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by on November 23, 2015

AAI Pushes Back Against Heightened Pleading Standards in Pay-for-Delay Cases (In re Effexor XR Antitrust Litigation)

In an amicus brief filed with 48 law, economics, and business professors, the American Antitrust Institute (AAI) has asked the Third Circuit Court of Appeals to reverse a district court’s invocation of Twombly and Iqbal to dismiss a direct-purchaser class action challenging a brand drug manufacturer’s payment for delayed generic entry by way of a “no authorized generic” (No-AG) promise.

Class plaintiffs alleged that Defendant Wyeth had unlawfully extended its monopoly on the branded drug Effexor by settling patent litigation with an agreement by generic challenger Teva to delay Teva’s entry into the market in exchange for Wyeth’s agreement not to launch an authorized generic version of Effexor. Because a brand manufacturer is permitted to introduce an “authorized generic” version of its drug during the 180-day generic exclusivity period awarded to a successful generic challenger under the Hatch-Waxman Act, a No-AG promise from the brand to a settling generic conveys tremendous value to the generic.

The district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint on grounds that it did not provide evidence through which the court could determine the monetary value of the No-AG promise.

The amicus brief argues that the district court erred in requiring plaintiffs, at the motion-to-dismiss stage, to provide evidentiary support typically considered at summary judgment or even trial. Just as problematic, the court assigned plaintiffs a burden to introduce evidence that the Supreme Court in Actavis determined defendants must bear in justifying payment. The professors and the AAI contend that these developments fly in the face of Actavis and binding Third Circuit precedent, and contravene pleading standards articulated in Twombly, Iqbal, and the Third Circuit’s rulings.

The brief was written by AAI Advisory Board Members Michael Carrier and Steve Shadowen.

by on November 10, 2015

Class Action Issues Update Fall 2015

As part of our efforts to promote the vitality of private enforcement and preserve antitrust class actions in particular, the American Antitrust Institute (AAI) issues periodic updates on developments in the courts and elsewhere that may affect this important device for protecting competition and consumers.

This update covers developments since the Summer 2015 update. Many of these timely issues will be considered at the AAI’s 9th Annual Private Enforcement Conference, which will be held November 18, 2015, at the National Press Club in Washington D.C., and will feature a panel on Developments on Class Certification in the Antitrust Context.

I.         Classes That Include Some Members Who Are Not Injured

The Supreme Court has taken up the question of whether a class may be certified under Rule 23(b)(3) if it includes members who were not injured and have no legal right to any damages. Tyson Foods Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 765 F.3d 791 (8th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 135 S.Ct. 2806 (U.S. June 8, 2015) (No. 14-1146).  AAI has been actively involved in this issue.[1]  Although Tyson Foods is a Fair Labor Standards Act case, the issue is important to antitrust class actions because, for instance, statistical models used to show common injury for class certification in cartel cases often predict that some class members may avoid paying overcharges.  Oral argument is scheduled for November 10, 2015.  The Solicitor General filed a brief in support of plaintiffs and will participate in oral argument.

The Supreme Court may not actually reach the question because, from the briefs, it is not clear that it is squarely raised.  Tyson objects to what it describes as a “single-sum class-wide verdict from which each purported class member, damaged or not, will receive a pro-rata portion of the jury’s one-figure verdict.”  However, plaintiffs reject this characterization, noting that “the judgment does not award damages to, or on account of, uninjured people.  The jury was instructed not to award damages to uninjured class members and had the evidence needed to avoid doing so.”

The Solicitor General suggests that the Court dismiss certiorari on this issue as improvidently granted because Tyson concedes that a class can be certified with uninjured members as long as there is some mechanism, prior to judgment, to ensure that uninjured class members do not contribute to the size of the damage award and cannot recover damages (in effect, Tyson argues for a rigorous ascertainability requirement, see below).

Tyson Foods also raises the question of whether class-wide liability and damages can be determined by statistical techniques based on averages.  And as with uninjured class members, the Court may not address this issue in any general way because plaintiffs have adopted a narrow argument. Plaintiffs maintain that representative proof is permitted because the employer failed to keep the time records required by the Fair Labor Standards Act that would have allowed individualized assessment.

