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Home / Work Products

by on October 31, 2023

No Justifications for Franchise No-Poach: AAI Urges District of NJ Court to Apply Per Se Rule to Labor Market Allocations

On October 20, 2023, AAI moved to file an amicus brief in the District of New Jersey in a class action alleging that Jackson Hewitt and its tax preparation franchises entered into illegal no-poach agreements. While considering arguments on class certification, Judge Michael Farbiarz invited the parties and interested amici to submit briefs on the standard (per se or rule of reason) that should apply to the case. AAI’s brief describes why no-poach agreements involving franchisors and franchisees should be evaluated as per se illegal.

AAI’s brief explains that a no-poach agreement is nothing more than a market allocation agreement involving labor markets and describes three reasons the per se standard should apply. First, AAI notes the importance of the per se standard in ensuring optimal deterrence for the kind of baldly anticompetitive conduct involved in market allocations. Second, AAI explains that the existence of some vertical relationship between the parties to the agreement, like a franchise agreement, does not convert a per se case into a rule of reason one. Instead, companies can have a vertical relationship in one market and compete in another, and the likely effect of the restraint is what matters for the per se analysis.

Finally, AAI notes that a claim that a restraint is ancillary to a procompetitive agreement is a defense, and that the defendants here do not seem to have made the necessary showings to support it. Defendants bear the burden of showing ancillarity, including three components: (1) that the restraint has a plausible connection to a legal agreement, (2) that the restraint is reasonably necessary to that agreement, and (3) that there are not less restrictive means to achieve the same purpose. Because defendants have stated that they did not enforce the no-poach provision, the restraint cannot be reasonably necessary. Moreover, in labor markets, there are less restrictive means to ensure investment in training and protect trade secrets, making it difficult, if not impossible, to justify a labor market allocation agreement.

Andrew R. Wolf of DannLaw acted as local counsel for AAI in the District of New Jersey.

Read the full brief here.

by on October 24, 2023

Exploring the Shipping Act with AAI’s Kathleen Bradish on ABA’s Trust and Trade Podcast

AAI’s Kathleen Bradish was featured on the ABA’s podcast Trust and Trade episode “The Hidden Impact of the Shipping Act Exemption“. Hosts Anant Raut and David Golden take a closer look at one of the oldest exemptions from US antitrust law, the Shipping Act exemption. Kathleen Bradish and Melissa Maxman, Partner at Cohen & Gresser LLP who litigated one of the most recent cases involving the exemption, debate whether it’s time to deep-six the Shipping Act Exemption.


GUESTS

Kathleen Bradish, Acting President, American Antitrust Institute
Melissa Maxman, Partner, Cohen & Gresser LLP
David Golden, Partner, Constantine Cannon LLP

Trust and Trade is one of the flagship podcasts of the American Bar Association’s Antitrust Law Section. Trust and Trade features in-depth discussions by experts in the fields of antitrust, consumer protection, and privacy, and reaches a global audience of practitioners, enforcers, policymakers, and thought leaders. One of the premier international podcasts for antitrust and consumer protection professionals, Trust and Trade enjoys large listener bases in the US, UK, Europe, Asia, Australia, and Brazil.

by on August 28, 2023

Class Action Issues Update Summer 2023

The American Antitrust Institute (AAI) seeks to preserve the effectiveness of antitrust class actions as a central component of ensuring the vitality of private antitrust enforcement.[1] As part of its efforts, AAI issues periodic updates on developments in the courts and elsewhere that may affect this important device for protecting competition, consumers, and workers. This update covers developments since our Fall/Winter 2022 update.

Class Action Summary (Summer 2023)

Our Summer Class Action Update includes coverage of several new decisions from the first part of 2023, including:

  • Uninjured Class Members: Van v. LLR, Inc., 61 F.4th 1053 (9th Cir. 2023), Black v. Occidental Petro. Corp., 69 F.4th 1161 (10th Cir. 2023)
  • Ascertainability: In re Niaspan Antitrust Litig. 67 F.4th 118 (3d Cir. 2023).
  • Incentive Payments: Fikes Wholesale, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 52 F.4th 704 (2d Cir. 2023); Maribel Moses v. The New York Times Company, Docket No. 21-2556-cv (2d Cir. August 17, 2023).
  • Mandatory Arbitration Clauses: Fraga v. Premium Retail Services, Inc., 61 F. 4th 228 (1st Cir. 2023).
  • Motions to Intervene: SEC v. LBRY, Inc., 26 F.4th 96 (1st Cir. 2023)
  • Attorney’s Fees: Lowery v. Rhapsody Int’l Inc., 69 F.4th 994 (9th Cir. 2023): Maribel Moses v. The New York Times Company, Docket No. 21-2556-cv (2d Cir. August 17, 2023).

I. Classes Containing Uninjured Class Members

In our past several updates, we noted the recurring debate in the federal courts over the certification of classes containing uninjured class members. The landscape has not changed significantly since we last reported on the issue in Fall/Winter 2022, but recent Ninth Circuit decisions and current 23(f) appeals may result in new developments in the second half of this year.

As we noted in the Fall/Winter 2022 update, the Supreme Court denied certiorari of StarKist Co. v. Olean Wholesale Grocery Coop., Inc, leaving intact the Ninth Circuit decision granting class certification.  The Ninth Circuit rejected a “per se” rule that there can only be a de minimis number of uninjured members in favor of a case-by-case analysis of the impact of uninjured class members for class certification. See Olean Wholesale Grocery Coop., Inc. v. Bumble Bee Foods LLC, 31 F.4th 651, 669 (9th Cir. 2022).

Panels in the Ninth Circuit probed what is a sufficient case-by-case analysis under Olean Wholesale in two appeals decided earlier this year.  In Bowerman v. Field Asset Services, Inc., 39 F. 4th 652 (9th Cir. 2022), the court decertified a class of workers claiming withheld overtime pay, noting that it had taken eight days to determine damages for only 11 plaintiffs. It concluded that individualized issues on damage were “prohibitively cumbersome,” and plaintiffs failed to prove that class issues predominated over individualized ones.  In Van v. LLR, Inc., 61 F.4th 1053 (9th Cir. 2023), the Ninth Circuit reached differing conclusions on three arguments the defendant made for decertification based on uninjured class members.  In a case involving improper sales tax charges, the panel rejected an argument that individual damages could be too small to support Article III standing, and it found the defendant had not substantiated arguments that some class members voluntarily paid the incorrect sales tax.  On the other hand, the court found that the defendant had substantiated its argument that some class members received discounts that offset their sales tax payments.  Noting these potentially uninjured class members, it remanded the case to the district court to analyze whether “a class member by member analysis [would] be unnecessary or workable.”

We also note that the Ninth Circuit has certified a 23(f) appeal on class certification in the In re Google Play Antitrust Litigation.  As part of this appeal, the Ninth Circuit will address questions of how to measure the impact of uninjured class members.  Defendant claims that the lower court did not conduct a “rigorous analysis” of the impact of uninjured class members as required by Olean Wholesale.  Defendant’s petition claims that “rigorous analysis” means (1) plaintiffs bear the burden of proving that there are not a “great number” of uninjured class members and (2) the court must identify what individualized injury issues may exist and how they apply to class members. Briefing is expected to be completed this summer.

Other circuits have adopted more bright-line tests.  The First, Fourth, Seventh, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits stated that a district court should not certify a class if uninjured putative class members exceeded a de minimis number. See e.g., In re Asacol Antitrust Litig., 907 F.3d 42, 47, 54 (1st Cir. 2018); Krakauer v. Dish Network Network, L.L.C., 925 F.3d 643, 658 (4th Cir. 2019); Messner v. Northshore Univ. HealthSystem, 669 F.3d 802, 825 (7th Cir. 2012); Cordoba v. DIRECTV, LLC, 942 F.3d 1259, 1277 (11th Cir. 2019); In re Rail Freight Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Litig., 934 F.3d 619, 624-25 (D.C. Cir. 2019).

