AAI Working Paper 08-02: The United States Department of Justice Antitrust Division’s Cartel Enforcement: Appraisal and Proposals

This paper by John Connor evaluates the effectiveness of the efforts of the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice to detect, indict, and deter horizontal collusion during 1990-2007 and offers policy suggestions likely to improve that enforcement.

This paper by John Connor evaluates the effectiveness of the efforts of the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice to detect, indict, and deter horizontal collusion during 1990-2007 and offers policy suggestions likely to improve that enforcement. Division leaders emphasize that collusion is the agency’s number-one priority. Paradoxically, there is evidence that the number, size, and injuriousness of discovered cartels is increasing. This is particularly true for international cartels.

Read the working paper.

A revised version may be found at: Competition Law Review Vol. 5, Issue 1 (December 2008): 89-122.