cir. 2020); Lopez v. Cintas Corp., 47 F.4th 428 (5th Cir. 2022); Brock v. Flowers Foods, 121 F.4th 753 (10th Cir. 2024).

[2] Fallick v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 162 F.3d 410 (6th Cir. 1998); Melendres v. Arpaio, 784 F.3d 1254 (9th Cir. 2015); In re Asacol Antitrust Litig., 907 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2018); Boley v. Universal Health Servs., 36 F.4th 124 (3d Cir. 2022); Wilson v. Centene Mgmt. Co., 144 F.4th 780 (5th Cir. 2025).

[3] Fox v. Ritz-Carlton Hotel Co., 977 F.3d 1039 (11th Cir. 2020); Barrows v. Becerra, 24 F.4th 116 (2d Cir. 2022).

[4] In re Nexium Antitrust Litig., 777 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 2015); EQT Prod. Co. v. Adair, 764 F.3d 347 (4th Cir. 2014).

[5] In re Petrobas Sec. Litig., 862 F.3d 250 (2d Cir. 2017); Rikos v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 799 F.3d 497 (6th Cir. 2015); Mullins v. Direct Digit., LLC, 795 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 2015); Sandusky Wellness Ctr., LLC v. Medtox Sci., Inc., 821 F.3d 992 (8th Cir. 2016); Briseno v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 844 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2017); Cherry v. Dometic Corp., 986 F.3d 1296 (11th Cir. 2021); Freund v. McDonough, 114 F.4th 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2024).

[6] Murray v. Grocery Delivery E-Servs. USA Inc., 55 F.4th 340 (1st Cir. 2022); Moses v. The New York Times Co., 79 F.4th 235 (2d Cir. 2023); Scott v. Dart, 99 F.4th 1076 (7th Cir. 2024); In re Apple Inc. Device Performance Litig., 50 F.4th 769 (9th Cir. 2022).

by on June 1, 2026

AAI Urges D.C. Circuit to Vacate District Court’s Market Definition and Monopoly Power Errors in FTC Challenge to Meta’s Instagram, WhatsApp Acquisitions (FTC v. Meta Platforms)

On May 29, 2026, the American Antitrust Institute (AAI) filed an amicus brief in FTC v. Meta Platforms, Inc., No. 26-5028, asking the D.C. Circuit to vacate a district court judgment in favor of Meta and remand for a proper analysis of the relevant market and Meta’s alleged monopoly power in the FTC’s Section 2 challenge to Meta’s acquisitions of Instagram and WhatsApp.

After a six-week bench trial, the district court ruled in Meta’s favor, finding that the FTC had failed to prove a relevant market for personal social networking services—centered on friends-and-family broadcast sharing—and that Meta lacked monopoly power even within the market the FTC alleged. The court placed dispositive weight on Meta’s experiments purporting to show diversion of consumer time between Facebook and Instagram on the one hand and TikTok and YouTube on the other, defining a broader market than the FTC alleged. It declined to find monopoly power based on Meta’s market shares, which the FTC’s expert calculated at between 54% and 62%.

AAI’s brief argues that the district court committed two independent categories of reversible error. First, it misapplied foundational market definition principles in four related but distinct ways. It bypassed analysis of functional interchangeability—whether consumers use TikTok and YouTube for the same purpose as Meta’s apps—and instead credited substitution evidence untethered from consumer purpose, effectively defining the market based on firms rather than products. It also misapplied the Hypothetical Monopolist Test because the evidence it relied on, including consumer behavior in response to temporary app outages and India’s permanent ban of TikTok, which modeled price increases ranging from 12% to infinity, did not properly approximate the small but significant and non-transitory price increase (SSNIP) the test requires. The court further failed to apply the “narrowest market principle,” which requires defining markets from the inside out rather than the outside in, and it drew the wrong inference from evidence of Meta’s sustained economic profits, which, properly understood, shows that TikTok and YouTube do not constrain Meta’s market power.

Second, the district court independently erred by applying an improper standard for measuring monopoly power. It treated a 65% market share as a de facto threshold for inferring monopoly power when the better-reasoned authorities hold that a market share above 50% can support a monopoly power finding. The FTC’s evidence cleared this threshold even in the district court’s overbroad market.

