The Anticompetitive Effects of the Proposed JBS-Cargill Pork Packing Acquisition

July 2015
I. Introduction

The proposed acquisition of Cargill Pork (Cargill) by JBS S.A. (JBS) would significantly reduce competition in the hog processing and slaughter industry, disadvantaging hog producers, wholesale pork buyers and, ultimately, consumers. The scale and scope of the proposed acquisition warrant substantial scrutiny by the U.S. Department of Justice.

JBS and Cargill are already two of the largest meatpackers in the United States and globally. In the United States, the combined firms sold $59 billion worth of meat products in 2014 making them the second and third largest meat processing firms behind Tyson Foods. Brazil-based JBS is the world’s largest meat company and the second largest beef packer, second largest poultry processor and third largest pork packer in the United States. Cargill is the largest privately held company in the United States and the third largest meat processor in the United States. The proposed acquisition also would mean that the top two pork packing firms — Smithfield and JBS — are controlled by foreign companies.

The proposed $1.45 billion acquisition would join the third and fourth largest pork packing companies and the post-acquisition JBS would surpass Tyson Foods to become the second largest hog processor in the country behind Smithfield. It also would create a considerably more vertically integrated JBS. The deal includes Cargill’s two pork slaughter and processing plants (located in Ottumwa, Iowa and Beardstown, Illinois), five feed mills (located in Missouri, Arkansas, Iowa, and Texas), along with four hog production facilities (located in Arkansas, Oklahoma, and Texas). Cargill’s hog production facilities were the eighth largest in the country in 2014, with 161,000 sows.

The merger extends JBS’ long-term effort to become the dominant protein company in each market. The company has grown into the largest meat processor in the world primarily through large acquisitions. JBS has “a very aggressive growth strategy” and growth through acquisitions is “in [the company’s] DNA.” The proposed Cargill acquisition represents “a strategic investment in the long-term growth of [JBS’] domestic and global pork business and demonstrates [the company’s] commitment to the U.S. livestock sector.”

The proposed merger would enable JBS to grow to become a more dominant and more vertically integrated meat manufacturer and violates the Clayton Act’s prohibition against mergers that may “substantially to

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6 JBS USA (2015).
lessen competition, or tend to create a monopoly.” \(^{10}\) The proposed merger runs afoul of the U.S. Department of Justice’s merger guidance stating “[m]ergers should not be permitted to create, enhance, or entrench market power or to facilitate its exercise.” \(^{11}\)

Rapid consolidation in the food and agriculture sectors has been of rising concern to farmers, consumers and federal regulators. Since the economy began to recover from the recession, the pace of mergers has accelerated and threatens to increase concentration in the already over-consolidated food and agriculture sectors. In 2014, there were more than more than 300 food and beverage mergers and acquisitions valued over $120 billion. \(^{12}\) The proposed acquisition contributes to the growing size and market power of the top meat and poultry processors that has had tremendous ripple effects across the food chain. Mergers and acquisitions in one portion of the food chain are used to justify reverberating mergers up and down the agribusiness, food manufacturing and retailing sectors.

Only robust antitrust enforcement can protect consumers and farmers from anticompetitive combinations and practices. A May 2012 Department of Justice report “stressed the importance of vigorous antitrust enforcement” and detailed the ways that anticompetitive mergers and conduct can harm farmers, consumers and others. \(^{13}\)

As President Barack Obama observed in his 2013 Inaugural Address “a free market only thrives when there are rules to ensure competition and fair play.” \(^{14}\)

The proposed acquisition creates a substantially more concentrated hog slaughter market and would give JBS-Cargill the capacity and incentive to profitably exert this market power over its rivals, farmers and consumers. It would significantly increase the company’s buyer power over farmers, both nationally and in the Midwest regions surrounding each facility (Section II). It would increase the anticompetitive vertical integration in the industry, reducing options for farmers selling hogs on the open market, delivering hogs under contract or raising hogs under production contracts (Section III). It would also further concentrate the market for wholesale pork products, raising prices for retailers, further processing companies and foodservice outlets (Section IV). Ultimately these price increases would be passed onto consumers at the grocery store (Section V). The combined increase in monopsony market power over hog producers and the increase in monopoly market power over consumers acts as a transfer of economic welfare from both farmers and eaters to what would become the second largest pork packer in the United States.

The Department of Justice must oppose the early termination of the antitrust review and issue a second request under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act to fully examine the anticompetitive and anti-consumer impacts of the proposed acquisition. \(^{15}\) We believe the Department of Justice should ultimately enjoin this merger.


\(^{13}\) U.S. Department of Justice. “Competition and Agriculture: Voices from the Workshops on Agriculture and Antitrust Enforcement in our 21st Century Economy.” May 2012 at 2.


II. Proposed Acquisition Would Exacerbate Buyer Power Over Hog Farmers

The proposed acquisition would increase the buyer power concentration over hog farmers in an already consolidated hog slaughter and processing sector. Over the past few decades, the U.S. pork packing and processing industry has gained a dominant position over hog farmers through mergers, acquisitions and the emergence of contractual relationships between packers and producers. The appropriate market to measure pork packer buyer power is live slaughter hogs (gilts and barrows) within the appropriate regional markets encompassing captive draw areas (see below for analyses of several regions of concern).

Competition among processors is critical for the thousands of farmers trying to earn a living selling their hogs. In 2013, 111 million hogs were purchased at a cost of over $20 billion. In 2014, commercial hog slaughter was 106.9 million head. 28.6 million of them were in Iowa alone.

The hog production sector is horizontally concentrated (only a few companies buy, slaughter and process the majority of hogs) and vertically integrated (pork packers have tight contractual relationships with hog producers throughout all stages of production). Meatpacking “concentration levels are among the highest of any industry in the United States, and well above levels generally considered to elicit non-competitive behavior and result in adverse economic performance,” according to Oklahoma State University professor Clement Ward. This horizontal consolidation and vertical integration in the pork packing industry has contributed significantly to the decline in the number of hog farms. The United States has lost 150,000 hog operations — about 70 percent — between 1993 and 2012.