Meanwhile, the Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth and Eighth have held that courts should not certify a class with any uninjured class members. See e.g., Barrows v. Becerra, 24 F.4th 116, 128 (2d Cir. 2022); In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 311 (3d Cir. 2008); Bell Atl. Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 339 F.3d 294, 302 (5th Cir. 2003); Rikos v. Procter & Gamble Co., 799 F.3d 497, 505 (6th Cir. 2015); Johannessohn v. Polaris Indus., 9 F.4th 981, 987 (8th Cir. 2021).

Since our last update, the Tenth Circuit has also weighed in on the issue of uninjured class members.  In Black v. Occidental Petro. Corp., the court upheld certification of a class of private landowners holding mineral and oil interests, explicitly rejecting the “no uninjured class member” standard.  69 F.4th 1161, 1185 (10th Cir. 2023) (noting that “[t]he presence of class members who experienced varying degrees of injury, including some who were altogether uninjured, does not bar class certification.”) The Black v. Occidental Petro opinion cites favorably to the Seventh Circuit decision in Messer v. Northshore Unitv. HealthSystem describing a de minimis standard, but the Tenth Circuit did not unambiguously adopt that criterion.

II. Ascertainability

In our previous several updates, we also discussed the circuit split over whether Rule 23 contains a heightened ascertainability requirement that demands class plaintiffs plead and prove an administratively feasible mechanism for identifying absent class members. As detailed in our Spring/Summer 2021 update, the First and the Fourth Circuits have continued to impose an ascertainability requirement.  On the other hand, the Second, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have rejected an administrative feasibility prerequisite. As referenced in our Fall/Winter 2022 update, the Fifth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits have yet to explicitly adopt a position over heightened ascertainability.

Since our last update, the Third Circuit revisited the ascertainability requirement in In re Niaspan Antitrust Litig. 67 F.4th 118 (3d Cir. 2023).  The decision confirms that administrative feasibility remains a prerequisite of ascertainability in the Circuit, despite the apparent softening of the Circuit’s approach in recent decisions.  Those earlier decisions are described in detail in our Fall 2020 and Fall 2017 updates. In the Niaspan decision, the Third Circuit panel wrote that “[t]he ascertainability standard, including the administrative feasibility principle it contains, is true to the text, structure, and purpose of Rule 23 . . . What we call ‘ascertainability’ and ‘administrative feasibility’ is merely the way courts perform that role, a practice familiar under the civil rules.” Id. at 132.  The decision further rejected Appellants’ arguments that other circuits, including the Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits, have dropped the ascertainabilty requirement.  Instead, the decision interpreted those circuit courts as adopting “a separate administrative feasibility requirement . . . through a rigorous analysis of Rule 23’s ‘superiority’ requirement.” Id. at 133-34 n.10.

The plaintiffs in Niaspan have petitioned for reconsideration en banc, and AAI has filed an amicus brief in support of their position. AAI’s brief argues that the Third Circuit panel erred by departing from the Third Circuit’s practical approach to the “administrative feasibility” requirement.

III. Specific Personal Jurisdiction

Since 2017, we have been tracking the lower federal courts’ application of the Supreme Court’s decision in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017) (“BMS”). That decision requires specific jurisdiction over all plaintiffs’ claims in the forum state for a mass action to proceed if there is otherwise no general jurisdiction.  This has raised questions as to whether the same standard will apply to class actions. If so, plaintiffs may be required to bring suits on behalf of nationwide or multi-state classes in a defendant’s home state. This would result in significant litigation advantages for corporate antitrust defendants, as well as inefficiencies.

In our Spring 2020 update, we noted that the Fifth, Seventh, and D.C. Circuits all held that BMS did not bar nationwide class actions prior to class certification, notwithstanding that specific jurisdiction may be lacking for unnamed class members. The Seventh Circuit, in an opinion by Chief Judge Wood in Mussat v. IQVIA, went further than previous circuit courts’ rulings in holding affirmatively that BMS does not apply to class actions.  The Supreme Court denied certiorari in that case.

In our Fall 2021 update, we noted that the Sixth Circuit, in Lyngaas v. Curaden AG, 992 F.3d 412 (6th Cir. 2021), had joined the Seventh Circuit in holding that “Bristol-Myers Squibb does not extend to federal class actions.” Quoting extensively from Chief Judge Wood’s opinion in Mussat, the circuit court noted that a class action is formally a single suit in which a defendant litigates against only the class representative, and the absent class members are therefore not “parties.” The court distinguished BMS by explaining that “[t]he different procedures underlying a mass-tort action and a class action demand diverging specific personal jurisdiction analyses.” Id. at 435.

As described in our Spring/Summer 2022 update, the First Circuit adopted the logic of the Sixth and the Seventh Circuit’s in its decision in Waters v. Day & Zimmermann NPS, Inc., 23 F.4th 84 (1st Cir. 2022).  The Waters decision found that BMS’s jurisdictional requirement did not apply to collective actions under the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).  Such actions differ somewhat from Rule 23 class actions because they are “opt-in” rather than “opt-out” collective actions.  But the court cited favorably to the Sixth Circuit’s opinion in Lyngaas, adopting the logic that only the named plaintiff has “party” status.  This strongly suggests the First Circuit will follow Mussat and Lyngaas in refusing to extend BMS to class actions.

As discussed in our last update, the Third Circuit has joined with the First, Sixth and Seventh Circuit in stating that BMS does not apply to Rule 23 class actions, noting that the Supreme Court has “regularly entertained nationwide classes where the [named] plaintiffs relied on specific personal jurisdiction, without taking note of any procedural defects.” Fischer v. Fed. Express Corp., 42 F.4th 366, 375 (3d Cir. 2022). But in the same decision, the Third Circuit split from the First Circuit to find that BMS did apply to FLSA collective actions. It reasoned that the FLSA’s text, the FLSA’s legislative history, and the weight of caselaw favored treating FLSA collective actions “as ordinary in personam suits for purposes of personal jurisdiction” requiring “opt-in plaintiffs […] demonstrate the court has personal jurisdiction with respect to each of their claims Id. at 375.

The Ninth Circuit’s decisions in Moser v. Benefytt, 8 F.4th 872 (9th Cir. 2021) and Owino v. CoreCivic, Inc., 36 F.4th 839 (9th Cir. 2022), have created some confusion in this area with their rulings on waiver of personal jurisdiction when a class is certified.   A divided panel decision in Moser held that personal jurisdiction objections cannot be waived prior to class certification because it is only after certification that defendant can object to absent class members’ claims. Over the dissent of Judge Cardone, the panel majority left open the possibility that personal jurisdiction objections could be available at the class certification stage under Rule 23.  Moser was remanded, and plaintiffs filed a notice of settlement.

In Owino, three plaintiff-classes of immigrant detainees who alleged federal statutory and state labor code violations against the overseer of a private detention facility were certified by the district court. On appeal, the panel applied Moser to find that the district court erred in holding that its personal jurisdiction defense had been waived.  The panel declined to vacate the district court’s class certification order, however, holding that, on remand, the district court may consider the personal jurisdiction defense at the appropriate time.  The Ninth Circuit denied rehearing en banc.

To date, no circuit court has held that BMS bars nationwide class actions in forum states that lack personal jurisdiction over absent class members.

