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Home / Work Products

by on May 4, 2022

Litigation Funding Is Changing the Contours of Antitrust Class Actions in the U.S. and Abroad

In this episode, AAI Vice President of Policy Laura Alexander discusses third-party litigation funding and its impact on private antitrust class actions with two experts in the field, one of the country’s foremost litigators of antitrust class actions and a representative from a leading litigation funder with deep experience in antitrust. Antitrust class actions are expensive to bring and prosecute. Historically, plaintiffs’ lawyers have used their own assets and traditional bank loans to finance them, in a high-risk/high-reward business model.  In the last decade, however, an alternative funding model has emerged: litigation funding firms have begun financing plaintiff-side antitrust litigation for profit using non-recourse debt, shifting risk and reward from the lawyers to the funders and, in the process, changing the landscape of private antitrust litigation and class actions. The conversation starts with a primer on litigation funding, and goes on to discuss how funding decisions factor into leadership and settlement dynamics, how litigation funding impacts which cases are brought and who brings them, and how monetization of claims is changing incentives for opt outs and what that might portend for class actions. Finally, the episode concludes with an analysis of the different role that litigation funding plays in collective actions abroad, and what lessons we might draw from foreign jurisdictions for funding class actions in the U.S.

MODERATOR:

Laura Alexander, Vice President of Policy, American Antitrust Institute

 

GUESTS:

Bill Isaacson is a partner in the Litigation Department at Paul Weiss and widely considered one of the preeminent litigators of his generation. A Fellow in the American College of Trial Lawyers, Bill was named “Litigator of the Year” in 2016 by The American Lawyer. Bill has tried cases in a number of areas, including contract, commercial torts, copyright, international arbitration and antitrust. In antitrust, Bill has successfully represented both plaintiffs and defendants in major antitrust litigations; of the approximately dozen federal antitrust class actions that have gone to trial and judgment in this century, he has tried five of them, winning verdicts in each case.

 

 

Dai Wai Chin Feman is the Director of Commercial Litigation Strategies at litigation funding firm Parabellum Capital. Recognized as one of 100 global leaders in legal finance by LawDragon, Dai Wai is a frequent speaker and writer on cutting-edge issues in the litigation finance industry. Dai Wai is a member of the US Regional Committee of the International Legal Finance Association, served as one of two industry members of the New York City Bar Association’s Litigation Funding Working Group, is a member of the New York City Bar Association’s Professional Ethics Committee, and participated on the Uniform Law Commission’s Third-Party Funding of Litigation Study Committee. Prior to joining Parabellum, Dai Wai was a litigation partner at Dorsey & Whitney LLP, where he specialized in commercial and antitrust litigation.

 

 

 

by on April 27, 2022

AAI Amicus Briefs Help Deliver Two Important Antitrust Victories in 9th Circuit

On April 26 and April 8, 2022, the Ninth Circuit, aided by AAI amicus briefs, handed victories to antitrust plaintiffs in two important cases involving platform markets and class certification, respectively, The PLS.com, LLC v. National Association of Realtors and Olean Wholesale Grocery Cooperative, Inc. v. Bumble Bee Foods, LLC (en banc).

In The PLS.com v. National Association of Realtors, a unanimous panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in favor of plaintiffs, reversing a district court opinion that held PLS had failed to state a claim against the National Association of Realtors (NAR).  Before it was driven from the market by NAR’s conduct, PLS offered an alternative real estate listing service to NAR’s MLS, targeting listings with limited information, so-called pocket listings.  AAI’s amicus brief argued two important points.  First, antitrust plaintiffs are only required to allege harm to competition and direct purchasers from conduct, and are not required also to allege harm to end consumers.  Second, AAI argued that the presence of network effects does not excuse exclusionary conduct by platforms.