National concentration in the hog slaughter industry has nearly doubled over the past three decades as mergers significantly reduced the number of competitors and increased market concentration. In 1982, the four largest firms slaughtered one out of three hogs (35.8 percent) nationally. By

that figure nearly doubled, as the four biggest companies slaughtered two out of three hogs (65.5 percent) (see Figure 1).21 Since the 1990s, Smithfield Foods, the nation’s largest pork processor, absorbed competitors including John Morrell, Premium Standard Farms and Farmland, which had facilities and operations throughout the Midwest.22 In 2001, Tyson Foods bought IBP, which had four hog packing plants in Iowa.23

The proposed acquisition would significantly increase the national concentration in pork packing. If the proposed acquisition were approved, the top four pork packers would slaughter three out of four hogs (74.0 percent), a 13.0 percent increase (see Table 1). The proposed acquisition would represent the largest increase in pork packer concentration in the past 25 years, significantly larger than when Smithfield purchased Farmland in 2003.24

The proposed acquisition would create a moderately concentrated national hog packer market, with a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) increase over 200 with a national HHI of over 1,600 that “potentially raise[s] significant competitive concerns [that] often warrant scrutiny.” 25 The proposed acquisition would make the three largest pork packers much closer in size and considerably larger than the next largest packers. Prior to the proposed deal, JBS and Cargill were only slightly larger than the next largest rival, Hormel (with 11.6, 8.7 and 8.5 percent of the national slaughter capacity, respectively). After the proposed deal, JBS-Cargill would be twice as large as Hormel and about four times larger than the fifth and sixth largest firms (Triumph and Seaboard, each with under 5 percent of the national slaughter capacity).

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**Table 1: National Pork Packing Concentration**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Slaughter Capacity (head/day)</th>
<th>Market Share</th>
<th>Post-Merger Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Smithfield</td>
<td>114,400</td>
<td>117,000</td>
<td>118,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tyson Foods</td>
<td>76,775</td>
<td>76,925</td>
<td>76,925</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JBS-Swift</td>
<td>47,000</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cargill Pork</td>
<td>37,800</td>
<td>37,800</td>
<td>37,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hormel</td>
<td>37,300</td>
<td>37,300</td>
<td>36,800</td>
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<td>CR-4</td>
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<tr>
<td>HHI-4</td>
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<td>HHI-All</td>
<td>1,412</td>
<td>1,418</td>
<td>1,422</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Analysis of National Pork Board data.

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24 The proposed acquisition increases the four-firm concentration ratio by 10 percentage points, a nearly 16 percent relative increase. The 2003 Smithfield-Farmland merger was associated with a 7 percentage point increase in the four-firm concentration ratio, a relative increase of 13 percent. John Morrell. [Press release]. “John Morrell president urges Senators to clear Smithfield-Farmland Foods transaction.” July 23, 2003.
A. Buyer power extracts value from farmers

The proposed acquisition would substantially strengthen monopsony buyer power and enable JBS-Cargill to exercise unilateral and coordinated market power to depress hog prices paid to producers and farmers. The rising concentration in the pork packing industry increases buyer power significantly and gives firms more leverage over farmer suppliers. This power dynamic allows processors to exercise considerable control over farmers, lower the prices they pay for hogs and more easily collude with other packers, either tacitly or expressly.

Pork packers and processors are the gatekeepers of the hog and pork sector. These firms can source hogs from thousands of different farmers but the farmers sell most of their hogs to only a handful of firms. Farmers generally sell all their marketable hogs to one buyer, which gives pork packers tremendous bargaining power over farmers. The decline in the number of hog buyers has left fewer selling options for hog producers, which puts them under increased pressure to take whatever price they can get, even if it does not cover their costs.

Consolidation has made it easier for pork packers to tacitly collude to drive down prices. All pork packers benefit when the prices they pay to producers are low, so there is little incentive to compete by bidding up prices and every incentive to exercise tacit coordinated market power. Buyers can withhold or lower their offers for hogs with little fear of competitors trying to pay more for the product. In some cases, there is only one buyer at hog auctions as a result of market consolidation. Consolidation also gives the pork packers a significant informational advantage over farmers because they regularly purchase large volumes of hogs and are more knowledgeable about prevailing market conditions. In 1990, when pork packer concentration levels were only half what they are today, a study found that the hog packing sector exhibited market buyer power that was “not statistically different from a collusive oligopsony.”

The perishability of most agricultural products significantly exacerbates the impact of market concentration and gives buyers unique leverage over farmers. Buyers can impose lower prices or unfavorable terms on farmers who must sell perishable products. Finished livestock are only at their ideal slaughter weight for a few weeks. Market hogs are slaughtered at an ideal weight of 265 pounds. If farmers cannot find decent prices for their hogs when they reach market weight, they must choose between bearing the cost of overfeeding their hogs while they search for alternate buyers and/or receiving less favorable prices.

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27 Ibid. at 4.
Buyer power is similar to seller power, but the power dynamics between pork packers buying hogs is different from the monopolistic power exerted by food companies on retail consumers. Buyers have different market incentives and operate in different marketplaces, and the limitations on buyer-side competition can be different than for sellers. Consolidated buyer markets and large single-firm buyer market shares can be more distorting and anticompetitive than seller markets.

Buyers can exert more market power over their suppliers with a smaller share of the purchasing market than sellers can exercise. Buyers can potentially exert unilateral dominance over suppliers with control of less than ten percent of the purchasing market. JBS and Cargill held about 10 percent of the national hog market before the proposed merger (11.6 and 8.7 percent, respectively), but the proposed acquisition would give JBS-Cargill more than one-fifth of the national hog market (20.3 percent), giving the post-merger firm considerably more leverage over hog farmers and capacity to disadvantage farmers in price negotiations and contracts.