IV. Incentive Awards for Class Representatives

In our Fall/Winter 2022 update, we continued to follow developments related to the Eleventh Circuit’s decision Johnson v. NPAS Sols., LLC. 875 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2020). Johnson held that incentive awards paid to lead class plaintiffs—a longstanding feature of antitrust and other actions—are unlawful under nineteenth-century Supreme Court precedent. In our Spring/Summer 2021, Fall 2021, and Spring/Summer 2022 updates, we noted that numerous district courts both within and outside the Eleventh Circuit, and numerous appellate panels outside the Eleventh Circuit, have rejected, distinguished, or narrowly construed Johnson to allow payment of incentive awards.

In August 2022, the Eleventh Circuit denied en banc rehearing in Johnson. Judge Pryor, joined by Judges Wilson, Jordan and Rosenbaum, authored a lengthy dissent, concluding that “[t]he panel majority opinion fundamentally undermined class action law based on a misinterpretation of two Supreme Court cases,” and “by denying rehearing en banc, our court has struck a lasting blow to class actions as a device for righting wrongs in this circuit.” The dissent also urged that, “[g]iven our failure to act, it will be up to the Supreme Court to overrule or clarify [the 1880s Supreme Court cases] to undo this problem of our making. If the Supreme Court does not act, then I urge either the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules to amend Rule 23 or Congress to enact a statute that explicitly authorizes incentive awards.” Over the dissent for rehearing en banc, the order staying the mandate in Johnson was lifted on October 17, 2022. Although the plaintiff petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari, the Court denied certiorari in April 2023. As a result, Johnson remains the binding precedent in the Eleventh Circuit.

As we discussed in our Fall/Winter 2022 update, the Ninth Circuit rejected Johnson in In re Apple Inc. Device Performance Litig. 50 F.4th 769, 785 n.13 (9th Cir. 2022). The Ninth Circuit considered the same nineteenth-century cases and held that they did not bar incentive awards. Id. at 785. Rather, the court held that “incentive awards cannot categorically be rejected or approved,” and “[s]o long as they are reasonable, they can be awarded.” Id. at 787. The Ninth Circuit was joined by the First Circuit in affirming the permissibility of incentive awards. See Murray v. Grocery Delivery E-Servs. USA Inc., 55 F.4th 340, 353–54 (1st Cir. 2022).

Recently, the picture was complicated by the Second Circuit’s decision in Fikes Wholesale, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 52 F.4th 704 (2d Cir. 2023).  While the court refused to bar the class representative incentive awards, it did so only because it was compelled to follow its own precedents in Melito v. Experian Mktg. Sols. Inc. and Hyland v. Navient Co. The Second Circuit panel instead agreed in principle with the Eleventh Circuit position, and it concluded that “[s]ervice awards are likely impermissible under Supreme Court precedent,” setting the stage for future challenges. Id.

A different panel in the Second Circuit, however, affirmed the legality of incentive rewards in Maribel Moses v. The New York Times Company, Docket No. 21-2556-cv (2d Cir. August 17, 2023). That panel rejected an argument based on the Eleventh Circuit decision in Johnson not just because of the Circuit’s binding precedent in Melito, but also because it found the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning unconvincing. The Moses panel wrote that the nineteenth century precedent relied on by the Eleventh Circuit “ha[s] been superseded, not merely by practice and usage, but by Rule 23, which creates a much broader and more muscular class action device than the common law predecessor that spawned the [earlier precedent.]” at 45.  Further, it noted that its decision is consistent with the “overwhelming majority” of circuits in agreeing that district courts are permitted to grant incentive awards.

Although the circuit split appears to be widening, the Supreme Court in April 2023 denied petitions for certiorari to review either the Eleventh Circuit or the Second Circuit’s Fikes decisions on incentive awards.

V. Class Action Waivers in Mandatory Arbitration Clauses

Beginning with our Fall 2016 update, we have been tracking the use of mandatory arbitration clauses in employment agreements, which the Supreme Court upheld in a 5-4 decision in Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis. 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018). Mandatory arbitration agreements often include forced-class action waivers that may prevent class litigation and class arbitration. In our Spring 2019 update, we addressed that the Supreme Court’s decision in New Prime, Inc. v. Oliveria held that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) does not compel courts to enforce private arbitration agreements involving “contracts of employment” with transportation workers, which are expressly excluded from the FAA’s coverage provided the workers are “engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.” 139 S. Ct. 532 (2019).

Since our Fall 2020 update, we have been tracking a circuit split over how the “foreign or interstate commerce” requirement affects the scope of the transportation-worker exclusion, particularly as applied to gig economy workers. In our Spring/Summer 2022 update, we noted that the Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the Seventh Circuit in Saxon v. Southwest Airlines. 142 S.Ct. 1783 (2022). Justice Thomas, writing for the Supreme Court, held that a “class of workers” under the FAA is defined by the work the workers perform, not the business their employer is in. Id. at 1788–89. And the class is “engaged in foreign or interstate commerce” for purposes of the FAA exclusion if the work renders the workers “directly involved in transporting goods across state or international borders.” Id. at 1789–90. The analysis, the Court held, requires a contextual inquiry into whether the employees “are actually engaged in interstate commerce in their day-to-day work.” Id. at 1788. To be “engaged in foreign or interstate commerce” under § 1, the class of workers must “play a direct and ‘necessary role in the free flow of goods’ across borders,” which is to say the workers must “be actively ‘engaged in transportation’ of those goods across borders via the channels of foreign or interstate commerce.” Id. at 1790. The Court said only that “[w]e recognize that the answer will not always be so plain when the class of workers carries out duties further removed from the channels of interstate commerce or the actual crossing of borders.” Id. at 1789 n.2.

Our Spring/Summer 2022 update noted that the Ninth Circuit’s Carmona v. Domino’s Pizza, LLC held that Domino’s delivery drivers qualify for the FAA exclusion because they are “engaged in a ‘single, unbroken stream of interstate commerce’ that renders interstate commerce a ‘central part’ of their job description.” 21 F.4th 627 (9th Cir. 2021). The losing defendant petitioned for certiorari. In October 2022, the Supreme Court granted the petition but immediately vacated and remanded back to the circuit court for further consideration in light of Saxon. Just recently, the Ninth Circuit ruled on the remanded case, . U.S. App. LEXIS 18578, at *1, *3 (9th Cir. July, 21 2023.  The court again rejected defendant-appellee Domino’s motion to compel arbitration,  finding that the Supreme Court’s decision in Saxon was not irreconcilable with its circuit precedent, Rittmann v. Amazon.com, Inc., 971 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2020). As a result, the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed its view that the Domino’s drivers, “like the Amazon package delivery drivers [in Rittmann], transport [interstate] goods for the last leg to their final destinations,” thereby engaging them in interstate commerce. No, 21-55009 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 18578 at *7

In our Fall/Winter 2022 update, we discussed three decisions that narrowed the kinds of employees covered by the FAA exclusion in light of Saxon. 

First, the Second Circuit vacated a May 2022 panel opinion in light of Saxon and granted panel rehearing in Bissonnette v. LePage Bakeries Park St., LLC. 49 F.4th 655 (2d Cir. 2022). On panel rehearing, the Second Circuit affirmed that the truck drivers did not qualify for the FAA exclusion. Bissonnette v. LePage Bakeries Park St., LLC, No. 20-1681, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 27628, at *1 (2d Cir. 2022). The Second Circuit reasoned that, “[a]lthough the plaintiffs spend appreciable parts of their working days moving goods from place to place by truck, the decisive fact is that the stores and restaurants are not buying the movement of the baked goods, so long as they arrive. Customers pay for the baked goods themselves; the movement of those goods is at most a component of total price. The commerce is in breads, buns, rolls, and snack cakes—not transportation services.” Id. at *13.