The Ninth Circuit accepted both arguments.  First, the panel held that in an antitrust context, “the term ‘consumer’ is not limited to ‘ultimate consumers.”  Real estate agents, who are the buyers of network listing services are also consumers in an antitrust case.  Second, as urged by AAI, the court rejected NAR’s argument that the presence of network effects implied that consumers would be better off with a single listing platform (NAR’s MLS) than multiple competing platforms.  The opinion mirrored AAI’s argument in its brief that such an argument is directly contrary to the purpose of the antitrust laws and that consumers, not NAR, should be allowed to choose which products they prefer.  If NAR’s arguments about the consumer benefits of its MLS were correct, then they would be a basis on which NAR could compete, not a basis for excluding its competitors.

The district court had also dismissed PLS’s claims on the basis that they failed to satisfy Ohio v. American Express (“Amex”).  Specifically, the district court held that “PLS does not allege a plausible injury to participants on both sides of the market…both home sellers and home buyers.”  On appeal, PLS argued that AmEx does not apply at the motion to dismiss stage or to networks that do not involve simultaneous transactions and that, in any event, it had alleged harm to both sides of the market.  While AAI did not brief the Amex issues, the Ninth Circuit’s decision largely followed AAI’s work on Amex in other cases.

The Ninth Circuit held that Amex can apply at the pleading stage in certain rule of reason cases based on indirect evidence of anticompetitive effects, but that market definition (and, therefore, satisfaction of the Amex requirements for market definition) is never required for rule of reason claims based on direct evidence.  Because PLS’s pleading of its claim based on indirect evidence satisfied Amex’s requirements, even if Amex did apply, the court found it unnecessary to decide “the more difficult questions the parties raise about how broadly the Amex decision applies.” Importantly, in holding that PLS had satisfied Amex by pleading harm to both buyers and sellers of homes, the court went out of its way to note that “Amex does not require a plaintiff to allege harm to participants on both sides of the market. All Amex held is that to establish that a practice is anticompetitive in certain two-sided markets, the plaintiff must establish an anticompetitive impact on the ‘market as a whole.’”

In Olean Wholesale Grocery Cooperative, Inc. v. Bumble Bee Foods, LLC, a district court certified three classes of purchasers, including direct purchasers and two groups of indirect purchasers, seeking to recover for the confessed criminal price fixing of the three leading producers of packaged tuna, Bumble Bee Foods LLC, Starkist, and Chicken of the Sea (“Tuna Suppliers”).  In opposition to class certification, the Tuna Suppliers introduced rebuttal experts seeking to counter plaintiffs’ expert statistical analysis attempting to show that the price fixing caused widespread injury across the respective classes.  The district court held a three-day evidentiary hearing and weighed the competing expert opinions, finding plaintiffs’ experts more persuasive. It held that plaintiffs’ common statistical evidence of impact was sufficient to help satisfy Rule 23’s predominance requirement, though it allowed that defendants could still challenge the admissibility and probative value of the evidence at trial.

On interlocutory appeal, the Tuna Suppliers, supported by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the Washington Legal Foundation, argued that the district court erred by refusing to definitively resolve the battle of the experts at class certification, and that plaintiffs’ expert’s statistical analysis was inherently problematic because it relied on the average overcharges to the classes, thereby masking the possibility that some of the class members were uninjured by the price fixing.  The Tuna Suppliers maintained that, because plaintiffs’ expert evidence could not necessarily sustain a jury finding for every class member, it should not be a permissible means of establishing that common questions would predominate at a class trial.

In an amicus brief submitted last August, AAI argued that such evidence need only be relevant and reliable to be admissible; it does not have to assure that each plaintiff would prevail on the merits of the impact element in an individual action. Rule 23 requires only that common “questions” must predominate over individual questions at trial; it cannot be read to suggest that the questions’ answers must be determined as a prerequisite to class certification. Moreover, any uninjured class members may be identified after trial, and longstanding case law prevents defendants from capitalizing on the uncertainty created by their own illegal conduct, including uncertain damages calculations.