Mergers and acquisitions have made the remaining pork packers significantly larger and helped to drive medium-sized firms out of business. Since 2003, six hog slaughter plants closed in the Midwest, reducing the total daily market for hogs by 22,500 head — the equivalent of eliminating Triumph Foods. This consolidation has reduced options and prices for farmers. A 1999 economic model by Purdue University estimated that a marketplace with 20 equally sized pork packers (akin to the national market in the late 1980s) would pay about 5 percent less than a perfectly competitive marketplace; a marketplace with eight firms would pay 18 percent less; and if there were only four firms, they would pay 28 percent less than a perfectly competitive market. The authors concluded, “We have shown that greater consolidation in the meat packing and processing industry creates a markdown effect on the prices farmers receive for live animals.”

34 Carstensen (2004) at 3.

38 Ibid. at 8.
As market concentration has increased, the real price farmers receive for their hogs has declined (see Figure 2). Between 1988 and 2012, the market share of the top four pork packers nearly doubled from 34 percent to 64 percent.\(^{39}\) Over the same period, real farmgate hog prices fell by about one-fifth (18 percent), from $84 per hundredweight in the period 1988 to 1992 to $68 per hundredweight between 2010 and 2014 (measured in inflation adjusted 2014 dollars).\(^{40}\) The proposed acquisition would only worsen this trend by strengthening JBS-Cargill’s overall leverage over hog farmers and strengthening its unilateral and coordinated market power to push down on hog prices. Even if the proposed acquisition contributed to small but significant reductions in the price farmers receive for hogs, it could have a significant impact on whether hog producers are economically viable or are forced to exit farming.\(^{41}\)

Farmers would be largely unable to avoid these price cuts. The livelihood of hog farmers depends on their ability to sell their hogs to buyers offering the best prices that enable them to pay for all of the costs that they incur, including production and transportation.\(^{42}\) Hog farming requires significant investment, infrastructure, and time considerations that are unique to those animals. Hog farmers cannot easily switch to another animal type or a commodity crop in order to avoid a small farmgate price decrease.

Nor would it be likely that new pork packers would enter the market to capitalize on JBS-Cargill’s exercise of market power by paying slightly more for hogs or charging slightly less for pork. New entry into pork processing is costly and time consuming. Construction of a large-scale slaughter facility would take hundreds of millions of dollars and the additional planning, design and permitting costs are substantial. A recent expansion of Cargill’s Ottumwa facility alone cost the company $25 million.\(^{43}\) Building a facility from scratch would likely be considerably more, and if a firm wanted to enter the market through purchasing an already completed facility, this current acquisition shows how much that can potentially cost. As the Department of Justice noted in its complaint against the Cargill-Continental grain merger, these factors make it unlikely that the “exercise of market power will be prevented by new entry […] or by any other countervailing competitive force.”\(^{44}\)

### B. Midwestern hog-buying geographic market

National concentration measurements can conceal much higher market concentration that farmers face at the regional or local level.\(^{45}\) Mergers can increase market power in regional markets where the merged firm can extract even minor price concessions

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that sellers cannot avoid.\textsuperscript{46} Pork packing plants are generally located near hog production areas to reduce livestock transportation costs from the farm to the slaughterhouse.\textsuperscript{47} The majority of U.S. hogs are produced in the Midwestern corn belt, where transportation costs and access to corn and soymeal feed ingredients is the lowest.\textsuperscript{48}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{46} U.S. v. Cargill (2000) at 19.
\end{itemize}

The proposed JBS-Cargill acquisition includes five pork packing plants, a JBS plant and a Cargill plant in Iowa, a JBS plant in Minnesota, a Cargill plant in Illinois and a JBS plant in Kentucky, spanning the hog producing region from Indiana to Minnesota, Nebraska and Missouri (see Map 1).\textsuperscript{49} The transportation cost and hog weight “shrinkage” limit the distance that hogs can be transported in order to reach a potential competing buyer’s processing facility.\textsuperscript{50}

Hogs are shipped on average 113 miles from

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{49} National Pork Board (2013) at 100; USDA NASS. 2012 Census of Agriculture Atlas Maps. “Number of Farms with 200 or More Hogs and Pigs: 2012.” 2014 at Map 12-M150.
  \item \textsuperscript{50} See Complaint at 7. U.S. v. JBS S.A. and National Beef Packing Co., LLC. (N.D. Ill. 2008) (No. 08-CV-05992).
\end{itemize}
farm to slaughterhouse, with a standard deviation of 96 miles.\textsuperscript{51} Almost all hogs would be shipped within two standard deviations of the average, or about 300 miles.\textsuperscript{52} The appropriate geographic markets to evaluate the proposed JBS-Cargill acquisition are the markets delineated by the overlapping draw areas of the JBS and Cargill pork packing plants.

In the overlapping 300-mile “draw areas” for the JBS and Cargill facilities, these facilities are two of a small number of competing pork processing plants. By acquiring Cargill’s facilities in these captive draw areas, JBS would be in a position to unilaterally, or in coordination with the few remaining competitors, depress prices paid to hog farmers because transportation costs would preclude producers from selling to more distant buyers outside the captive draw areas in sufficient quantities to prevent the price decrease.\textsuperscript{53}

The JBS and Cargill plants compete to source hogs with other large slaughter plants within this 300-mile draw. This area includes the major pork packers in Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska and South Dakota. This Midwestern region encompasses the buyer market for hogs for the proposed acquisition based on locations of the suppliers (hog farmers), transportation limitations and competitive landscape for hog purchases.\textsuperscript{54}

There are essentially two broad draw areas within this Midwestern hog and corn belt, the western draw of Iowa and surrounding states and the eastern draw of Illinois and Indiana and the surrounding states. These states represent half of the hog farms (49.2 percent) and two-thirds of the hog sales (66.2 percent) in the United States (see Table 2).\textsuperscript{55} The proposed acquisition reduces the options for the nearly 28,000 hog producers in both regions, substantially increases horizontal concentration and increases the monopsony buyer power of pork packers, giving them more market power to depress the prices farmers receive for their hogs. In this analysis, we examine the Iowa pork packing market, the Iowa and surrounding states market and the Illinois-Indiana and surrounding states market.