Second, the Fifth Circuit applied Saxon to limit the scope of the FAA exclusion in Lopez v. Cintas Corp. 47 F.4th 428 (5th Cir. 2022). The Fifth Circuit held that once the goods at issue arrived at a Houston warehouse and were unloaded, “anyone interacting with those goods was no longer engaged in interstate commerce.” Id. at 433. The Fifth Circuit also noted that, unlike either seamen or railroad employees, “the local delivery drivers here have a more consumer-facing role.” Id.

Finally, we reported on the First Circuit’s decision in Immediato v. Postmates, Inc. 54 F.4th 67 (1st Cir. 2022). The First Circuit held that couriers who deliver goods from local restaurants and retailers in trips that typically span a few miles are not exempt under the FAA. Id. at 76. Applying First Circuit precedent and considering Supreme Court precedent contemporary with congressional enactment of the FAA, the First Circuit held that “once an interstate shipment arrives at a local retailer and is ‘there held solely for local disposition and use,’ the goods are no longer considered to be ‘in interstate commerce.’” Id. The court also explained that “engaged in interstate commerce” does not “extend to the intrastate sale of locally manufactured goods.” Id. at 77.

Since our last update, there has been some pushback on this trend, with the 1st and 9th circuits adopting a widened view of the FAA exclusion post-Saxon.  The First Circuit recently issued a decision that breaks with the Second Circuit to clarify that, post-Saxon, a worker need not be in a transportation industry to qualify as a transportation worker for purposes of the FAA exclusion.  In Fraga v. Premium Retail Services, Inc., 61 F. 4th 228 (1st Cir. 2023), the First Circuit emphasized that “the contractual relationships among the various actors play an important role in determining whether an intrastate trip is part of an integrated interstate journey.” It distinguished between FAA excluded workers involved in “last mile” deliveries for Amazon, where Amazon had a contractual relationship with both the transportation service and the end customer, and non-excluded Lyft drivers transporting passengers from Logan Airport, where there was no contractual relationship between the airlines and Lyft.  The Ninth Circuit decision in Caroma v. Domino’s Pizza, LLC is described above.

Since Epic Systems was decided in 2018, several legislative proposals that would fully or partially overturn the decision have circulated, including the Forced Arbitration Injustice Repeal Act (FAIR Act). The FAIR Act was reintroduced in the 118th Congress on April 27, 2023 and is substantially similar to the FAIR Act introduced by Sen. Richard Blumenthal (D-CT) and Rep. Hank Johnson (D-GA) in February 2019, and which we discussed in our Spring 2019 update. Our Spring/Summer 2022 update noted that the FAIR Act was reported out of the House Judiciary Committee on March 11, 2022, and a week later, on March 17, it passed the House 220-209, with one Republican, Rep. Matt Gaetz (FL), joining House Democrats in the majority. The 117th Congress’s FAIR Act was not acted upon in the Senate. The recent iteration of the FAIR Act remains in committee awaiting action.

VI. CLASS MEMBER MOTIONS TO INTERVENE IN CLASS PROCEEDINGS

In our Fall/Winter 2022 update, we addressed the Fifth Circuit’s standard for resolving motions to intervene by class members who disagree with the litigation strategy of counsel for class representatives.

In Guenther v. BP Ret. Accumulation Plan, class plaintiffs sued BP Corporation alleging ERISA violations stemming from BP’s acquisition of Standard Oil and the subsequent conversion of Standard Oil’s employee retirement benefits to BP retirement benefits. 50 F.4th 536 (5th Cir. 2022). After five years of litigation, on the eve of class certification, a class member who had also been involved in separate litigation against BP moved to intervene as of right. The district court, applying the circuit’s four-factor test for evaluating intervention as of right under FRCP 24(a)(2), denied the motion. The class member appealed, challenging only the district court’s finding that the fourth factor—inadequate representation—was unsatisfied. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the intervention of right.

The Fifth Circuit explained that the that the movant’s burden in satisfying the fourth factor is “minimal.” Id. at 543. The movant “must only show that the existing representation ‘may be inadequate.’” Id. Here, however, the movant did not make the requisite showing. To ensure that the fourth factor “has some teeth,” the movant “must establish ‘adversity of interest, collusion, or nonfeasance on the part of the existing party.’” Id. To establish adversity of interest, the movant must establish that “its interests diverge from the putative representative’s interests in a manner germane to the case.’” Id. As relevant here, “[d]ifferences of opinion regarding an existing party’s litigation strategy or tactics used in pursuit thereof, without more, do not rise to an adversity of interest.” Id. The court held that intervention as of right was inappropriate because the movant and the class plaintiffs “shared the same ultimate objective” and the movant “lack[ed] a distinct interest that is at risk of being adversely represented.” Id.

The Ninth Circuit in W. Watersheds Project v. Haaland held that the presumption of adequate representation when the intervenor shares the same “ultimate objective” as a party is overcome by a showing “that an existing party cannot or will not make ‘any reasonable argument’ that the intervenor would make if it were a party.” 22 F.4th 828, 841 (9th Cir. 2022).  In that case, the intervenor was able to identify three relevant arguments that the parties had not addressed.

Similar logic was used by the First Circuit to opposite effect in SEC v. LBRY, Inc. Upholding the denial of a motion to intervene, the court held that “[w]hen a proposed intervenor’s objective aligns seamlessly with that of an existing party [,] a rebuttable presumption of adequate representation attaches.” 26 F.4th 96, 99 (1st Cir. 2023). Other circuit courts generally require some showing of conflict to warrant intervention. See e.g., Planned Parenthood of Wisconsin, Inc. v. Kaul, 942 F.3d 793, 799 (7th Cir. 2019); Wineries of the Old Mission Peninsula Ass’n v. Twp. Of Peninsula, Michigan, 41 F.4th 767, 774 (6th Cir. 2022).

Across circuits, it is generally the norm that class members seeking to intervene must make a showing of “conflict” or “adversity” to demonstrate that the existing representation is inadequate.

VII. CALCULATING ATTORNEYS’ FEES

In our Fall 2020 update, we discussed recent case developments governing calculation of  attorneys’ fees. The Sixth Circuit’s decision in Linneman v. Vita-Mix Corp., 970 F.3d 621 (6th Cir. 2020) considered several questions regarding the calculation of attorneys’ fees in class-action settlements. In Linneman, the district court used a lodestar calculation to award $3.9 million ($2.2 million plus a 75 percent upward multiplier) in coupon settlement.

On appeal, defendant argued that district court erred by using a lodestar calculation to calculate fees under a coupon settlement because of § 1712 of the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”). CAFA requires that, “[i]f a proposed settlement in a class action provides for a recovery of coupons to a class member, the portion of any attorney’s fee award to class counsel that is attributable to the award of the coupons shall be based on the value to class members of the coupons that are redeemed.” The Sixth Circuit disagreed and held that the CAFA inquiry “centers on the meaning of the phrase ‘attributable to the award of the coupons’ because only that ‘portion’ of the fees award must be ‘based on the value to class members of the coupons that are redeemed.’” The court recognized a circuit split but noted that the majority of circuits construe the “attributable to” language narrowly and allow lodestar calculations in coupon settlements. A minority view is expressed by the Ninth Circuit which holds that lodestar calculations are not permissible.

Defendant further argued that the district court abused its discretion in calculating the billing rate. The Sixth Circuit agreed. The Sixth Circuit follows the “community market rule,” under which the billing rate “should not exceed what is necessary to encourage competent lawyers within the relevant community to undertake legal representation.”  The court held that the district court ran afoul of the community market rule by relying on counsels’ affidavits describing their backgrounds, billing rates, and involvement in the case, and opting to split the difference between pre-calculated local billing rates and requested rates claimed to “reflect [ ] the national practice and experience” of class counsel.