II.        Offers of Judgment and Mootness 

The Supreme Court is considering whether defendants can defeat class actions by “picking off” the proposed class representatives with an offer of “complete relief” for the representatives’ individual claims, even when the offer to settle is rejected.  Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 768 F.3d 861 (2014), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 2311 (U.S. May 18, 2015) (No. 14-857).  This tactic, if permitted, could pose particular risks to small-dollar indirect purchaser class actions.  The Court heard oral argument on October 14, 2015.  The Solicitor General filed a brief in support of plaintiffs and participated in oral argument.

Campbell-Ewald addresses an issue left open in Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 133 S. Ct. 1523 (2013), in which a sharply divided Court effectively held that the mootness of a class representative’s claim prior to certification precluded a class action.  The majority in Genesis Healthcare did not reach the question of whether an unaccepted Rule 68 offer mooted the class representative’s claim itself, while the four liberal dissenting Justices took the position that such an unaccepted offer was a legal nullity.  Given the division in Genesis Healthcare, it came as no surprise that the Court appeared sharply divided at oral argument as to whether and how an unaccepted offer of complete relief might moot the individual class representative’s claim.

It would not be surprising if the Court concluded that an unaccepted Rule 68 offer alone did not moot the class representative’s claim.[2] However, there seemed to be some support for the proposition that “complete relief” embodied in a tender and entry of judgment for the plaintiff (over the plaintiff’s objection and without preclusive effect) was permissible and would moot or terminate the plaintiff’s claim. Whether “complete relief” would have to take into account the class representative’s continued interest in a success fee, or in sharing fees and expenses with other class members, remains to be seen.

III.      Ascertainability 

Some courts have adopted a rigorous “ascertainability” requirement as a precondition for class certification, demanding not only that the class definition be based on objective criteria, but also that an “administratively feasible” method must exist for identifying individual class members and ascertaining their class membership.  Recent cases applying a heightened ascertainability requirement include In re Processed Egg Products Antitrust Litig., 2015 WL 5544524 (E.D. Pa. Sep. 18, 2015) (rejecting use of affidavits from consumers), and Brecher v. Republic of Argentina, 2015 WL 5438797 (2d Cir. Sep. 16, 2015) (clarifying that “touchstone of ascertainability is whether the class is sufficiently definite so that it is administratively feasible for the court to determine whether a particular individual is a member”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

A unanimous panel of the Seventh Circuit recently rejected any heightened requirement of ascertainability in Mullins v. Direct Digital, LLC, 795 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 2015).  The court expressly rejected the Third Circuit’s restrictive approach in Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300 (3d Cir. 2013), finding the Third Circuit’s policy reasons for requiring more than affidavits from putative class members to be unpersuasive. Importantly, the Seventh Circuit stated “By focusing on making absolutely certain that compensation is distributed only to those individuals who were actually harmed, the heightened ascertainability requirement has ignored an equally important policy objective of class actions: deterring and punishing corporate wrongdoing.” Mullins, 795 F.3d at 668 (internal quotation marks omitted).

The defendant has filed a petition for certiorari based on a conflict in the circuits. Direct Digital, LLC v. Mullins, 15-549 (docketed Oct. 29, 2015), 2015 WL 6549672.

IV.       Cy Pres

The Ninth Circuit is hearing two appeals involving cy pres awards.  Objectors argue that the cy pres awards are inappropriate under the ALI Principles because they claim it would have been feasible to return some (or more) funds to members of very large consumer classes.  See Gaos v. Google, Inc., No. 15-15858 (9th Cir.) (docketed Apr. 28, 2015); Fraley v. Facebook, Inc., No. 13-16819 (9th Cir.) (argued Sep. 17, 2015).