The AAI brief also argued that the court should unequivocally reject the defendants’ effort to cast categorical doubt on statistical analysis, and specifically regression modelling, in antitrust cases.  Regression models frequently rely on averaging techniques, but that is not where they begin and end.  Such models are routinely accepted as reliable methods of proving widespread injury to antitrust classes because econometric techniques can control for price changes caused by supply and demand factors and then focus on the uniformity of differences across class members to reliably show common impact.

All three judges on the merits panel adopted the position advocated by AAI in rejecting defendants’ categorical arguments on the use of statistical analysis and regression modeling to prove class-wide impact in antitrust cases.  However, the three judges sided with defendants in holding that the district court erred by refusing to resolve the disagreement among the parties’ experts over the number of potentially uninjured members in the class.  And the panel then split over the standard for determining whether the presence of uninjured class members may defeat predominance.  The panel majority concluded that the district court, before certifying a class, must find that only a “de minimis” number of class members are uninjured. Judge Hurwitz, partially dissenting, maintained that neither the text of Rule 23 nor Ninth Circuit precedent permit the court to implement such a requirement.

In the aftermath of the panel opinion and partial dissent, neither party petitioned for panel or en banc rehearing, instead agreeing to accept remand.  However, the court sua sponte ordered briefing on whether en banc hearing was warranted, and on August 3, 2021, it ordered rehearing.  In a merits brief before the en banc Court, AAI argued that the defendants’ proposed predominance standard would undermine antitrust policy while contravening Supreme Court precedent, Ninth Circuit precedent, and the text of Rule 23.

The AAI en banc brief emphasized, first, that defendants’ proposed de minimis standard is inappropriate because, in many cases, common issues will predominate regardless of whether more than a de minimis percentage of class members were uninjured. Second, a de minimis rule does not follow from Article III standing doctrine, which is jurisdictional.  Federal courts do not need to determine whether injury has occurred on the merits to determine whether they have the power to adjudicate the issue of injury.  Third, Rule 23 does not require merits determinations, or resolving the battle of the experts, to assess whether class plaintiffs are capable of establishing injury using common evidence.  According to binding precedent, plaintiffs’ evidence is sufficient if it could sustain a jury verdict.

On April 8, 2022, the en banc court affirmed the district court’s certification of all three classes, implicitly crediting and accepting numerous arguments put forward in the AAI brief. Like the merits panel, the en banc court flatly rejected the Tuna Suppliers’ argument that regression models involving “averaging assumptions” are inherently unreliable, noting that such approaches are widely accepted as a reliable econometric technique in antirust cases and are permissible under Tyson Foods.  Moreover, the court was not persuaded by the Tuna Suppliers’ contention that averaging masked impact insofar as the price-fixed products at issue here were susceptible to individualized negotiations and differences in bargaining power among customers.  The court held it is “both logical and plausible” to conclude “that the conspiracy artificially inflated the baseline for price negotiations.”

Accepting one of AAI’s principal arguments, the en banc court also rejected the Tuna Suppliers’ attack on the plausibility of plaintiffs’ use of averaging as applied to certain individual class members.  The court held that the Tuna Suppliers’ argument “improperly conflates the question whether evidence is capable of proving an issue on a class-wide basis with the question whether the evidence is persuasive.” The court explained that “the question is whether each member of the class can rely on [the expert’s] model to show antitrust impact of any amount.” Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that each member could.

The court added, importantly, that “[w]hile individualized differences among the overcharges imposed on each purchaser may require a court to determine damages on an individualized basis, such a task would not undermine the regression model’s ability to provide evidence of common impact.” The court therefore rejected the Tuna Suppliers’ argument that the regression model could not “sustain liability in individual proceedings” on the question of impact in satisfaction of the Tyson Foods standard.