The Sixth Circuit also concluded that the district court erred in three other respects. First, the district court awarded a multiplier without making a finding of “rare and exceptional circumstances” as required by Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 599 U.S. 542 (2010). Second, the district court did not exclude hours that class counsel worked after they rejected an arguably reasonable settlement offer. Third, the district court did not make any specific findings about the value of the settlement. Finally, the Sixth Circuit found that awarding counsel post-judgment interest pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1961 was not error.

Since our last update, the Ninth Circuit clarified its position on attorney’s fees in Lowery v. Rhapsody Int’l Inc., 69 F.4th 994 (9th Cir. 2023). On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded to the district court that it “should rigorously evaluate the actual benefit provided to the class and award reasonable attorneys’ fees considering that benefit.” Id. at 997. The Ninth Circuit stated that district court “should consider [the] actual or anticipated value to the class members, not the maximum that hypothetically could have been paid to the class.” Id. Furthermore, district courts “should also consider engaging in a ‘cross-check’ analysis of the lodestar method to ensure that the fees are reasonably proportional to the benefit received by the class members.” Id. Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit reminded that “the key factor” is “assessing the reasonableness of the attorneys’ fees” to the benefit to the class members, not that “class action attorneys may devote hundreds or even thousands to a case.” Id. at 1002.

In Lowery, a plaintiffs-class of copyright owners sued defendant for infringement of their musical compositions. As settlement negotiations progressed, the amount the plaintiffs-class would receive decreased to $52,841.05.  Assessing class counsel’s request for $6 million in fees using the lodestar method, the magistrate judge decided to lower fees to  $1.7 million. The Ninth Circuit rejected the $1.7 million in attorneys’ fees because it was thirty times larger than the benefit received by plaintiffs, making it unreasonable in light of FRCP 23. The appeals court also instructed the district court to disregard the “illusory $20 million settlement cap” and instead base its lodestar calculation of attorneys’ fees on the actual $52,841.05 received.

The Second Circuit in the Moses case discussed above also addressed attorney’s fees.  See Maribel Moses v. The New York Times Company, Docket No. 21-2556-cv (2d Cir. August 17, 2023.  Several class members there objected to the award of attorney’s fees in a settlement by the New York Times of claims that its subscription renewal practices violated California disclosure law.  The Second Circuit remanded to the district court for failure to conduct a review of the substantive fairness of the attorney’s fees as required by (1) the 2018 revision of Rule 23(e)(2) and (2) the traditional factors outlined by City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F. 2d 448 (2d Cir. 1974).  The Second Circuit concluded that the district court erred specifically in presuming fairness based on the settlement’s arm’s-length negotiation, and in “not considering the attorneys’ and incentive awards in evaluating the fairness of the settlement.”

Further, the Second Circuit found, contrary to the district court, that CAFA’s coupon settlement provisions applied to the free “access codes” for NYT subscriptions provided to certain class members. It reasoned that the codes were akin to coupons because (1) they required the class members to continue to do business with the defendant, (2) they are valid only for “select products or services,” and (3) lacked the flexibility and the transferability of cash payments.

Access the Class Action Issues Update Summer 2023 PDF.

 

[1] The American Antitrust Institute is an independent, nonprofit organization devoted to promoting competition that protects consumers, businesses, and society. We serve the public through research, education, and advocacy on the benefits of competition and the use of antitrust enforcement as a vital component of national and international competition policy.

by on August 23, 2023

How Should Antitrust Tackle Antitrust’s “Duty to Deal” in the Tech Sector? A Conversation With Erik Hovenkamp, 2023 Jerry S. Cohen Award Winner for Antitrust Scholarship

In this episode of Ruled by Reason, guest host Roger Noll, Professor of Economics, Emeritus, at Stanford University and AAI Advisor sits down with Erik Hovenkamp to chat about his award-winning article “The Antitrust Duty to Deal in the Age of Big Tech” (131 Yale L.J. 1483 (2022)). Professor Hovenkamp is Assistant Professor at the USC Gould School of Law. His article argues that the law on exclusive dealing has failed to distinguish between “primary” and “secondary” refusals to deal. The article explains that the suffocating evidentiary requirements imposed on refusal to deal claims should not be applied to secondary refusals to deal because they do not implicate the same innovation concerns that motivate suspicion of “primary” refusal to deal claims. Instead, Hovenkamp argues that secondary refusal to deal claims should be evaluated analogously to tying or related vertical restraints.

Antitrust scholarship that is considered and selected for the Jerry S. Cohen Award reflects a concern for principles of economic justice, the dispersal of economic power, the maintenance of effective limitations upon economic power or the federal statutes designed to protect society from various forms of anticompetitive activity. Scholarship reflects an awareness of the human and social impacts of economic institutions upon individuals, small businesses and other institutions necessary to the maintenance of a just and humane society–values and concerns Jerry S. Cohen dedicated his life and work to fostering.

Erik Hovenkamp is Associate Professor of Law at the USC Gould School of Law.

Roger Noll is Professor of Economics Emeritus at Stanford University.

by on August 10, 2023

AAI Asks Ninth Circuit to Deny Google’s Appeal of Class Certification in the Google Play Litigation and to Reject Any Special “Passthrough” Showing at Class Certification Stage

On August 7, 2023, AAI filed an amicus brief in the Ninth Circuit support of plaintiffs-appellees in the interlocutory appeal of the consumer class certification in In re Google Play Antitrust Litigation. In the 23(f) appeal, Google argues that the consumer class should not have been certified because the app developers allegedly injured by Google’s supracompetitive service fees did not “passthrough” the harm to consumers. According to Google, the district court judge failed to do the “rigorous analysis” required by Rule 23(b)(3) when it failed to credit its expert’s evidence on passthrough.

AAI’s brief argues that Google’s argument misconstrues the relevant precedent, including the Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in Olean Wholesale Grocery v. BumbleBee Foods, LLC, in several ways. First, Google tries to recast a claim by its expert that there was no impact on consumers as an argument that there are too many “uninjured class members.”  This is, AAI notes, as an attempt to make an argument about harm appropriately made at trial into a threshold argument about class overbreadth. AAI’s brief points out that Google’s expert’s evidence identifies no sub-set of uninjured class members and therefore raises no individualized issues that would defeat class certification.

Second, AAI’s brief addresses Google’s argument that the district court judge improperly shifted to Google the burden on predominance under Rule 23. AAI’s brief describes the proper burden-shifting framework for Rule 23 in the Ninth Circuit and explains why Google’s argument is unfounded.

Finally, AAI notes that Google, by suggesting that plaintiffs need to show passthrough for every class member, effectively askes the Ninth Circuit to impose a requirement that every class member be required to show Article III standing. AAI’s brief explains why this is inconsistent with existing precedent and with good legal policy, especially given the potential to deter needed private enforcement against tech platforms.

Read the full brief here.

by on August 1, 2023

Unpacking the 2023 Revised Merger Guidelines: A Conversation With the U.S. Department of Justice

On this episode of Ruled by Reason, AAI President, Diana Moss, and AAI Vice President for Legal Advocacy, Kathleen Bradish talk with leadership at the U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division about the newly released merger guidelines. Moss and Bradish are joined by Susan Athey, Chief Economist for the Antitrust Division and Michael Kades, Deputy Assistant Attorney General for the Antitrust Division. This is the 7th revision of the merger guidelines since they were first released by the antitrust agencies in 1968. The revisions are notable for many reasons, not the least of which is their timing, which comes at an inflection point in antitrust enforcement and competition policy. The draft guidelines address a number of growing concerns around consolidation, including high and rising concentration, high barriers to entry, and the emergence of dominant firms and tight oligopolies in key markets. The revised guidelines also take on issues not addressed head on by previous agency guidance, such as the effect of mergers on the loss of worker bargaining power, firm growth through “serial acquisitions,” the complexities of partial ownership and control, elimination of potential entrants, and the emergence of business models, such as digital ecosystems with multisided platforms. This episode unpacks these and other key takeaways from the draft merger guidelines.

