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AAI will host its 25th Annual Policy Conference, New Thinking on the Antitrust Treatment of Collective Action: Organized Labor, Countervailing Power, and Algorithmic Price Setting, on May 22, 2024 at the National Press Club in Washington D.C.
U.S. antitrust law and competition policy have always had a complicated relationship with collective action. Collusion has been called “the supreme evil of antitrust,”[1] yet we permit and encourage a wide array of competitor collaborations because “the war of all against all is not a good model for any economy.”[2] Recent developments in law, policy, and technology have posed a new set of challenges in striking this balance between competition and cooperation.
Among other examples, growing recognition of widespread market power in labor markets has prompted new thinking about competition and collective bargaining rights. Scholars and legislators also have explored other forms of group negotiation as a countervailing power response to monopoly and oligopoly market structures, whether to promote economic welfare or fairness. At the same time, sellers are pushing the boundary line between collective action and collusion using algorithmic pricing technology.
The Policy Conference will feature three panels of experts providing insight, analysis, and recommendations on key issues in these important and still-developing areas of law and policy. The conference will include a gala luncheon featuring the presentation of the 2024 AAI Antitrust Achievement Award and the presentation of the Jerry S. Cohen Award for Antitrust Scholarship.
[1] Verizon Communications v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 408 (2004) (Scalia, J.).
[2] Polk Bros., Inc., v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 776 F.2d 185 (7th Cir. 1985) (Easterbrook, J.)
CONFERENCE LOCATION:
National Press Club Holeman Lounge
529 14th Street NW, 13th Floor
Washington, DC 20045
CLE CREDITS:
This conference was approved by the Pennsylvania Continuing Legal Education Board for 4.5 CLE credit hours. Attendees will be emailed CLE certificate of attendance after the conference.
REGISTRATION PRICING:
$200 | Conference Registration
$100 | Government/Academic Attendees
$0 | Media Conference
$0 | Advisory Board/Sponsor/Guest
A.B. Data
Amazon
American Antitrust Institute
American Antitrust Institute
American Antitrust Institute
American Antitrust Institute
American Economic Liberties Project
American University Washington College of Law
American University Washington College of Law
applEcon
Baker & Miller PLLC
Berger Montague
Bloom Strategic Counsel
Bloomberg
Boston College of Law
Boston University Questrom School of Business
Bridgeline Solutions
Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck
Center for Democracy and Technology
Cirque Analytics
Cirque Analytics
Cirque Analytics
Cohen Gresser
Cohen Milstein
Cohen Milstein
Cohen Milstein
Cohen Milstein
Cohen Milstein
Columbia Law School
Consumer Reports
Cuneo Gilbert & LaDuca, LLP
Cuneo Gilbert & LaDuca, LLP
Cuneo Gilbert & LaDuca, LLP
Cuneo Gilbert & LaDuca, LLP
Cuneo Gilbert & LaDuca, LLP
Cuneo Gilbert & LaDuca, LLP
DiCello Levitt LLP
DISCO
Don Resnikoff Law
Econ One
Econ One
Econ One
Econ One
Eisner Amper
Federal Trade Commission
Federal Trade Commission
Garwin Gerstein & Fisher LLP
George Washington University
George Washington University Law School
Georgetown University Law Center
Global Competition Review
Gustafson Gluek PLLC
Howard University School of Law
Huntington National Bank
IESE Business School
IESE Business School
Joseph Saveri Law Firm
Justice Catalyst
Kaplan Fox
Law360
Lowey Dannenberg
Lowey Dannenberg
MLex
MLex
Mogin Rubin
MoloLamken
National Institute of Standards and Technology
New York University School of Law
Northeastern University
Office of the New York State Attorney General
Open Markets Institute
Open Markets Institute
Politico
Radice Law Firm
Rust Consulting/Kinsella Media
Saïd Business School University of Oxford
Scott+Scott
Secretariat Economists
Seton Hall University School of Law
Simpluris
Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP
The Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania
U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Division
U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Division
U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Division
University of Baltimore
University of Chicago Law School
University of Wisconsin Law School
Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP
Weinstein Kitchenoff & Asher LLC
Weitz & Luxenberg
Weitz & Luxenberg
Western Alliance Bank
Wexler Boley & Elgersma
Widener University, Delaware Law School
Yale Law School
Yale School of Management
Zelle LLP
Welcome and Overview
Randy Stutz, President, American Antitrust Institute
Panel 1: The Law and Economics of Countervailing Power: Key Issues and Principles
Do countervailing power arguments make sense as a response to an increasingly concentrated marketplace? The entrenchment of giant corporations in many parts of the economy, including Big Tech, healthcare, and retail, has brought the question to the fore in merger reviews and elsewhere. This panel will critically assess the trend among many different parts of the antitrust community to look to countervailing power as a partial solution to the pressing issue of market power. Panelists will discuss the validity and utility of economic theories around countervailing power and what evidence exists about how those theories play out in practice. They will also explore the broader effects of countervailing power on market dynamics, consumer choice, and the competitive process, and will consider alternative approaches to the problem of unequal bargaining positions.
Moderator:
Kathleen W. Bradish, Vice President and Director of Legal Advocacy, American Antitrust Institute
Panelists:
Laura Alexander, Deputy Director, Bureau of Competition, Federal Trade Commission
Scott Hemphill, Moses H. Grossman Professor of Law, New York University School of Law
Sandeep Vaheesan, Legal Director, Open Markets Institute
Panel 2: Antitrust and Organized Labor: Recent and Future Developments
The relationship between antitrust law and collective bargaining rights is in a dynamic period. Courts have interpreted the Clayton Act’s labor exemption as potentially covering independent contractors; legislators have explored group bargaining rights for gig workers and online content creators; and the Federal Trade Commission has defined a relevant market for union labor in a merger case. This panel will explore the significance of recent developments in the antitrust treatment of collective bargaining rights and consider what these trends may portend for antitrust law’s future role in the labor movement.
Moderator:
Randy Stutz, President, American Antitrust Institute
Panelists:
Hiba Hafiz, Associate Professor, Boston College Law School
Marina Lao, Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law
Eric Posner, Kirkland & Ellis Distinguished Service Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School
Steven Salop, Professor of Economics and Law, Georgetown University Law Center
Networking Break
Luncheon and Award Presentations
Jerry S. Cohen Award for Antitrust Scholarship
Alfred E. Kahn Award for Antitrust Achievement
Michael Kades, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Division
Acceptance by Peter Carstensen, Fred W. & Vi Miller Chair in Law Emeritus, University of Wisconsin Law School
Break
Panel 3: Assessing Current Litigation Involving Digital Information Sharing and Algorithmic Pricing
Cartels are often associated with a small number of firms selling homogenous products in a concentrated market, but history is replete with examples where large groups of sellers successfully cartelized an industry by establishing collective governance rules or other overt mechanisms for colluding. AI-powered pricing algorithms are the newest weapon threatening to empower durable cartels by facilitating collusive price setting among groups of online sellers. This panel will take stock of the earliest, path-breaking litigation over algorithmic collusion in rental housing, casino hotels, and other markets. It will also explore legal, economic, strategic, and practical considerations facing lawyers and expert witnesses in future algorithmic collusion cases.
Moderator:
Joshua P. Davis, Shareholder, Berger Montague
Panelists:
Boris Bershteyn, Partner, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher and Flom, LLP
Fatima Brizuela, Attorney, Scott+Scott
Cecilia Cheng, Counsel to the Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Division
Maggie Herrington, Senior Manager, Cirque Analytics
Closing Remarks