The Google case involves an $8.5 million settlement of a privacy claim related to search queries where all of the funds were approved to go to cy pres recipients for Internet privacy protection projects, rather than to any of the more than 100 million class members.  The objectors argue that a claims process was feasible because only a negligible number of class members would  likely submit claims.  They also challenge the choice of cy pres recipients because of the affiliation of plaintiffs’ lawyers and Google with the recipients’ institutions.

The Facebook case involves a $20 million settlement of a privacy claim related to “sponsored stories” where the class exceeded 150 million members. A claims process was used, at the urging of the district court, which will result in a distribution of $15 to each claimant, with the remainder going to cy pres.  Nonetheless, the objectors argue that the balance should be returned to claimants.

V.        Class-Action Waivers

The Supreme Court heard oral argument on October 6, 2015, in DirecTV v. Imburgia, 135 S. Ct. 1547 (No. 14-462). The case involves the question of whether a class-action waiver is enforceable in an arbitration agreement that incorporates state law, where the law would bar enforcement but is preempted. During oral argument some Justices expressed frustration with the California courts’ engaging in what the Justices described as a “run around” of Court decisions, but other Justices questioned the power of the Court to rule on a point of state contract interpretation.

On October 7, 2015, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau announced that it would initiate a formal rulemaking process to regulate arbitration agreements in consumer finance products.  Companies could still have an arbitration clause, but they would have to say explicitly that it does not apply to cases brought on behalf of a class unless and until class certification is denied by the court, or the class claims are dismissed in court.

VI.       Proposed Legislation 

H.R. 1927, the “Fairness in Class Action Litigation Act,” was passed out of committee on June 24, 2015, and is awaiting a floor vote. As previously noted, the bill would likely eviscerate consumer, antitrust, employment, and civil rights class actions by barring class certification unless proponents demonstrate, based on a “rigorous analysis,” that each person in a class has suffered “the same type and scope of injury.”  A comparable Senate bill has yet to be introduced.

VII.     Advisory Committee on Civil Rules 

The Rule 23 subcommittee of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules has revised and refined its work on possible class action amendments, which it anticipates publishing in draft form in August 2016.  The subcommittee’s agenda book for the meeting of the Advisory Committee, scheduled for November 5-6, 2015, indicates that the subcommittee has narrowed potential amendments to six issues: (1) “frontloading,”[3] (2) excluding preliminary approvals of class certification from immediate appeal, (3) clarifying the trigger for the opt-out period, (4) notice to unnamed class members, (5) handling objections to proposed settlements, and (6) criteria for settlement class certification.

The subcommittee put two issues on hold (ascertainability and Rule 68 “pick off” offers), and recommended removing two other issues (cy pres and issue classes).  With regard to Chief Justice Roberts’ concern about the manner in which cy pres issues have been handled in some cases, the subcommittee noted that the ALI addressed these issues in § 3.07 of its Principles of Aggregate Litigation, and that the courts are increasingly referring to the ALI formulation in addressing these issues.  The subcommittee “concluded that a rule amendment would not be likely to improve the handling of these issues, and that it could raise the risk of undesirable side effects.”

VIII.   Foreign Developments

The U.K. Consumer Rights Act 2015, which amended the Competition Act 1998 to establish “opt out” collective proceedings in competition cases, went into force on October 1, 2015.  The opt-out provision applies only to UK domiciled claimants; however, non-UK domiciled claimants may opt in to such actions.  Whether the law will attract antitrust class action activity in the UK remains to be seen.  UK law continues to prohibit contingency fee agreements related to opt-out collective proceedings, and loser-pays principles still apply.  On the other hand, third-party litigation funding is permitted, insurance is available against an award of costs, and success-fee arrangements are permitted.  Activity under the new law initially may be limited because of transitional rules involving the statute of limitations.

Comments or suggestions for amicus participation should be directed to AAI Vice President and General Counsel Richard Brunell at rbrunell@antitrustinstitute.org or 202-600-9640.

 


[1] See AAI’s successful amicus brief in In re Nexium Antitrust Litig., 777 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 2015).

[2] Every Court of Appeals to consider the question has now adopted this position.