MODERATORS:

Diana Moss, President, American Antitrust Institute
Kathleen Bradish, Vice President of Legal Advocacy, American Antitrust Institute

GUESTS:

Susan Athey, Chief Economist, U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Division
Michael Kades, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Division

by on July 17, 2023

The Cloud Technology Market: Storm of Innovation or Rainy Days for Competition?

On this episode of Ruled by Reason, AAI President, Diana Moss, and AAI Vice President for Legal Advocacy, Kathleen Bradish talk about competition and cloud technology markets. AAI recently issued the report: The Cloud Technology Market: Storm of Innovation or Rainy Days for Competition? Moss and Bradish unpack AAI’s analysis of a vitally important market in the digital economy, beginning with the explosive growth in cloud computing over the last two and a half decades. The report identifies the major cloud players and asks: What is the state of competition in the market? For example, is technological dynamism driving new entry? Are players jockeying for position by stealing share from each other? What does this all mean for how cloud providers compete with one another and are they any warning signs that competition may be flagging? Most important, how should antitrust enforcers and competition policymakers be thinking about promoting competition in cloud?

by on July 17, 2023

How Do We Fix the Competition Problem in Shipping? The Role for Private Actions under the Shipping Act

On this episode of Ruled by Reason, AAI Vice President for Legal Advocacy Kathleen Bradish hosts J. Wyatt Fore and David Golden of Constantine Cannon to discuss their work in private antitrust enforcement under the Shipping Act. They explain how consolidation in the shipping industry has led to a serious competition problem, one that came into full view when Covid-19 exposed a dangerous lack of resilience in the supply chain. The conversation covers the role of the Federal Maritime Commission in antitrust enforcement and the role for private enforcement in working alongside the FMC to encourage greater competition in shipping. Wyatt and David discuss their own experience litigating in front of the FMC and improvements that can be made to the process to make it easier for private plaintiffs to bring meritorious claims. This episode is for anyone interested in finding out more about competition in an industry that touches on nearly every aspect of our lives. After listening, head over to the AAI website to read Wyatt and Kathleen’s white paper “Competition Enforcement, Private Actions and the Shipping Act” for a deeper dive on the issues raised here.

David Golden is a partner in the Washington, DC office of Constantine Cannon. His practice focuses on antitrust litigation and counseling, especially in high-technology industries. He has represented both plaintiffs and defendants in various areas of antitrust law, including price fixing, tying, bundling, monopolization, and merger analyses, and he also represents clients before government agencies and in policy advocacy. David is widely published on antitrust especially with respect to IP and technology issues. Before practicing law, he was in the software industry.

Wyatt Fore is an attorney in the Washington, DC office of Constantine Cannon, where he concentrates his practice on antitrust litigation, government investigations, and merger and acquisition advocacy. He also provides counseling on a wide array of matters, including antitrust considerations for emerging technologies. Wyatt writes frequently on antitrust issues and co-edited the ABA Antitrust Section In addition to litigating the Intermodal Motor Carrier case, Wyatt writes frequently on antitrust issues, including co-editing the ABA Antitrust Section’s white paper on Competition Implications of Big Data and Artificial Intelligence / Machine Learning.

by on July 11, 2023

Busting the Live Nation-Ticketmaster Monopoly: What Would a Break-Up Remedy Look Like?

Monopolies and More Monopolies

Monopolies have gotten a lot of attention under the Biden administration. But that attention seems focused almost exclusively on digital platforms. At the same time, there is an urgent need for enforcement of monopolization law against anticompetitive practices by dominant firms in other sectors. Take Monsanto’s dominance in agricultural biotechnology, which has produced high fees for patented genetic crop technology—raising farmer’s costs and cutting their already slim margins. Also consider Autodesk, the mammoth purveyor of software for the building industry, which prompted architects to complain of the mismatch between price increases and stagnant product development. Yet Autodesk continues on an acquisition spree that seems to have gone undetected by antitrust enforcers.

Then there is Live Nation-Ticketmaster. In 2010, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) gave the companies a “pass” to vertically integrate. This created a behemoth with a wingspan covering artist management, concert promotion, venue management, and primary ticketing—virtually the entire live events supply chain. At the time, Ticketmaster’s market share in primary ticketing was a whopping 80 percent. Instead of moving to block a patently illegal merger, the government settled for conditions that simply prohibited Live Nation from engaging in practices designed to stifle competition.

In 2020, a DOJ investigation revealed evidence of Live Nation practices that were in violation of  “the plain language” of the 2010 merger consent decree. DOJ offered evidence that Live Nation had repeatedly conditioned, and threatened to condition, the provision of live concerts on a venue’s purchase of Ticketmaster ticketing services. Moreover, the evidence showed that Live Nation retaliated against venues that used competing ticketing services. DOJ’s solution to this problem was simply to extend the ineffective remedies in the original consent decree. This was a deal that Live Nation was compelled to agree to, since the likely alternative was a more thorough DOJ investigation that might uncover additional anticompetitive conduct.

Correcting the Legacy of Failed Antitrust Enforcement Against Live Nation

Allowing the Live Nation-Ticketmaster merger in 2010, and extending the consent decree in 2020, are leading examples of failed antitrust enforcement. However, public reports indicate that DOJ is again investigating Live Nation’s practices, which presumably builds on existing evidence of illegal conduct. Perhaps the third time will be the charm, if an investigation culminates in a monopolization case against Live Nation. But time is running out. Any monopolization case under Section 2 of the Sherman Act could take years to litigate to resolution, and could be snagged in a transition to a different administration. This would be reminiscent of the government’s 2001 case against Microsoft when, in the hand-off from the Clinton to Bush II administrations, DOJ caved on the remedy and agreed to a handful of ineffective concessions.

Based on recent developments, a new monopolization case against Live Nation could open the door to antitrust enforcement of harmful conduct that goes beyond the focus of the 2010 consent decree and 2020 amended consent decree. For example, Live Nation’s “durable” monopoly in primary ticketing—which is the wellspring of its incentive to exercise market power—remains unchecked. The company also controls an estimated 60% of the concert promotion market and is estimated to have exclusive contracts with about 70% of venues.

Moreover, since 2010, Ticketmaster has set up shop in the resale market, where it has amassed market share and risen to dominance. With $4.5 billion in revenue from resale in 2022, more than double what it earned in 2019, Ticketmaster has eclipsed many of its rivals. This array of dominant market positions means that Live Nation has incentives to limit competition in markets beyond the sale of ticketing services to independent venues. A hypothetical monopolization case against Live Nation could, therefore, refocus the lens on the unsolved problem of throttling independent venues. But it could also target Ticketmaster’s practices that restrain competition in the resale market.

Harms From Live Nation’s “Durable” Monopoly

Ticketmaster’s monopoly in primary ticketing drives the company’s incentive to exercise its market power, across the live events supply chain. For example, Live Nation prioritizes the venues they own and operate, at the expense of Independent venues. These venues, which have little to no choice in primary ticketing and are threatened with the loss of events, are forced to comply with Ticketmaster’s restrictive contracts. This includes requirements to bundle sports and concert tickets. Moreover, Ticketmaster’s practices that limit competition in the resale market are a form of “self-preferencing.” Fans are frustrated and discouraged from shopping in the resale market and, therefore, forced back to Ticketmaster’s dominant primary and secondary ticketing platforms to buy their tickets.