The court also considered and rejected the Tuna Suppliers’ contention that the district court was required to make a merits determination on whether the plaintiffs’ expert’s model was correct to ensure it did not improperly certify a class in which some members lack Article III standing. The court explained that “the class did not have to ‘first establish that it will win the fray’ in order to gain certification under Rule 23(b)(3).” Rather, it was sufficient that the district court determined the plaintiffs’ expert’s pooled regression model “was capable of showing that the DPP class members suffered antitrust impact on a class-wide basis, notwithstanding [the defense expert’s] critique.” The court reasoned that, while “[r]easonable minds may differ” as to whether plaintiffs’ expert’s evidence “is probative,” “that is a question of persuasiveness for the jury once the evidence is sufficient to satisfy Rule 23.”

On the question of how Article III standing doctrine applies to the predominance inquiry at class certification, the court held that it did not need to reach the issue because the plaintiffs made the requisite showing that all class members had standing.  However, it held, with respect to the presence of uninjured class members generally, that “courts must apply Rule 23(b)(3) on a case-by-case basis, rather than rely on a per se rule that a class cannot be certified if it includes more than a de minimis number of uninjured class members.” The court acknowledged, however, that the Supreme Court’s recent decision in TransUnion v. Ramirez expressly left open the question whether every class member must demonstrate Article III standing before a court certifies a class.

Judge Lee dissented from the en banc court’s opinion, joined by Judge Kleinfeld.  The two dissenting judges believed the district court’s Rule 23 gatekeeper role required it to resolve the the uninjured class member question and deny certification if the number of uninjured class members is more than de minimis.

AAI’s amicus program is a key component of fulfilling AAI’s mission of promoting competition that protects consumers, businesses, and society. Comments on AAI amicus briefs or suggestions for AAI amicus participation should be directed to Randy Stutz, rstutz@antitrustinstitute.org, (202) 905-5420.

 

 

by on April 27, 2022

AAI Advisor Robert Taylor Issues New Analysis on the Market Power Problem in Beef, Lays Out New Policy Framework for Ensuring Competition and Fairness in Cattle and Beef Markets

Today, AAI Advisor and agricultural economist, C. Robert Taylor (Alfa Professor Emeritus in the College of Agriculture, Auburn University) issued the new report Harvested Cattle, Slaughtered Markets?

In this seminal report, Professor Taylor explains that cattle and beef production is increasingly horizontally concentrated and vertically integrated, from cattle feedlots to packers/processors to beef retailers. Although size and integration may lead to economic efficiencies, narrowly defined, they may also be a deadly combination that lead to abuses of market power and many undesirable market and externality consequences, including an illusion of choice for consumers, unfairness and harm to the competitive process. He highlights the current challenge of developing appropriate policy to neutralize the potential for market power exploitation, to internalize externalities, to insure or even increase efficiency by adoption of technology, and to insure competition and fairness in the future.

In the report, Professor Taylor analyzes the market power of the four largest beef packers and its relationship to certain contractual and trading markets practices. In particular, the report explores certain current market practices that may undermine fair and competitive markets, and harm competition as an active, dynamic process. These practices include, among others: (1) overreliance on Alternative Marketing Arrangements (AMA) base prices tied to the residual cash market; (2) the opacity of and variability around what “live cattle” is being priced in the markets; (3) limited depth and competitiveness in certain cash negotiated markets; (4) the risks of market manipulation arising from captive supply flexibility by dominant packers and/or large captive feeders; (5) preferential deals; and (6) partial vertical integration by dominant firms.

The report explains that since the advent of AMAs, tens of millions of taxpayer dollars have been spent by academic and government economists studying cattle markets. All reflect an “ideology,” over-simplified economic models, largely untested but critical assumptions, standards of statistical significance that may not be appropriate for policy prescription, and limited as well as sometimes inaccurate data. Professor Taylor emphasizes that restoring competition and fairness to cattle and beef markets requires moving policy beyond a number of prevailing assumptions and conventions. These include narrow economic ideology and hidden value judgments inherent in oft-cited academic studies of cattle and beef markets. Moving policy beyond textbook models of monopsony and monopoly is also vital, due to the dominance of complex giant transnational corporations with vast webs of corporate legal entities and financing and risk sharing arrangements offered only to a few aligned businesses.