[3] This refers to requiring that certain key information is provided to the judge asked to approve class action settlements.

by on November 9, 2015

AAI Files Comments on Competition and Open Skies

Today the AAI filed comments with the Departments of Transportation, Department of State, and Department of Commerce on the debate surrounding entry into U.S. markets under Open Skies agreements. The comment was filed in DOT-OST-2015-0082 and can be found here.

by on November 6, 2015

AAI Says SMARTER Act Not So Smart – Antitrust Agency Enforcement Data Do Not Support the Premise of the Legislation

Today the American Antitrust Institute (AAI) issued “Antitrust Enforcement Data Shows SMARTER Act Is Not So Smart.” The brief analysis and commentary casts doubt on the wisdom of the Standard Merger and Acquisition Reviews Through Equal Rules Act (“SMARTER Act”). The proposed legislation seeks to eliminate supposedly disparate treatment of mergers handled by the DOJ and FTC by (1) preventing the FTC from ever using its administrative process to adjudicate a proposed merger, and (2) requiring the FTC to meet the DOJ’s theoretically more stringent standard for obtaining a preliminary injunction to block a merger in federal court.

After the October 7, 2015 Senate Antitrust Subcommittee hearing on the SMARTER Act, AAI reviewed workload statistics from the FTC and DOJ to test the “theory” underlying the bill. The analysis  shows that the SMARTER Act’s premise – unfairness caused by the FTC’s differently worded procedures and standards – is not supported by the data. On the contrary, the workload data demonstrate that firms that have their merger reviewed by the DOJ are more likely to have their deal closely scrutinized or challenged than firms whose mergers are reviewed by the FTC.

by on September 28, 2015

AAI Supports Scrutiny of Drug “Product Hopping” in Doryx Case (Mylan Pharmaceuticals v. Warner Chilcott)

The American Antitrust Institute (AAI) has filed an amicus brief urging the Third Circuit Court of Appeals to follow a recent decision of the Second Circuit and hold that “product hopping” by brand-name drug manufacturers is not immune from antitrust review.

Product hopping is a scheme by which a brand drug manufacturer seeks to thwart FDA-approved generic competition by switching patients to a reformulated version of the drug shortly before generics enter the market.  The AAI brief asks the Third Circuit to reverse a district court holding that Warner Chilcott’s reformulations of the dosage and form of the brand drug Doryx (a tetracycline used to treat severe acne) and withdrawals of earlier versions could not violate Section 2 of the Sherman Act, even if the primary purpose and effect was to defeat generic competition via generic substitution laws.

The brief explains why the case law and the peculiar characteristics of pharmaceutical markets require antitrust scrutiny of product hopping.  Product hopping prevents meaningful generic entry because it undermines the state drug product substitution laws that enable generic competition.  Those laws, which allow the pharmacist (with the consumer’s consent) to substitute a cheaper generic for a brand prescription, only apply when the brand and the generic are essentially identical.

If the prescription is written for a reformulation (a different form or a different dosage), consumers cannot buy the cheaper generic.  As a result of product hopping, the brand drug company is able to extend its monopoly even after the original brand drug goes off patent or otherwise loses its exclusivity.  Consumers and insurance plans pay millions of dollars more for drugs that may offer little or no additional therapeutic benefit.

In its brief, the AAI tells the Third Circuit that the lower court erred in reasoning that product hopping is not anticompetitive when generic manufacturers are not completely blocked from entering the market.  The brief argues that this is inconsistent with monopolization law and the practical reality that entry through generic substitution laws is the only efficient means of generic entry, as the Second Circuit recently explained in upholding an injunction against a product-hopping scheme involving the drug Namenda.

AAI’s brief also questions the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants on the ground that they lacked monopoly power.  According to AAI’s brief, the district court ignored well-accepted principles allowing the proof of monopoly power through direct evidence of anticompetitive effects.