The brief was written by Brendan Benedict and Michael Altebrando of Benedict Law Group PLLC, a generalist litigation boutique with a focus on antitrust and consumer protection. AAI thanks Mr. Benedict and Mr. Altebrando for serving as pro bono counsel.

Read the full amicus brief: AAI Amicus Brief in FTC v. Meta Platforms, Inc.

by on June 1, 2026

AAI Urges Ninth Circuit Not to Second Guess Jury Verdicts Defining Single-Brand Product Market and Awarding Half-Billion Dollars in Treble Damages (Innovative Health, LLC v. Biosense Webster, LLC)

The American Antitrust Institute (AAI) recently filed an amicus brief in Innovative Health, LLC v. Biosense Webster, LLC, No. 25-6024, urging the Ninth Circuit to affirm jury verdicts that a Johnson & Johnson Company, Biosense Webster, violated Sections 1 and 2 of Sherman Act and the Cartwright Act through unlawful tying, monopolization, and attempted monopolization.

Biosense manufactures cardiac mapping machines, which are used by electrophysiologists to help treat irregular heart rhythms. Biosense also provides clinical support for the machines and sells catheters needed for mapping procedures. The FDA permits used catheters to be reprocessed for re-use. Innovative is a reprocessor that competes against Biosense by selling what the evidence showed are lower-priced, higher-quality catheters.

Biosense adopted a tying policy conditioning its provision of clinical support on a hospital’s purchase of Biosense catheters. Innovative alleged that Biosense’s conduct excluded reprocessors from the catheter market, thus depriving hospitals of the choice to buy superior catheters on better terms. In finding that Biosense’s policy represented an unlawful tie, the jury agreed with Innovative that clinical support for Biosense’s mapping machines, the tying product, represented a single-brand aftermarket under the so-called Kodak/Epic lock-in standards. The jury awarded Innovative over $147 in damages for lost sales, an amount subject to trebling under the Clayton Act.

On appeal, Biosense argues that courts extremely rarely define single-brand aftermarkets due to a legal presumption against them, and that the damages award should be disaggregated to remove conduct that Biosense claimed was lawful.

AAI’s brief pushes back on Biosense’s challenges to the jury verdicts. AAI showed that there is no such presumption against single-brand markets in aftermarkets, and that courts regularly recognize such markets where, as here, real-world economic evidence demonstrates that competition in a foremarket fails to discipline anticompetitive conduct in the aftermarket. On the issue of damages disaggregation, AAI showed that Biosense’s position lacked both factual and legal support given the jury’s finding that hospitals were coerced into purchasing Biosense catheters and the jury’s conclusion that all of Biosense’s conduct was unlawful.

The brief was written by AAI General Counsel Mark S. Hegedus with assistance from AAI President Randy M. Stutz.

Read the full amicus brief: AAI Amicus Brief in Innovative Health, LLC v. Biosense Webster, LLC

by on May 28, 2026

AAI Corrects the Record on the Use of Circumstantial Evidence to Prove a Section 1 Violation (In re Libor-Based Financial Instruments Antitrust Litigation)

On May 26, 2026, the American Antitrust Institute (AAI) filed an amicus brief in In re Libor-Based Financial Instruments Antitrust Litigation, No. 25-2756, asking the Second Circuit to reverse a district court’s opinion granting summary judgment to defendant banks in investors’ Section 1 claim arising out of the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) bid-rigging scandal uncovered in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis.

The plaintiffs, a large group of investors, brought Section 1 claims against 16 major banks for conspiring to manipulate the U.S. dollar LIBOR to depress interest payments and improve public perceptions of their financial health between 2007 and 2010. In 2016, after the district court dismissed the case for failing to allege antitrust injury, the Second Circuit reversed, relying on arguments presented in an AAI amicus brief to hold that the plaintiffs properly alleged horizontal price fixing and antitrust injury.

In 2025, after discovery, the district court granted summary judgment for the defendant banks, reasoning that, because the record contained no direct evidence, the plaintiffs had to show parallel conduct and “plus factors” establishing the existence of an illegal conspiracy. The court held that their evidence failed to rule out the possibility that the banks acted unilaterally, without conspiring.