The report concludes with analysis of several pathways for change, including: modest reforms, breaking up the giant corporations; developing and protecting a parallel system; and exchange trading.

by on April 25, 2022

AAI Says FERC Should Act Quickly to Update Natural Gas Facilities Certification Policy to Protect Competition and Consumers

AAI filed comments today in Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Docket No. PL18-1-001, a proceeding designed to update the Commission’s over two-decade old policy regarding certification of new interstate natural gas facilities. AAI’s comments focus exclusively on how the Commission’s policy of relying on so-called Affiliate Precedent Agreements (APAs) as evidence of “need” for certificating natural gas facilities raise potentially serious competition and consumers concerns around “regulatory evasion” or “self-dealing.” AAI’s comments explain that such conduct can impair competition and result in higher prices of essential natural gas and electricity, to the detriment of consumers.

AAI’s comments state that updated, strong, and comprehensive Commission policy governing reliance on APAs as evidence of project need is critical to the agency’s mandate to promote competition and protect consumers. AAI’s comments address two major issues. First, addressing the potentially harmful effects of APAs, especially against the backdrop of changes in energy markets and broader concerns over declining competition, should be high priority for the Commission. Second, there are important additional informational requirements, not included in FERC’s most recent Draft Policy Statement, that should be considered in promulgating accurate, comprehensive, and strong policy to address the potential adverse effects of APAs.

AAI’s comments urge the Commission to act expeditiously in producing binding, updated policy containing an accurate analytical framework to address the potential harmful effects of APAs and the agency’s reliance on them as evidence of project need.

 

by on April 21, 2022

AAI Provides Comprehensive Look at Merger Policy to Assist Federal Agencies in Updating Guidelines

AAI has submitted a response to a request for information from the Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice (“Agencies”) to assist the Agencies in updating their merger guidelines. 

AAI’s response to the request for information addresses both overarching aspects of merger policy and specific aspects and omissions from the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines currently in effect. (The 2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines are no longer endorsed by both agencies). AAI’s response begins by discussing key principles for an effective review and drafting process and then provides detailed legal, economic, and policy analysis of nine major issues that are particularly important for the Agencies to consider in updating and strengthening their merger guidelines, which implicate a critical area of antitrust enforcement. 

On January 18, 2022, the FTC and DOJ announced that they were launching an inquiry into antitrust enforcement against illegal mergers.  As part of the inquiry, which was encouraged by President Biden’s Executive Order on Promoting Competition in the American Economy, the Agencies issued a detailed request for information addressing potential updates to the Agencies’ merger guidelines. 

AAI’s response to the request examines a series of substantive considerations the Agencies should consider and address, including the following:

  1. Accounting for mergers that are part of a trend toward concentration but that may not be individually concentrative in isolation
  2. Accounting for merging parties’ past antitrust violations—whether for collusion or monopolization—in predicting the effects of their mergers
  3. Clarifying the probative value of various forms of evidence, viewed both individually and collectively, including evidence of non-price effects, intent evidence, and evidence of post-merger effects in addressing consummated mergers
  4. Accounting for the buyer power and labor-market effects of mergers, countervailing power as a merger defense, and how to evaluate divergent pro- and anticompetitive effects found on the buy-side and sell-side of a market or across different markets
  5. Accounting for special complexities accompanying mergers involving digital business ecosystems
  6. Accounting for mergers involving two-sided simultaneous transaction platforms as defined by the Supreme Court in Ohio v. American Express
  7. Updating competitive effects theories to account for nascent competitor acquisitions and mergers facilitating information exchange
  8. Accounting for empirical and other trends in merging firms’ failure to realize claimed efficiencies
  9. Considering how remedies factor into appropriate merger guidance.

by on April 12, 2022

AAI Reviews Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson’s Antitrust and Class Action Record, Explores Competition Policy Implications of Her Supreme Court Appointment

AAI has published a commentary reviewing the newest Supreme Court justice’s career encounters with antitrust law, competition policy, and complex civil litigation generally. 