The brief was written by AAI Vice President and General Counsel Richard Brunell, with help from various advisors and staff.  A copy is available here.  AAI’s brief in the Second Circuit case is available here.  For more information contact Richard Brunell, 202-600-9640.

by on September 22, 2015

AAI Urges the Department of Justice to Take a Broad Look at Potential Collusion in U.S. Airlines

In a letter to Assistant Attorney General Bill Baer, the AAI encouraged the U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Division to take a broad “lens” in looking into potential collusion in the domestic airline industry.

AAI’s letter notes that potential anticompetitive coordination is not limited to capacity discipline to maintain supracompetitive fares. It is also important to consider parallel conduct involving fees for ancillary services and on certain “rules” of commerce. The latter include policies and strategies that could impair competition from the rival distribution channels that are critical for promoting transparency and comparison-shopping. The letter summarizes the fundamental changes in the domestic airline industry over the last decade that give rise to concerns over potential collusion in the domestic airline industry and goes on to suggest a range of opportunities for potential coordinated conduct that the AAI believes are important to scrutinize.

by on September 11, 2015

Professor Tim Greaney, AAI Advisory Board Member, Testifies Before House Judiciary Committee on the State of Competition in the Health Care Marketplace

AAI Advisory Board member Professor Thomas L. Greaney testified on September 10, 2015 before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Regulatory Reform, Commercial and Antitrust Law. The hearings addressed The State of Competition in the Health Care Marketplace: The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act’s Impact on Competition. Professor Greaney’s testimony is now available, along with the link to the webcast.

by on September 8, 2015

Working Paper No. 15-03: A History of the FTC’s Bureau of Economics

The Institute for Consumer Antitrust Studies, at Loyola University Chicago School of Law and the American Antitrust Institute (AAI) are pleased to announce the publication of the first comprehensive history of the Bureau of Economics of the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC). Former FTC economist Dr. Paul Pautler’s A History of the FTC’s Bureau of Economics is now available on the websites of both institutes.

AAI President and economist, Dr. Diana Moss, noted “We are pleased to highlight this novel history, particularly in light of the evolution and role of economics in the antitrust issues studied by our institutes.” Professor Spencer Weber Waller, Director of the Institute for Consumer Antitrust Studies added “We are thrilled to work with Paul Pautler and the AAI to make this comprehensive and important work available to scholars and policymakers in the public domain, on a lasting basis.”

A History of the FTC’s Bureau of Economics is available for free as a 2015 Working paper at the website of the Institute for Consumer Antitrust Studies, on the AAI website as Working Paper No.  15-03, and on SSRN.com.

Dr. Pautler served at the FTC in numerous capacities from 1978 to 2014, notably as a Deputy Director of the Bureau of Economics for over 25 years. He received a number of awards, including the FTC’s Robert Pitofsky Lifetime Achievement Award in 2013. Dr. Pautler’s other published work covers industrial organization, antitrust policy, health care economics, and regulation. He is currently working on a book on the economics of consumer protection. He lives with his wife of 37 years in the foothills of the Blue Ridge Mountains in Southwest Virginia.

The American Antitrust Institute is an independent, nonprofit education, research, and advocacy organization working to increase the role of competition, assure that competition serves the interests of consumers, and challenge abuses of concentrated economic power in the American and world economy.

The Institute for Consumer Antitrust Studies is a non-partisan, independent academic center designed to explore the impact of antitrust enforcement on the individual consumer and the public.  The Institute seeks to promote a more competitive consumer friendly economy.

 

Media Contacts:
Spencer Weber Waller
Professor and Director
Institute for Consumer Antitrust Studies
Loyola University Chicago School of Law
312-915-7137
Swalle1@luc.edu
www.luc.edu/antitrust

Diana Moss
President
American Antitrust Institute
202-536-3408
dmoss@antitrustinstitute.org
www.antitrustinstitute.org

by on July 31, 2015

Foer and Brobeck’s Antitrust Advocacy Chapter From Watchdogs and Whistleblowers, a Reference Guide to Consumer Activism

AAI’s Bert Foer and CFA’s Steve Brobeck contributed a chapter on “Antitrust Advocacy” in the new volume: Watchdogs and Whistleblowers, a Reference Guide to Consumer Activism (Greenwood, 2015), Stephen Brobeck and Robert N. Mayer, eds.  Read the chapter here.