\textsuperscript{54} DoJ/FTC (2010) at 13 to 14.

\textsuperscript{55} USDA NASS. 2012 Census of Agriculture data.
These are imprecise but reasonable proxies for the changes to the hog slaughter markets that hog farmers would face under the proposed JBS-Cargill acquisition.

1) Iowa hog buying market

The Iowa pork packing market is already tremendously concentrated. Although 8 pork packing companies operate 11 plants in Iowa, the top four Iowa companies have slaughtered more than 9 out of 10 hogs for the past several years (see Table 3). This level of market concentration and the market shares of the top four firms have been fairly stable for almost a decade, suggesting that the market may already lack competition.\(^{56}\) Most of the changes in the concentration levels have related to market exits and, more rarely, entrants,\(^ {57}\) not the vibrancy of competition between the major packers. Iowa ranks number one in hog farms and sales, accounting for one-eighth of the nations hog operations and one-quarter of hog sales.\(^ {58}\) For hog farmers in the central part of the Iowa, they are most likely to sell or deliver their hogs to Iowa-based pork packing plants.

The proposed acquisition significantly increases concentration. Iowa’s pork packing is already highly concentrated, with an HHI of 3,000. The combination of JBS and Cargill would essentially double the capacity of JBS’ pork packing operations and make it 4 times larger than the third largest firm (Smithfield), more than 8 times larger than the fourth largest firm (Sioux-Preme Packing), 12 times larger than the fifth largest firm, 25 times larger than the sixth and 32 times larger than the smallest firm. The proposed acquisition would increase the HHI by 277 to 3,278. The Department of Justice Horizontal Merger Guidelines state that mergers resulting in highly concentrated markets with HHI increases over 200 points are “presumed to be likely to enhance market power.”\(^ {59}\)

2) Iowa and surrounding states hog buying market

The pork packing market for Iowa and surrounding states (Illinois, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska and South Dakota) is moderately concentrated with 15 firms and 26 plants, but the top four firms slaughtered three out of four hogs over the past several

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\(^{56}\) DoJ/FTC (2010) at 18.

\(^{57}\) National Pork Board (2013) at 101.

\(^{58}\) USDA NASS. 2012 Census of Agriculture data.

\(^{59}\) DoJ/FTC (2010) at 19.
years. The smallest 9 firms (each with only one plant) slaughtered only 6.7 percent of the hogs in 2014. In 2014, the pork packing concentration for Iowa and surrounding states had an HHI of 1,648, making it moderately concentrated (see Table 4).

The proposed acquisition would substantially increase concentration in the region, increasing the HHI by more than 400 points to an HHI of 2,066, making the pork packing industry 25 percent more concentrated. The Horizontal Merger Guidelines suggest that merger in moderately concentrated markets that increase HHI by more than 100 points “potentially raise significant competitive concerns and often warrant scrutiny.”

The proposed acquisition would double the slaughter capacity of JBS, making it the largest pork packer in the five-state region, slaughtering more than one-quarter of the hogs (28.9 percent) and JBS-Cargill would be substantially larger than almost other firms in the region. In Iowa and surrounding states, the post-acquisition JBS-Cargill would be more than 25 percent larger than both Tyson and Smithfield, the top two pork packers nationally, but it would also dwarf all other competitors (see Table 5). It would be 3 times larger than Hormel, the fourth largest firm nationally and regionally after the proposed acquisition, and 4 times larger than Triumph Foods, the fifth largest firm. It would be 16 times larger than the sixth largest, 17 times larger than the seventh largest and more than 50 times larger than the six smallest firms.

The significant size of the gap between the post-acquisition JBS-Cargill and most of the rest of the marketplace suggests that the remaining market participants will be unable to provide sufficient competition. The post-acquisition JBS-Cargill and the top two national firms would dominate the market and all would be many-fold larger than even the other largest national rivals operating in Iowa and surrounding states. This would make it easier for these three buyers to exercise coordinated market power that would disadvantage hog producers. Auction buyers would likely tacitly collude on prices through strategies including sharing buying agents, avoiding competitive bidding and withholding spot market purchases when prices are high. For example, since hog

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Slaughter Capacity (head/day)</th>
<th>Market Share</th>
<th>Post Merger Change</th>
<th>Δ</th>
<th>% Change</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Post JBS-Cargill</td>
<td>2012</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tyson Foods</td>
<td>61,475</td>
<td>61,625</td>
<td>61,625</td>
<td>61,625</td>
<td>23.4%</td>
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<td>Smithfield</td>
<td>59,600</td>
<td>62,000</td>
<td>61,000</td>
<td>61,000</td>
<td>22.7%</td>
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<tr>
<td>JBS-Swift</td>
<td>37,000</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>77,800</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cargill Pork</td>
<td>37,800</td>
<td>37,800</td>
<td>37,800</td>
<td>14.4%</td>
<td>14.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hormel</td>
<td>29,500</td>
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<td>29,500</td>
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<td>1,473</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>1,665</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Source: Analysis of National Pork Board data.

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60 DoJ/FTC (2010) at 19.  
61 Ibid. at 18.
Post-acquisition, concentration in the Illinois-Indiana market would go up significantly. The HHI in the region would rise by almost 500 points to 2,122, increasing concentration by 25 percent, significantly above the 100-point increase that would warrant close scrutiny under the Horizontal Merger Guidelines. In central Indiana, Illinois, eastern Ohio, the proposed acquisition would reduce the number of major packers from four to three (see Map 1), leaving farmers with even fewer options than producers in the Iowa market.