AAI’s brief argues that the district court was wrong to force the plaintiffs’ claims into the so-called parallel-plus framework and that, in addition, it misapplied the standard for assessing parallel conduct within that framework. To prove their Section 1 claim, the plaintiffs relied on both economic evidence of the banks’ parallel offering-rate submissions and non-economic evidence of verbal communications that independently supported an inference that the banks coordinated their submissions. The district court held that the written communications, because they did not qualify as direct evidence of an agreement, were ambiguous and therefore lacked probative value under Matsushita. It further held that, because the plaintiffs relied only on circumstantial evidence, they could prove a Section 1 claim only using the parallel-plus framework.

The AAI brief explains that evidence similar to the evidence in this case has been deemed direct evidence by other courts, and even if the evidence is circumstantial, it is not rendered ambiguous or insufficient under Matsushita simply because it is subject to competing inferences. The distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence is often illusory and does not support a legal rule that formulaically forces parties into alternative modes of analysis.

AAI also argued that Section 1 plaintiffs can independently prove their claims outside the parallel-plus framework by relying on non-economic evidence of an actual agreement, and under the summary judgment standard, courts may not take the case from a jury if a reasonable juror could draw one of multiple competing inferences in the plaintiffs’ favor.

AAI also explained that, even under the parallel-plus framework, the plaintiffs’ cumulative evidence should have been more than enough to establish parallel conduct, and the district court failed to follow the Second Circuit’s guidance on examining plus factor evidence holistically.

The brief was written by AAI President Randy Stutz and AAI Senior Counsel David O. Fisher.

Read the full brief: AAI’s Amicus Brief (In re Libor-Based Financial Instruments Antitrust Litigation

by on May 27, 2026

AAI Provides Comprehensive Analysis of Competitor Collaborations to FTC and DOJ

On May 21, 2026, AAI filed detailed public comments in response to a joint notice of public inquiry from the Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice regarding potential revisions to the April 2000 Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations Among Competitors.

Competitor collaborations—which may include joint ventures, trade or professional associations, licensing arrangements, or strategic alliances—are contractual arrangements among rivals that may produce benefits to consumers by enabling firms to offer superior goods or services, bring products to market faster than they otherwise could, facilitate better use of existing assets, or create incentives for output-enhancing investments. But they also present serious risk of anticompetitive harm, particularly where they mask per se violations of the Sherman Act that would otherwise generate criminal liability.

The Agencies withdrew the 2000 Guidelines in December 2024, committing to enforcement on a case-by-case basis and directing businesses contemplating competitor collaborations to review the relevant statutes and caselaw. In their recent notice of public inquiry, the Agencies sought comments on an array of issues that arise in analyzing competitor collaborations.

AAI’s comments make the following recommendations:

General Drafting Principles

  • The Agencies should make the revised guidelines accessible not only to businesses and their counsel but the courts, private enforcers, and the public. 
  • The Agencies should eliminate the suggestion in the 2000 Guidelines that antitrust enforcement may deter procompetitive collaborations. 
  • Throughout the revised guidelines, the Agencies should give equal attention to sell-side and buy-side conduct, horizontal and vertical restraints, and exclusionary and collusive effects. 
  • The Agencies should forgo safe harbors and eliminate “safety zones.”


Applying the Rule of Reason

  • The Agencies should clarify that the rule of reason has four steps, not three. 
  • The Agencies should clarify that the plaintiff’s burden at Step 1 of the rule of reason is satisfied by a direct or indirect showing of anticompetitive effects. 
  • The Agencies should clarify that the defendant’s burden at step 2 is a burden of proof. 
  • The Agencies should clarify that the defendant has the burden at Step 2 to show procompetitive justifications that are nonpretextual. 
  • The Agencies should specify that cognizable efficiencies must be “in the relevant market.” 
  • The Agencies should emphasize the heightened importance of relying on the per se rule when a competitor collaboration’s horizontal restraints lack cognizable procompetitive justifications. 
  • The Agencies should recognize that vertical restraints that have collusive effects and no cognizable efficiencies can be condemned under the quick-look standard.