These restrictive practices harm artists, teams, venues, and fans. Independent venues are compelled to pass on monopoly service fees to fans, resulting in inflated ticket prices. Fans face high, and often duplicative ticket fees when they are driven back to Ticketmaster’s ticketing platforms. There, they are subjected to poor service and the scraping and harvesting of their personal data on concert attendance and other preferences. Artists lack bargaining power vis-à-vis Live Nation, which forces them into lopsided revenue-sharing agreements with venues. They also face exorbitant fees and commissions imposed by Live Nation, significantly diminishing their earnings from ticket and merchandising sales.

Artists’ lack of bargaining power garnered significant attention at the recent Senate Judiciary Committee hearing where singer-songwriter Clyde Lawrence testified, “Due to Live Nation’s control across the industry, we have practically no leverage in negotiating.” Even blockbuster artists like Taylor Swift, who is managed by AEG, must deal with Live Nation. Live Nation’s control of the venues on Swift’s Eras Tour meant AEG, which has its own ticketing service, had no choice but to ticket through Ticketmaster.

Aside from adverse effects on ticket prices and fees, Live Nation’s practices hamper quality and innovation in the live events markets. As is evident from the many crashes and glitches on Ticketmaster’s platform, monopolies have little to no incentive to innovate to produce high quality service or better distribution technology. Moreover, the specter of dealing with a monopolistic provider of services in the live events market can chill incentives for innovation in the creative arts.

New Concerns Around Ticketmaster’s Incursion Into the Resale Market

Regardless of individual opinion on the merits of the secondary ticket market, the reality is that it is the only source of competition for fans when they wish to “shop” for tickets. Indeed, a well-functioning secondary market produces efficiency benefits because it brings together artists and fans that would not otherwise be able to connect after a sale has been made on the primary market. There is ample evidence of Ticketmaster’s harmful practices for limiting competition in the resale market, which the company continues to pretextually justify as necessary to prevent alleged scalping and to protect fans.

For example, take ticket holdbacks and slow ticketing—the policies of releasing limited ticket inventory or releasing it slowly. This creates artificial scarcity and drives up ticket prices. How about restricted paperless ticketing, or Ticketmaster’s “SafeTix” service? This means tickets are only available on Ticketmaster’s smartphone app where the QR code changes frequently, making it harder for fans to use tickets purchased from other fans or from resellers who use competing marketplaces. Needless to say, rendering invalid a ticket that was initially sold by Ticketmaster and later resold by a marketplace is an abusive practice.

Then there is delayed ticket delivery, where fans do not receive their tickets until hours before an event, discouraging them from using competing resale services. Many fans have expressed frustration that their orders through a ticket reseller were “busted,” or cancelled, because Ticketmaster made the process of transferring tickets within the company’s proprietary app excessively difficult.

Finally, Ticketmaster requires resale ticket customers to disclose personal information to use tickets originally purchased from Ticketmaster. This expands Ticketmaster’s vast trove of consumer data, which the company can leverage via data analytics technology to steer fans to Ticketmaster services. All these restrictive policies have the effect of limiting competition in resale and driving fans back to Ticketmaster’s primary and secondary ticketing platforms. As fans lose confidence, they will eventually stop comparison shopping in the resale market and shop only with Ticketmaster.

Break Up What? Why Effective Remedies Target Incentives to Wield Market Power 

If and when DOJ files a monopolization case, we will know what Live Nation practices the government alleges to be illegal. Only then can a serious discussion about specific remedies begin. But we do know a few things right now. First, more conduct remedies are unlikely. Rules that constrain how a monopoly runs its business do nothing to eliminate powerful economic incentives to exercise market power. Moreover, smaller competitors and customers, who are often the best source of intel about potential violations of the consent decree, fear retaliation. So, they keep quiet. Ticketmaster’s historical conduct shows why behavioral remedies do not work. Indeed, as DOJ’s 2020 investigation revealed, Live Nation proved its willingness to breach its commitments and found ways to work around the rules.

Most important, Live Nation may not even have to violate the restrictions in the consent decree to exercise its market power. It is so dominant that smaller rivals simply “fall in line.” This silent threat is perhaps the most pernicious result of Live Nation’s monopolization, and was thoroughly explored by lawmakers and witnesses at the Senate Judiciary Committee hearing on Ticketmaster.

Second, we know enough about Live Nation’s practices and policies to suggest what types of antitrust remedies would be most effective in restoring competition in the live events markets. There have been amorphous calls for breaking up Live Nation, but no specifics. Specifics are important in antitrust enforcement because remedies directly target a firm’s incentive to exercise market power. To answer this critical question, we look again to the major source of Live Nation’s market power—Ticketmaster’s dominance in the primary ticketing market.

Break-Up Remedy #1: Taking Another Run at Live Nation’s Efforts to Throttle Independent Venues

For example, Ticketmaster’s control of primary ticketing creates the ability and strong incentive for Live Nation to disadvantage independent venues. Forcing independent venues into purchasing Ticketmaster’s ticketing services is easy because venues have few alternatives. Threatening independent venues is also profitable because any revenue Live Nation loses by denying independent venues events is more than regained by monopoly markups on service and ticket fees.

Only a complete divestiture of Ticketmaster would eliminate Live Nation’s ability and incentive to throttle independent venues. Post-divestiture, independent venues could choose a ticketing platform that meets their needs, without the threats of retaliation that DOJ’s most recent investigation exposed. Entry into the ticketing market by competitors would also be easier and new entrants that offer better ticketing platforms could become viable challengers.

Break-Up Remedy #2: Dismantling Ticketmaster’s Efforts to Stifle Resale

What about antitrust remedies to restore competition in the resale market? With almost complete control of the primary ticketing market and now also a dominant position in resale, Ticketmaster has powerful incentives to frustrate competition from resellers and drive fans back to its own ticketing platforms. Squeezing out rival resellers is profitable, as demonstrated Ticketmaster’s myriad practices for shutting down competition.

For example, Ticketmaster has little to lose from cutting off resellers that buy primary tickets from Ticketmaster. Any losses would be more than made up on higher fees on primary tickets purchased directly by fans, who have few alternatives to Ticketmaster. For tickets that are sold by fans on resale platforms, Ticketmaster’s efforts to stifle competition are essentially costless because the original ticket has already been sold. So, forcing fans back to Ticketmaster’s primary and secondary ticketing platforms, with high and often duplicative fees, is lucrative indeed.

Ticketmaster’s strategy to leverage its primary market dominance into the secondary market has been a success. And while some have suggested a prohibition on Ticketmaster engaging in resale, this would do nothing to eliminate its incentive to use its dominance in primary ticketing to restrain competition in resale. A remedy that would fully restore competition is breaking up Ticketmaster into a number of smaller entities, just as AT&T was broken up into “baby Bells” in the 1984 consent decree.

Breaking up Ticketmaster would loosen its monopoly grip on primary ticketing and reduce the market share held by any one entity to competitive levels. Without the power of a monopoly, post-breakup competitors in primary ticketing would lack the ability to force use of their own ticketing platforms because they would risk losing substantial sales to other primary ticketing options that do not impose such restrictions. As a result, a larger number of smaller competitors would have incentives to compete, on the merits, in both primary and secondary ticketing.

Bootstrapping Antitrust with Good Legislation

To recap, a hypothetical antitrust remedy that fully restores competition lost because of Live Nation’s known anticompetitive practices would require two major divestments. One is to break off, or separate, Ticketmaster from Live Nation and the second is to reduce Ticketmaster’s dominance by breaking it up into smaller, standalone companies. A major part of any such structural remedy would be identifying viable buyers for divested Ticketmaster assets. Looking to existing resellers or other live events market participants as potential buyers would be a critical part of this process.