C. Proposed acquisition raises anticompetitive concerns similar to mergers in which DOJ intervened

The proposed JBS-Cargill acquisition would increase anticompetitive monopsony buyer power sufficiently for the post-acquisition firm to exercise unilateral or coordinated market power over hog producers throughout the Midwest. The above regional analysis of Iowa and surrounding states and Illinois-Indiana and surrounding states understates the effects of concentration that farmers would face after the proposed acquisition. These multistate regions are imprecise and the appropriate measurement for farmers is 300 miles from their farm and each of these regions has multiple overlapping captive draw areas.

For example, hog producers in western Illinois-southeastern Iowa-northeastern Missouri would lose an important potential competitive buyer. Instead of two Smithfield plants and two Cargill plants, three Tyson plants, and one JBS plant, there would be three Tyson plants, three JBS-Cargill plants and two Smithfield plants. For producers in southeastern Illinois and central Indiana, farmers would go from three major competitors to two. The analysis of the Iowa state market likely comes closest to

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Post-Merger Firm Rank</th>
<th>JBS-Cargill Compared to Rivals</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>#2 Tyson Foods</td>
<td>+26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#3 Smithfield</td>
<td>+28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#4 Hormel</td>
<td>3 x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#5 Triumph Foods</td>
<td>4 x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#6 Rantoul Foods</td>
<td>16 x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#7 Sioux-Preme Packing</td>
<td>17 x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#8 Premium Iowa Pork</td>
<td>26 x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#9 Spectrum Meat</td>
<td>49 x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#10 Dakota Pork</td>
<td>52 x</td>
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</table>

Source: Analysis of National Pork Board data.
reflecting the impact of the proposed acquisition on farmers, with the proposed acquisition causing a substantial increase in concentration and creating a highly-concentrated hog buying market.

The proposed acquisition’s expected result in highly-concentrated hog markets is comparable to several Department of Justice interventions to block mergers that increased buyer power over agricultural markets and farmers. In JBS’s attempt to acquire National Beef, the market for the purchase of fed cattle in the High Plains region would have had an HHI increase of over 500 points to 2,600. Additionally, in the wholesale boxed beef market, the acquisition would have also increased the HHI 500 points. In Tyson Foods’ acquisition of Hillshire, the HHI for the purchase of sows from farmers would have increased by more than 500 points to 2,100. The changes in HHI and concentration in the Cargill-Continental merger also triggered scrutiny. In the Texas Gulf port market for wheat, the post-merger Cargill would have accounted for 34 percent of all wheat purchases in the region and lead to an HHI increase of 451 for a total HHI of 2,611. The Ardent flour milling joint venture for hard wheat in the Los Angeles market would have increased the HHI by more than 200 points to over 2,500. These precedents warrant close scrutiny of the proposed acquisition and suggest that the Justice Department should enjoin the JBS-Cargill pork-packing merger.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Slaughter Capacity (head/day)</th>
<th>Market Share</th>
<th>Post Merger Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tyson Foods</td>
<td>68,900</td>
<td>69,000</td>
<td>69,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cargill Pork</td>
<td>37,800</td>
<td>37,800</td>
<td>37,800</td>
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<tr>
<td>Smithfield</td>
<td>30,200</td>
<td>31,100</td>
<td>30,100</td>
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<tr>
<td>JBS-Swift</td>
<td>28,500</td>
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<tr>
<td>Triumph Foods</td>
<td>20,000</td>
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<td>HHI-4</td>
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<td>HHI-All</td>
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| Source: Analysis of National Pork Board data.
III. Proposed acquisition accelerates vertical integration, shift to production contracts at JBS

The proposed acquisition will intensify vertical integration and the use of production contracts in the hog sector, disadvantaging farmers. Mergers and acquisitions tend to lead to more vertical integration, which increases market power and disadvantages farmers. Vertical integration by meat processors represents a growing share of the supply chain and tightly manages all aspects of meat and poultry production “from genetics to grocery.”

Pork packers often secure livestock through contract marketing arrangements or production contracts with farmers. These contracts give farmers a guaranteed market for their hogs, but large contract buyers can extract lower prices and distort and conceal prices. Marketing and production contracts undermine the cash market and enable packers to manipulate the spot market, which is used as the reference price for most contracts, creating a long-term downward pressure on the value of hogs — either the prices farmers receive at auction, the prices they receive for marketing contracts or the fees they receive for production contracts.

Vertically integrated hog processing companies use marketing or production contracts to secure the hogs they slaughter. In marketing contracts, farmers agree to deliver a certain number of hogs at a future date. In another type of contract arrangement, known as a production contract, pork packers own the hogs and hire farmers to raise them. Production contracts essentially convert independent farmers that own their livestock into contract employees that perform services for the pork-packing industry. The significant reduction in autonomy and independence from often-exploitative contracts has been compared to serfdom or sharecropping and has been widely criticized in the broiler chicken industry.

Pork packers can use marketing contracts to secure livestock without having to bid against other packers to buy hogs at auction. Contracts have been commonplace in some agricultural sectors, such as poultry, for decades but have been a relatively new phenomenon in the hog sector. Between 1991 and 1993, there were too few hog contracts for the USDA to count; by 2008, two-thirds of hogs were delivered under contract. By 2013, less than 10 percent of hogs were sold on the spot market, which further reduces competition and depresses the prices independent farmers receive for their hogs.

Contracting can further depress hog prices. Contracts short-circuit the price discovery functions of the marketplace by securing supplies outside of the public auctions or spot markets for hogs. The price for contract hogs is typically tied to the spot or futures market prices, so meatpackers benefit when futures and spot prices decline. As the cash market is replaced by marketing and production contracts, the cash market becomes so limited that the remaining cash prices that are the basis for contracts become increasingly suspect and unrepresentative.