Applying the Ancillary Restraints Doctrine

  • The Agencies should specify that the ancillary restraints doctrine is an affirmative defense. 
  • The Agencies should specify that a putatively ancillary restraint is not removed from the per se category simply because it is part of an otherwise efficiency-enhancing integration. 
  • The Agencies should specify that ancillary restraints can be reviewed under the quick-look rule of reason, not just the comprehensive version. 
  • The Agencies should reiterate that two or more restraints are “assessed together” only if they are intertwined “inextricably.” 
  • The Agencies should clarify that the ancillary restraints doctrine does not countenance multi-market balancing for the same reason the rule of reason does not.


Concerted Action

  • The Agencies should clarify that every single competitor collaboration—including those that form single entities—constitutes concerted action subject to Section 1 scrutiny.


Collaborations with Both Vertical and Horizontal Elements

  • The Agencies should specify that collaborations with both horizontal and vertical elements may be reviewed under the per se rule and may be evaluated for both collusive and exclusionary effects.


Platforms

  • The Agencies should address competitor collaborations in markets involving platforms.


Group Purchasing Organizations (GPOs)

  • The Agencies should treat GPOs as a distinct structural category of competitor collaboration and provide the dedicated analytical framework their scale and competitive risks warrant. 
  • The Agencies should explicitly build on the buyer-side market power framework developed in the 2023 Merger Guidelines, according GPOs’ buy-side effects coequal analytical treatment alongside their sell-side effects. 
  • The Agencies should specifically address the information sharing risks associated with GPO membership. 
  • The Agencies should address the particularly significant role of exclusionary contracting in GPOs. 
  • The Agencies should recognize that fee structures can create anticompetitive effects.


Algorithmic Pricing Agreements

  • The Agencies should emphasize that an anticompetitive agreement among competitors need not be express and may be inferred from conduct enabled by modern technologies.
  • The Agencies should make clear that there is no exhaustive list of plus factors and that the absence of any particular plus factor is not fatal to the inference of concerted action.
  • The Agencies should clarify that competitors’ use of the same pricing algorithm may amount to concerted action.

Read the complete comments here: AAI Comments on Revised Competitor Collaboration Guidelines

by on May 20, 2026

AAI Urges FTC to Vigorously Defend Rule Revising Merger Filing Form

On May 8, 2026, the American Antitrust Institute (AAI) submitted a letter to the Directors of the Bureau of Competition and the Bureau of Consumer Protection of the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) urging them to recommend that the FTC pursue its appeal of the Eastern District of Texas’s opinion invaliding the Agency’s 2024 rule revising the Hart-Scott-Rodino (“HSR”) Act merger filing form, Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. FTC, No. 6:25-cv-9-JDK, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29274 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 12, 2026).

The HSR Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18a, requires merging parties to file a premerger notification form with the FTC and DOJ if their deal exceeds certain dollar and size thresholds. The HSR Form has not been significantly updated since 1978, and a consensus has formed that it is outdated. In 2024, a bipartisan FTC voted unanimously to promulgate a new rule governing the documents and information that merging parties must submit. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce and several co-plaintiffs challenged that rule in the Eastern District of Texas, which invalidated the rule on the grounds that the estimated $39,644 additional costs it imposed on filing parties is not justified. Although the FTC appealed, it subsequently issued a request for public comment on a revised form, suggesting that it may abandon its defense of the 2024 form on appeal.

AAI’s letter urges the FTC to vigorously appeal the Eastern District of Texas’s ruling regardless of whether it proceeds with a further revision. It explains the serious implications of the district court’s approach, which failed to account for antitrust law’s focus on stopping illegal mergers in their incipiency, before their high costs are imposed on consumers and businesses. It also explains how the district court’s improper standing analysis will allow future rulemaking challenges in the district, ensuring that the FTC will continue to face rule challenges which will be held to the same improper standard.

On May 18, 2026, the FTC filed a motion seeking to hold the appeal in abeyance pending a further revision to the rule.

The letter was written by AAI Senior Counsel David O. Fisher.

Read the letter: AAI’s Letter to the Directors of the Bureau of Competition and the Bureau of Consumer Protection of the Federal Trade Commission

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