What do these developments mean for tackling the Live Nation monopoly? An immediate implication is that effective antitrust remedies should be the first stop on the pathway to restoring competition lost by Live Nation’s restrictive practices. Legislative proposals to limit ticket transferability or regulate resale prices are no substitute for restructuring Live Nation. And they could have detrimental effects on the operation of resale markets that are designed to increase accessibility by fans, artists, and teams.

While structural antitrust remedies should be the tip of the spear in re-injecting competition in the live events markets that have been debilitated by Live Nation, some legislative proposals could serve to bootstrap them. For example, California SB829 would prohibit the ticketing provider’s use of exclusive contracts with venues, a favored tactic of Live Nation’s. The bill would allow, though not require, venues to contract with more than one ticketing company.

A test case for this type of policy is the Los Angeles venue, Crypto.com Arena—home to both the Lakers, ticketed by Ticketmaster, and the Clippers, ticketed by AXS. A recent survey revealed that Ticketmaster’s fees on primary tickets for NBA Lakers games are higher than AXS’s fees on Clippers tickets. But they are not as high as Ticketmaster’s average fees for other NBA tickets—supporting the idea that non-exclusive contracting can help discipline competition.

Other bills that have been proposed, like Colorado’s SB23-060, would have had the opposite effect. Under current law, Colorado protects ticket transferability and, therefore, competition in resale markets. In its original form, SB23-060 would have largely granted primary ticketing companies the power to enforce whatever terms and conditions they applied to tickets, including prohibiting transferability. Prohibitions on ticket transferability, of course, would effectively shut down the resale markets and the benefits it offers to artists and fans alike. The bill was rightly vetoed by Colorado’s governor at the urging of consumer advocacy organizations, citing potential competitive harms.

There are also several proposals at the federal level. Some would be helpful to competition while other would be harmful. Take the Better Oversight of Stub Sales (BOSS) and Strengthening Well Informed and Fair Transactions for Audiences of Concert Ticketing (SWIFT) Act (H.R. 3360), and the Unlock Ticketing Markets Act (S. 1321). Among other things, BOSS and SWIFT would protect ticket transferability and, therefore, the viability of the secondary market. These bills also rein in practices such as opaque pricing and ticket inventory strategies that harm consumers. S. 1321 seeks to eliminate exclusive contracts, albeit through different means than the California proposals. Other federal proposals seek to enshrine terms and conditions into law that give artists, venues, or the ticketer the ability to limit competition through transferability restrictions, price controls, or other means. Such proposals would ultimately further consolidate market power in the supply chain, to the detriment of fans.

Revitalizing Structural Remedies for Monopolies

A breakup remedy in a successful government monopolization case against Live Nation would revitalize the use of structural remedies to prevent dominant firms from using their market power to limit competition. Structural remedies in Section 2 cases have rarely been used. But their success in restoring competition in the wake of cases like U.S. v. AT&T demonstrate their value. In an era of intense non-bipartisanship, it will be important to generate unified political support for a monopolization case against Live Nation and a carefully crafted structural remedy that re-injects competition into the live events markets. A successful structural remedy here would also pave the way in the courts for similar remedies, when needed, in future Section 2 cases.

The good news is that, unlike other antitrust cases, breaking up Live Nation has overwhelming bipartisan support. This was abundantly clear at the Senate Judiciary Committee’s recent hearing. Bipartisan support was also evident in letters to DOJ from the Subcommittee on Competition Policy, Antitrust, & Consumer Rights leadership, Chairwoman Senator Amy Klobuchar and Ranking Member Senator Mike Lee. To borrow a sports metaphor, DOJ has a slam dunk of a case to break up Live Nation and Ticketmaster, and the fans are on their side.

Access the commentary PDF.

For more information, please contact:

Diana Moss, President, American Antitrust Institute at: (202) 828-1226 or dmoss@antitrustinstitute.org

by on July 10, 2023

New Report by AAI, UC Berkeley and Equitable Growth Calls Attention to Private Equity’s Voracious Acquisition of Physician Practices

The American Antitrust Institute (AAI), in collaboration with the University of California at Berkeley (UCB) Petris Center on Health Care Markets and Consumer Welfare, and the Washington Center for Equitable Growth (Equitable Growth), announced the release of a new report on private equity ownership in healthcare.

The report, Monetizing Medicine: Private Equity and Competition in Physician Practice Markets, highlights private equity’s voracious acquisition of physician practices over the last several years. The analysis evaluates market penetration across 10 physician practice specialties within markets across the U.S., the impact on market shares and concentration, and on prices and expenditures.

Lead author on the report, Professor Richard Scheffler, Distinguished Professor of Health Economics and Public Policy, and Director of the Petris Center at UCB, noted “This report provides convincing evidence that incentives to put profits before patients have grown stronger with an increase in private equity ownership of physician practices. This will fundamentally change the way medicine is practiced.”

The report’s findings should draw significant attention by competition enforcers and healthcare policymakers. For example, the number of private equity acquisitions of physician practices has grown six-fold between 2012 and 2021. Some markets have been highly penetrated by private equity, with a single private equity firm holding more than 30% in one or more physician specialties. The study compares price increases in those markets to all markets and finds they are almost 1.5 to over 3 times higher. This is true for key areas of medicine, including: gastroenterology, dermatology and obstetrics & gynecology. Results for price increases across other physician practices featuring private equity ownership can be found in the full report.

The policy implications surrounding the report’s analysis of private equity ownership of physician practices are significant. Report co-author, Laura Alexander, Director of Markets and Competition Policy at Equitable Growth explained: “Our findings underline the vast implications that rapid, stealth consolidation of physician markets by private equity funds have had for competition, patients, and anyone who pays for healthcare practices. It’s clear that there is a need for attention and action from competition enforcers and policymakers to address these accelerating acquisitions.”

The report clearly frames a set of immediate policy steps that would strengthen competition enforcement and healthcare policy in physician practice markets. For example, reporting and scrutiny of small healthcare provider acquisitions, particularly by private equity funds. Key adjustments to the Hart Scott Rodino (HSR) Act reporting requirements would support stronger antitrust enforcement. Mandatory reporting to increase transparency of ownership of physician practices is also critical. Other policy implications include closing regulatory loopholes that distort competition in healthcare and expanding liability to private equity funds for misconduct by portfolio companies.

Finally, the analysis in the report should draw needed attention to lowering barriers to entry in concentrated physician markets and developing additional funding sources for capital investments. Diana Moss, President of AAI, noted “The report makes clear that physicians need more options for restructuring their practices so they can continue to do what they do best–practice medicine. Selling out to private equity or other large corporate entities shouldn’t be the only options on the table.”

Funding for the project was generously provided by Arnold Ventures. The report was authored by: Richard M. Scheffler, PhD, Distinguished Professor of Health Economics and Public Policy; Director of the Nicholas C. Petris Center on Health Care Markets and Consumer Welfare, University of California, Berkeley; Laura Alexander, JD, Director of Markets and Competition, Washington Center for Equitable Growth; Brent D. Fulton, PhD, MBA, Associate Research Professor of Health Economics and Policy; Associate Director of the Petris Center; Daniel R. Arnold, PhD, Assistant Research Economist; Research Director of the Petris Center; and Ola A. Abdelhadi, PhD, Post-doctoral Scholar, Petris Center.

Resources:
Read the full report
Read the addenda
Read the full report and addenda

For further information, please contact:
Richard Scheffler (UCB): 510-508-5079, rscheff@berkeley.edu
Laura Alexander (Equitable Growth): 202-276-4050, lalexander@equitablegrowth.org
Randy Stutz (AAI): 202-828-1226, rstutz@antitrustinstitute.org
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