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69 USDA GIPSA (2013) at Table 17 at 30 to 31.

70 Barkema, Drabenstott and Novack (2001) at 36.

The combination of pork packer concentration and increased vertical integration means that smaller farms face fewer options to market their hogs and can become the suppliers of last resort when large packers need extra hogs for their slaughter facilities. The hogs sold by independent farmers effectively are sold on spot markets that have “the characteristics of a salvage market,” as economists from Purdue University noted.

Fewer public transactions leave the markets susceptible to volatility, distortion and manipulation, since even a few sales can have a significant impact on the prices farmers receive. The rise of hog contracting can contribute to the long-term downward pressure on price and increase price volatility. This creates the potential for pork packers and processors to manipulate hog prices across the industry.

JBS is one of the few pork packers that primarily relies on purchasing auction hogs and entering marketing arrangements with farmers. Conversely, Cargill obtains all of its hogs through production contracts. The proposed acquisition would not only magnify JBS’s buyer power but would make JBS a considerably more vertically integrated pork packer. JBS’s takeover of Cargill’s pork operations includes not only Cargill’s two pork packing plants but also five feed mills and two industrial farrowing operations, with more than 160,000 sows. This acquisition would immediately make JBS a vertically integrated hog firm, owning feed mills, hog production facilities and inheriting production hog contract growers. This would limit the choices for all hog producers — either where to sell or market their hogs as well as the options to raise hogs under production contracts, which confirms and reinforces “the potentially harmful effects of increased concentration.”

The proposed acquisition accelerates and cements vertical integration and the use of production contracts in the hog sector. JBS would likely shift from largely sourcing all of its hogs from auctions and marketing contracts to using production contracts to raise the hogs produced by Cargill’s farrowing production facilities. This could have a significant impact on hog farming in the upper and eastern Midwest, where production contracts are considerably less common.

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73 Paarlberg et al. (1999) at 3.

74 Ibid. at 8.


76 DoJ/FTC (2010) at 19.
IV. Proposed acquisition would create anticompetitive conditions in the wholesale pork market

The proposed JBS-Cargill acquisition would exacerbate horizontal monopoly power in the wholesale pork market. JBS and Cargill are two of the largest manufacturers of unbranded wholesale pork. Cargill Pork’s primary product is fresh, wholesale pork that is boxed and shipped to retailers, foodservice firms and further processors. JBS has just begun to move into branded meat products and primarily sells only the meat commodities of wholesale pork and beef. The other major pork packers — Smithfield, Tyson and Hormel — sell a greater volume of branded and processed meat products, making Cargill and JBS essential to the wholesale pork market. The proposed acquisition would create the largest marketer of wholesale pork and eliminate a rivalry by eliminating a top competitor.

The appropriate product market is the national market for unbranded wholesale pork, a homogenous set of pork cuts sold to retailers, foodservice and further processors. Many pork packers also sell branded fresh meats and processed meat products, which is excluded from the wholesale market. Retail pork and beef (wholesale meat) represent one of the largest categories of unbranded groceries.

The level of packer concentration creates leverage over the retail and other wholesale pork buyers. The consolidation in the meatpacking sector allows pork packers to exert market influence over the prices buyers pay for wholesale pork. A 2001 study found that packers used their market power to keep wholesale pork prices high even when farmgate hog prices fell. Another study found that more than a third of the farm-retail price spreads were caused by the combined exercise of monopsony and monopoly market power by the concentrated pork packing industry.

There have been similar studies in the beef industry demonstrating that packers used their market power to capture value in the meat supply chain and raise supermarket prices. A 2014 study found that beef packers (often the same firms as the top pork packers) have an advantage over livestock producers and “their gross margin will tend to remain the same when there is an increase in the price of the primary commodity, and it will tend to expand when there is a decrease in that price.” A 1980 Congressionally commissioned study found that beef packer concentration had “a significant effect on the prices for fresh beef.”

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79 Azzam and Pagoulatos (1990) at 363.
86 Emmanouilides and Fousekis (2014) at 16.
This market concentration is compounded by the lack of price transparency in the market for wholesale pork. Pork packers can more easily tacitly coordinate pricing when they have more market information than downstream buyers, which gives suppliers more market power and leverage over buyers. Marketing arrangements (forward and formula contracts) are also common in the wholesale pork market, further thinning the cash market and making the price for wholesale pork opaque. The USDA includes a “perilously low percentage volume of trade” in the public wholesale pork reports. Wholesale pork price discovery is compromised because the prices for the most commonly purchased wholesale pork products are rarely reported. As a result, wholesale pork buyers can pay a wide range of prices for the same shipment of wholesale pork. For example, the price ranges for the two most common pork loin cuts varied by 45 to 76 percent.

Today, the top four pork packers control more than two-thirds (67.9 percent) of the national wholesale pork market (see Table 7). The HHI is estimated to be 1,394, making the national wholesale pork market at the high end of unconcentrated. The proposed acquisition would make JBS-Cargill the nation’s largest producer of wholesale pork with nearly one-third of the U.S. market (28.4 percent). The top four

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90 Value Ag. LLC. (2009) at 4.
91 Ibid. at 35, 36 and 40.