Justice Jackson has presided in Section 7 cases under the Clayton Act, cases involving technical Hart Scott Rodino violations, and antitrust discovery disputes.  She has also addressed competition policy issues in RICO and agricultural commodities cases, and she has resolved several class-certification disputes in consolidated actions brought under other federal statutes. 

During her time at the U.S. Sentencing Commission, Justice Jackson served as Vice Chair when the Commission reviewed the adequacy of the Sentencing Guidelines’ recommendations for cartel fines.  She also clerked for Justice Breyer during an important term in which the Court considered whether to hear a direct appeal of the Microsoft case and heard argument and issued a decision in the California Dental case.  In both cases, Justice Breyer issued a dissent.

The commentary notes that if Justice Jackson fits a similar mold as Justice Breyer, as many predict, she is less likely to be a strong champion of progressive antitrust and more likely to be a pragmatic moderate who carefully balances administrability considerations against the procompetitive objectives of the law.  Regardless, barring significant Court reform measures, the lopsided conservative majority on the current Court ultimately may limit her ability to meaningfully shape antitrust jurisprudence.

by on April 5, 2022

AAI Letter to DOJ Says Merger of Ultra-Low-Cost Carriers Spirit and Frontier Risks Higher Fares and Ancillary Fees, and Lower Service Quality

AAI sent a letter to Jonathan Kanter, AAG, U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Division to present analysis supporting the concern that the proposed merger of Spirit Airlines and Frontier Airlines eliminates important competition at the national level and in numerous airport-pair markets for scheduled air passenger service. The threatened loss of competition would likely be felt by consumers in the form of higher airfares, higher ancillary fees, and lower quality service. Moreover, AAI analysis based on publicly available information casts serious doubt on Spirit-Frontier’s efficiency claims, and notes that remedial slot and gate divestitures used in past airline mergers are unlikely to be effective. AAI’s letter urges the DOJ to carefully consider moving to block the merger.

The letter explains that the proposed merger is the first merger of two major U.S. ultra-low-cost (ULC) airlines. ULC carriers operate different airline networks and employ different revenue models than the legacy airlines that have featured in previous major mergers. Spirit and Frontier have a demonstrated track record of inconsistent exit and entry in airport-pair markets and poor service quality. Moreover, the two carriers serve price-sensitive consumers that are often traveling to and from destinations where there is no choice of airport and little choice of alternative carriers. These unique features pose novel challenges for the Antitrust Division’s review of the merger.

by on March 29, 2022

Invigorating Antitrust Enforcement: A Conversation With Carl Shapiro

In this episode Diana Moss sits down with Carl Shapiro, Distinguished Professor of the Graduate School at the Haas School of Business and the Department of Economics at the University of California at Berkeley, to unpack the debate over the role of antitrust and how to invigorate enforcement of the antitrust laws in the United States. In framing the dialog over where antitrust should go, they create a multi-faceted conversation that reveals why competition is a broader and important public policy issue for a market-based economy and democratic society. Major themes include the controversy over indicators of declining competition, recent changes to the antitrust ideological spectrum, proposed legislative reforms to the antitrust laws, revisions to the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, and the challenges that face the Biden antitrust chiefs at the U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Division and Federal Trade Commission. These threshold questions have critical implications for the effectiveness of antitrust enforcement moving forward in promoting competition and for protecting consumers and workers.