by on July 30, 2015

Farm, Consumer and Competition Groups Oppose JBS-Cargill Pork Merger Deal Would Concentrate Buyer and Seller Power in Pork Industry

Today, American Antitrust Institute, Food & Water Watch, Iowa Farmers Union, Missouri Rural Crisis Center and National Farmers Union demanded that the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) investigate the proposed JBS-Cargill pork packing acquisition. The proposed $1.45 billion acquisition would create the second largest pork processing company in the U.S. The groups are concerned that increased concentration in the pork packing industry would harm hog farmers and consumers.

“The wave of mega-mergers sweeping the food and agribusiness industries encourages a cascade of consolidation throughout the supply chain,” said Wenonah Hauter, Food & Water Watch executive director. “The rampant consolidation is raising consumer prices, reducing consumer choices and undermining the economic livelihood of farmers.”

Food & Water Watch, Iowa Farmers Union, Missouri Rural Crisis Center and National Farmers Union also submitted a joint white paper documenting the anticompetitive effects of the proposed JBS-Cargill acquisition. The proposed deal would significantly increase the pork packing industry’s power over hog farmers.

A combined JBS and Cargill would accelerate vertical integration and reliance on hog production contracts. It would also, the white paper concludes, concentrate the wholesale pork product market, disadvantaging grocery stores and restaurants and ultimately raising pork prices for consumers. Post-merger, the largest two pork packing firms operating in the U.S. — Smithfield and JBS — would be controlled by foreign companies.

“The JBS-Cargill merger would combine the third and fourth largest pork packing companies in the United States, further concentrating an industry that is already run by just a handful of firms,” said National Farmers Union President Roger Johnson. “The rapid consolidation of market power in the hands of just a few pork processors has resulted in the loss of more than 90 percent of all hog farms since 1980. The JBS-Cargill merger certainly warrants further investigation by the Department of Justice and should be stopped.”

If the proposed acquisition were approved, the four largest pork packers would slaughter about three-quarters of hogs, up from about two-thirds today. The white paper extensively examines how the proposed acquisition would increase the economic market power of pork packers over farmers in the Midwestern hog belt. The proposed merger would reduce the number hog buyers and marketing options for hog farmers. After the proposed acquisition, the top four pork packers would control 94.5 percent of the market in Iowa alone, 85.5 percent in Iowa and surrounding states and 82.3 percent in Illinois-Indiana and surrounding states.

“The JBS-Cargill merger would reduce the number of hog buyers in the Midwest and allow the pork packers to further depress the prices farmers receive for their hogs,” said Rhonda Perry, Program Director at Missouri Rural Crisis Center and livestock and grain farmer in Howard County, Missouri. “The pork packing monopoly has already driven almost all the independent hog farmers out of business. The Justice Department has to stand up for America’s farmers and rural communities and block this merger.”

Rapid consolidation in the food and agriculture sectors has been of rising concern to farmers, consumers and federal regulators. Since the economy began to recover from the recession, the pace of mergers has accelerated and threatens to increase concentration in the already over-consolidated food and agriculture sectors.

AAI’s President, Diana Moss, explained “This merger could also create ripple effects throughout the food chain by spurring additional mergers to push back against the greater market power of JBS and Cargill. With less and less competition, we should be gravely concerned about the safety and stability of our important food supply chain.”

#          #          #

The letter to the U.S. Department of Justice is available here.

The Anticompetitive Effects of the Proposed JBS-Cargill Pork Packing Acquisition white paper is available here.

 

For more information, contact:

Diana Moss, President, American Antitrust Institute, (202) 536-3408, dmoss@antitrustinstitute.org

Kate Fried, Food & Water Watch: (202) 683-4905, kfried@fwwatch.org

Andrew Jerome, National Farmers Union, (202) 314-3106, ajerome@nfudc.org

Tim Gibbons, Missouri Rural Crisis Center, (573) 449-1336, timgibbons@morural.org

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