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Table 7: National Wholesale Pork Market

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company</th>
<th>2014 Slaughter Capacity (head/day)</th>
<th>2014 Est. % Wholesale</th>
<th>2014 Wholesale Capacity (head/day)</th>
<th>2014 Wholesale Market Share</th>
<th>Post JBS-Cargill Wholesale Market Share</th>
<th>Δ</th>
<th>% Change</th>
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<tr>
<td>Tyson Foods</td>
<td>76,925</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>64,848</td>
<td>23.9%</td>
<td>23.9%</td>
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<td>JBS-Swift</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>18.4%</td>
<td>28.4%</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td>54.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Triumph/Seaboard</td>
<td>40,800</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>38,515</td>
<td>14.2%</td>
<td>14.2%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Smithfield</td>
<td>118,500</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>30,810</td>
<td>11.4%</td>
<td>11.4%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cargill Pork</td>
<td>37,800</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>27,027</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
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Source: Analysis of National Pork Board data.
firms would sell more than three-quarters (77.8 percent) of the wholesale pork market. The proposed acquisition would increase the HHI by nearly 400 points to 1,761, increasing the concentration level substantially to moderately concentrated. That should raise “significant competitive concerns” and “warrant scrutiny.”

The proposed acquisition would raise concentration in the wholesale pork market and give JBS-Cargill sufficient market power to unilaterally raise wholesale prices or more effectively coordinate with other packers to disadvantage wholesale buyers. Because the market lacks transparency and price discovery, the proposed acquisition makes it even harder for wholesale pork buyers to shop for better deals. The impact of concentrated wholesale pork market power is especially acute for restaurants, cafeterias and other foodservice institutions that are more disaggregated than the retail, manufacturing or food distribution sectors. Ultimately, these higher prices would be passed onto consumers in the form of higher retail pork prices in grocery stores, foodservice establishments or restaurants.

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94 DoJ/FTC (2010) at 19.
V. Proposed Merger Would Increase Pork Prices, Erode Consumer Welfare

The horizontal and vertical elements of the proposed merger would enable or facilitate JBS-Cargill’s ability to unilaterally impose pork price increases and erode consumer welfare. Monopoly power allows sellers to keep prices higher than they would be under more competitive situations. The size and scope of the proposed merger is likely to increase pork prices and especially disadvantage lower-income consumers during a period of economic stagnation combined with already rising food prices.

Consumers are especially vulnerable to the consolidated market power of food companies since food is essential and total consumer demand for food is largely unresponsive to price. This inelastic demand also means that concentrated market power in the food sector can distort competition, raise prices and erode equity more significantly than sectors where consumers are more responsive to prices. According to the American Antitrust Institute, the concentration in buyers, processing and retailing has “undoubtedly contributed to the increased cost of food.” Even small increases in pork prices constitute a considerable welfare loss to all consumers and can “result in a substantial transfer [to pork packers and retailers] when aggregated across all consumers.”

Shoppers have certainly faced high and rising grocery prices over recent years. The industry trade magazine *Progressive Grocer* reported in 2013 that, “Prices for grocery items remain high” and “have risen every month over the past two-and-a-half years.” Since the Great Recession started, grocery food prices rose more quickly than inflation and wages, and over the three years between 2010 and 2012 grocery food prices rose twice as quickly as average wages.

The rising concentration in the pork packing industry has been accompanied by a significant rise in the consumer retail price for pork products. Over the past 20 years, the market share of the top four pork packers rose by 41 percent from 46 percent in 1995 to 64 percent in 2014. Total pork prices rose by 67 percent over the same period and

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96 Domina and Taylor (2009) at 8.


98 Miller and Hayenga (2001) at 561.

99 *Progressive Grocer.* April 2013 at 50.

100 U.S. Department of Labor. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). Monthly average consumer price index for food at home (CUSR0000SAF11), all items total inflation (CUSR0000SA0) and average hourly earnings of private sector production workers and non-supervisory employees (CES0500000008).

pork chop prices rose by 42 percent (see Figure 3).  

Pork packer consolidation has pushed down the real prices that farmers receive for their hogs (see Section I), but few of these savings are passed on to consumers — the packers and retailers are pocketing the difference. The USDA found that the efficiency gains in the pork sector have not been shared with consumers, suggesting that any efficiency gains that may possibly occur from the proposed merger would be unlikely to be shared with consumers. According to USDA, consumer prices for retail pork “increased substantially” between 1992 and 2004 despite the cost savings for pork packers from changes in the hog production sector and increases in processor efficiency.  

Although the price of hogs has been trending downward, the consumer price of pork products has been less responsive to the declining hog prices. Some studies have found that increases in farmgate prices are passed on to consumers completely and immediately, but when farmgate prices fall, the grocery store prices do not fall as rapidly or completely.  

This phenomenon of sticky pricing (or asymmetric pricing) is common in many markets.  

High levels of concentration in meatpacking and retailing allow these sectors to exercise their market power to keep consumer prices high even when the input prices for live hogs declines because there is insufficient competitive pressure that could capitalize on lower input prices to capture new consumers, demonstrating an oligopolistic coordinated market.  

But concentration in the hog industry may amplify the asymmetric pricing tendencies that tend to ratchet up consumer prices even when input prices fall dramatically. Over the past several decades, the real price farmers receive for hogs has trended downwards and been increasingly volatile while retail prices have steadily increased (see Figure 4).  

Many studies have documented sticky pork pricing. Retail prices are “significantly asymmetric” for slower but significant changes in hog prices. Some economists attribute the increased spreads between hog farm prices and retail pork prices as well as

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102 BLS. Consumer Price Index series. Monthly average price index for total pork (CUSR0000SEFD), pork chops (CUSR0000SEFD03) and bacon and breakfast sausage (CUSR0000SEFD01). Available at www.bls.gov/data/, accessed July 2014.  
107 Miller and Hayenga (2001) at 561.
the asymmetric price response when input prices fall due to the exercise of market power by the pork packers. A USDA economist reported that “pork has evidence of asymmetric adjustment between wholesale and retail prices” and that this could be “evidence of a non-competitive price of pork to consumers.” Unlike other agricultural markets, retail pork prices may not eventually reach an equilibrium following a hog price decline, instead “lower costs may not be passed onto consumers, questioning the efficiency of price transmission in the U.S. hog/pork supply chain.”