MODERATOR:

Diana Moss, President, American Antitrust Institute

GUEST:

Carl Shapiro is Distinguished Professor of the Graduate School at the Haas School of Business and the Department of Economics at the University of California at Berkeley. He also is the Transamerica Professor of Business Strategy Emeritus at the Haas School of Business. Shapiro served as a Senate-confirmed Member of the President’s Council of Economic Advisers during 2011-12.

For the two years immediately prior to that, he was the Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Economics at the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice; he also held that position during 1995-96. From 1998 to 2008, Shapiro served as Director of the Institute of Business and Economic Research at UC Berkeley. He has been Editor and Co-Editor of the Journal of Economic Perspectives and is co-author, with Hal R. Varian, of Information Rules: A Strategic Guide to the Network Economy.

 

 

by on March 14, 2022

Wisconsin Assistant AG for Antitrust Cooley Takes on the “State” of State Antitrust Enforcement

In this episode, AAI Vice President of Competition Laura Alexander and Gwendolyn Cooley, Wisconsin’s Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust and Chair of the Multistate Antitrust Task Force for the National Association of Attorneys General discuss the state of state antitrust enforcement.  The conversation covers “antitrust federalism” and the current relationship between state and federal antitrust enforcers, unique hurdles faced by state antitrust enforcers, the special expertise state enforcers bring to antitrust enforcement, and the priorities of states in enforcing state and federal antitrust laws.  State antitrust enforcers have been leading the charge on everything from non-compete clauses to privacy, and with a reinvigoration of antitrust enforcement at the federal level, new avenues for cooperation and coordination are opening up for states to take on an even bigger role.

MODERATOR:

 Laura Alexander, Vice President of Policy, American Antitrust Institute

GUEST:

Gwendolyn Cooley is the Wisconsin Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust. As Chair of the NAAG Multistate Antitrust Task Force and as Wisconsin’s Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust since 2005, Gwendolyn has extensive experience litigating antitrust cases on behalf of the State of Wisconsin- including merger enforcement, cartel prosecutions, and as the lead attorney in State of Wisconsin v. Indivior, where she leads 42 Attorneys General in their case against the manufacturer of Suboxone. Gwendolyn was on the trial team for the States’ challenge to the T-Mobile/Sprint merger. She was co-chair of the Pharmaceutical Industry Working Group in the National Association of Attorneys General Antitrust Task Force, and is a delegate to the “Future of Pharma Mergers” multi-agency initiative spearheaded by the FTC, and leads the Reimagining Pharma Attorney Generals Advisory Group. Active in the American Bar Association, she is Co-Chair of the ABA’s Antitrust Law Section State Enforcement Committee, and is the 2017 recipient of the State State Bar of Wisconsin’s annual Government Lawyers Division Service Award.

by on March 3, 2022

AAI Senior Fellow Peter Carstensen Responds to Economic Research on Marketing of Beef Cattle, Says it Fails to Address Market Power and Buying Methods

In a recent article, Peter C. Carstensen, AAI Senior Fellow and Professor of Law Emeritus University of Wisconsin Law School, provides a critique of economic research on marketing of beef cattle. The article, “Dr. Pangloss as an Agricultural Economist,” responds to analysis included in The U.S. Beef Supply Chain: Issues and Challenges (Proceedings of Workshop of Cattle Markets, Kansas City, Missouri, June 3-4, 2021). 

In August of 2020, the then leadership of the House Agriculture Committee requested USDA to fund research on issues surrounding the marketing of beef cattle, including industry structure, barriers to entry, price discovery and methods to address deficiencies, and purchasing mandates.

Texas A&M University and its Agricultural and Food Policy Center carried out the project, which produced nine articles that present a “sustained, unreflective, Panglossian, defense of the status quo.” 

Professor Carstensen’s analysis reveals the central concern that, with minor exceptions, the articles in the proceedings fail to address the relationship between the market power of the packers and the choice of buying methods which might exploit that power by choosing the most anticompetitive method to accomplish efficiency enhancing goals.

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