Kathleen W. Bradish
Vice President and Director of Legal Advocacy



Cecilia Cheng
Counsel to the Assistant Attorney General

Joshua P. Davis
Research Professor in Residence, UC Law San Francisco






Eric Posner
Kirkland & Ellis Distinguished Service Professor of Law


Panel 1: The Law and Economics of Countervailing Power: Key Issues and Principles
Alexander, Laura. Countervailing Power: A comprehensive Assessment of a Persistent but Troubling Idea, https://www.
Hemphill, C. Scott and Nancy Rose: Mergers that Harm Sellers, https://www.
Panel 2: Antitrust and Organized Labor: Recent and Future Developments
Hafiz, Hiba.Towards a Progressive Labor Antitrust, Available at SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4668316
Lao, Marina. Standalone Antitrust Labor Immunity, Available at SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3768626
Posner, Eric. The New Labor Antitrust, Available at SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4575258
Salop, Steven. An Antitrust Exemption for Workers: And Why Worker Bargaining Power Benefits Consumers, Too, Available at: https://www.americanbar.org/digital-asset-abstract.html/content/dam/aba/publications/antitrust/journal/85/3/an-antitrust-exemption-for-workers.pdf
Panel 3: Assessing Current Litigation Involving Digital Information Sharing and Algorithmic Pricing
Assad, Stephanie and Emilio Calvano, Giacomo Calzolari, Robert Clark, Vincenzo Denicolò, Daniel Ershov, Justin Johnson, Sergio Pastorello, Andrew Rhodes, Lei Xu, Matthijs Wildenbeest. Autonomous algorithmic collusion: Economic research and policy implications, https://www.tse-fr.eu/sites/default/files/TSE/documents/doc/wp/2021/wp_tse_1210.pdf
Federal Trade Commission and U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Division. Statement of Interest of the United States: Karen Cornish-Adebiyi, et al. v. Caesars Entertainment, Inc., et al., https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ftc_gov/pdf/joint_statement.pdf
OECD (2017). Algorithms and Collusion: Competition Policy in the Digital Age,
https://www.oecd.org/competition/algorithms-collusion-competition-policy-in-the-digital-age.htm