Consumers and farmers faced a stark example of this phenomenon during the 1998 hog crisis. When the prices farmers received for hogs plummeted, the supermarket prices that consumers paid for pork products did not decline very much. Real hog prices dropped by about two-thirds between June and December of 1998, but real pork chop prices fell by only 8 percent and bacon prices actually rose by 5 percent (see Figure 5).

Some have suggested that asymmetric pricing trends may not be related to market power but to consumer search costs or to cost adjustments by manufacturers. However, these explanations work poorly for retail food price asymmetry because consumers are largely captive to their preferred grocery retailer. Each supermarket effectively acts as a local, one-stop-shopping average. Series ID: APU0000704111 Bacon and APU0000704211 Center Cut Bone-in Pork Chops. Farmgate prices from USDA NASS, Agricultural Prices Annual Summary. 1990–2011. See Remer, Marc. U.S. Department of Justice. Economic Analysis Group. “An Empirical Investigation of the Determinants of Asymmetric Pricing.” EAG No. 12-10. November 2012. This paper discounts market power of asymmetric pricing in retail gasoline prices by determining market concentration based on brand (but not franchise) density of establishments, not of sales. See also, Kimmel, Sheldon. U.S. Department of Justice. Economic Analysis Group. “Why Prices Rise Faster than they Fall.” EAG No. 09-4. July 2009. This paper argues that manufacturers would have to increase capital or labor expenditures to take advantage of lower prices, which slows the response to declining input costs. This is less true in pork slaughter and fabrication, which rarely operates at full capacity and can easily accommodate increased supplies without making capital investments.

Figure 5: Assymetric Pricing During 1998 Hog Crisis
(in 2014 dollars)

Source: USDA NASS, BLS
monopoly. Consumers are unlikely and unwilling to switch to different stores based on small price increases. Search costs do not explain the price asymmetry in the retail pork market, which is a slower cycle change than some high-frequency search cost examples (such as gasoline). Indeed, studies that discount market power explanations admit that “the price of products whose consumers are less likely to shop for the lowest price are slower to adjust downwards during a negative cost shock, but increase at the same rate following a cost increase.”

Beyond price, increased concentration reduces consumer choice and can lower the quality of goods, as fewer participants compete to capture consumers based on value. According to the USDA, high levels of market concentration allow the largest participants to extract more of the economic value from food transactions, but “consumers typically bear the burden, paying higher prices for goods of lower quality.” For example, according to USDA, the low-cost pork produced from large-scale hog operations, where the animals are bred to gain weight quickly, “may not have the flavor or texture some buyers seek.”

The proposed merger would strengthen JBS-Cargill’s market power over wholesale pork and enable the post-acquisition firm to profitably increase wholesale prices, ultimately hitting consumers at the supermarket checkout. As the Department of Justice has noted, “A firm with a large market share may not feel pressure to reduce price even if a smaller rival does.”

116 Miller and Hayenga (2001) at 561.
119 MacDonald and McBride (2009) at 22.
120 DoJ/FTC (2010) at 15.
VI. Conclusion and Recommendations

The proposed JBS-Cargill acquisition significantly increases concentration in the pork packing industry and would undermine competition, reduce the price farmers receive for their hogs, accelerate anticompetitive vertical integration and raise consumer prices. The merger is one of the largest pork-packing mergers in recent years. The size and impact of the proposed acquisition deserves close examination. The U.S. Department of Justice should issue a second request to fully investigate the potential adverse, anticompetitive impacts the proposed acquisition can have on the marketplace, consumers and farmers.

The Department of Justice should pay special attention to several factors that could further exacerbate the anticompetitive effects of the proposed acquisition:

**JBS-Cargill’s Midwestern captive draw areas:** The proposed acquisition substantially increases pork packer concentration on the national level but has an especially negative impact on hog farmers in the eastern and upper Midwest. The proposed acquisition would make JBS-Cargill the second largest national pork packer, the second largest in Iowa, the largest in Iowa and surrounding states and essentially the same size as the largest packer in Illinois-Indiana and surrounding states. JBS-Cargill could exercise unilateral and/or coordinated market power to depress the price they pay for hogs. For farmers operating in the midst of the captive draw areas of JBS and Cargill, the proposed acquisition would limit their hog marketing options, reduce the price they receive for hogs and erode their economic viability. These impacts harm not only the farmers themselves but also the economic stability of surrounding rural communities.

**The impact of Cargill’s vertical integration on JBS and the hog sector:** The proposed acquisition will likely accelerate the vertical integration of the hog sector in the upper and eastern Midwest by joining Cargill-owned farrowing facilities and feed mills with the larger post-acquisition pork slaughter operations. Vertical integration reduces farmer independence and autonomy and subverts price discovery by excluding larger volumes of hogs from the open market. The proposed acquisition would allow JBS-Cargill to exercise unilateral and coordinated market power to manipulate the thin auction hog market that is the price basis for most production and marketing contracts.

**The impact on the wholesale pork market and consumers:** The proposed acquisition creates the largest wholesale pork producer in the United States controlling nearly one-third of wholesale pork sales. This would give the post-acquisition firm unilateral and coordinated market power to impose price increases on wholesale pork buyers that have fewer alternative sources. The largely opaque wholesale pork market, where common wholesale pork cuts are sold at a wide range of price points magnifies this effect. This disadvantages foodservice and retail establishments and ultimately JBS-Cargill would be able to impose price hikes on retail and foodservice consumers. Even small increases in consumer pork prices can constitute a significant welfare transfer from consumers to pork packers.

There are more than sufficient anticompetitive concerns for the Department of Justice to block the early termination of the merger review, issue a second request and extend the investigation into the JBS-Cargill acquisition. The Department of
Justice should not approve the largest pork-packing merger in years that would erode competition in hog slaughter and wholesale pork that would disadvantage farmers and consumers. The Department of Justice should enjoin this proposed acquisition.